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INTRODUCTION 
On June 6, 2013, the Washington Post and the Guardian captured 
public attention by reporting that the intelligence community was 
collecting large amounts of information about U.S. citizens.1 The 
National Security Agency (NSA) and Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion (FBI) were “tapping directly into the central servers of nine 
leading U.S. Internet companies, extracting audio, video, photo-
graphs, e-mails, documents and connection logs that enable ana-
lysts to track a person’s movements and contacts over time.”2 
In conjunction with the articles, the press published a series of 
PowerPoint slides attributed to the NSA, describing a program 
called “PRISM” (also known by its SIGAD, US-984XN).3 The title 
																																																																																																																						
 1. Barton Gellman & Laura Poitras, U.S., British intelligence mining data from nine 
U.S. Internet companies in broad secret program, WASH. POST, June 7, 2013, http:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-intelligence-mining-data-from-nine-
us-internet-companies-in-broad-secret-program/2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-cebf-11e2-
8845-d970ccb04497_story.html [http://perma.cc/Y6F2-3UHX]; Glen Greenwald & 
Ewen MacAskill, NSA Prism program taps in to user data of Apple, Google and others, 
GUARDIAN, June 6, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-
giants-nsa-data [http://perma.cc/G4AD-DA88]. 
 2. Gellman & Poitras, supra note 1. The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight 
Board later clarified, “Once foreign intelligence acquisition has been authorized 
under Section 702, the government sends written directives to electronic commu-
nication service providers compelling their assistance in the acquisition of com-
munications.” PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE SUR-
VEILLANCE PROGRAM OPERATED PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN 
INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT 7 (2014) [hereinafter PCLOB REPORT], available 
at http://www.pclob.gov/Library/702-Report-2.pdf [http://perma.cc/VJ76-Q4CL]. 
 3. PRISM/US-984XN Overview, April 2013, available at https://www.aclu.org/ 
files/natsec/nsa/20130816/PRISM%20Overview%20Powerpoint%20Slides.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/F5JZ-2GMD] [herinafter PRISM SLIDES]. A Signals Intelligence 
Activity Designator (SIGAD) is an alphanumeric designator that identifies a facili-
ty used for collecting Signals Intelligence (SIGINT). The facilities may be terrestri-
al (for example, connected to internet cables), sea-borne (for example, intercept 
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slide referred to it as the most used NSA SIGAD.4 The documents 
explained that PRISM draws from Microsoft, Google, Yahoo!, Fa-
cebook, PalTalk, YouTube, Skype, AOL, and Apple—some of the 
largest e-mail, social network, and communications providers—
making the type of information that could be obtained substantial: 
email, video and voice chat, videos, photos, stored data, VoIP, file 
transfers, video conferencing, notifications of target activity (for 
example, logins), social networking details, and special requests.5 
The slides noted that the program started in September 2007, with 
just one partner (Microsoft), gradually expanding to the most re-
cent company (Apple, added October 2012), and that the total cost 
of the program was $20 million per year.6 As of 2011, most of the 
more than 250 million Internet communications obtained each 
year by the NSA under Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (FISA) Amendments Act derived from PRISM.7 
A follow-up article two days later printed another slide depict-
ing both PRISM and “upstream” collection of communications on 
fiber cables and infrastructure (“[c]ollection directly from the 
servers of . . . U.S. Service Providers.”)8 Upstream interception al-
lowed the NSA to acquire Internet communications “as they 
																																																																																																																						
ships), or satellite stations. SIGADs are used to identify SIGINT stations operated 
the so-called “Five-Eyes” (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States). According to documents published in June 2013, as of 
March 2013 there were 504 active SIGADs. Glenn Greenwald & Ewen MacAskill, 
Boundless informant: the NSA’s secret tool to track global surveillance data, GUARDIAN, 
June 11, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/08/nsa-boundless-
informant-global-datamining [http://perma.cc/6HYJ-VHLY]. PRISM is the name 
by which the program was known inside the NSA. See PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBER-
TIES OVERSIGHT BD., PUBLIC HEARING REGARDING THE SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM 
OPERATED PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEIL-
LANCE ACT 3 (2014) [hereinafter PCLOB HEARING], available at http:// 
www.pclob.gov/Library/20140319-Transcript.pdf [http://perma.cc/GM4K-4Y99]. 
 4. PRISM SLIDES, supra note 3, at 1. 
 5. Id. at 2. 
 6. Id. at 3. 
 7. [Redacted], 2011 WL 10945618, at *9 (FISA Ct. Oct. 3, 2011). PCLOB later con-
firmed that as of mid-2011, approximately 91% of Internet communications obtained 
each year came through PRISM. PCLOB REPORT, supra note 2, at 34. 
 8. James Ball, NSA’s Prism surveillance program: how it works and what it can do, 
GUARDIAN, June 8, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/08/nsa-
prism-server-collection-facebook-google [http://perma.cc/TZ3R-NJTH] (including 
slide entitled FAA702 Operations). 
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transit the ‘internet backbone’ facilities.”9 The NSA could collect 
all traffic crossing Internet cables—not just information targeted at 
specific Internet Protocol (IP) addresses or telephone number. The 
potential yield was substantial: in the first six months of 2011, the 
NSA acquired more than 13.25 million Internet transactions 
through its upstream collection.10 The slide urged analysts to use 
both PRISM and upstream collection to obtain information.11 
Within days of the releases, the intelligence community 
acknowledged the existence of the programs.12 In August 2013 the 
Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, offered further 
confirmation, noting that PRISM had been in operation since 
Congress had passed the 2008 FISA Amendments Act.13 He de-
classified eight documents,14 and by the end of the month, he had 
announced that the intelligence community would release the to-
																																																																																																																						
 9. [Redacted], 2012 WL 9189263, at *1 (FISA Ct. Aug. 24, 2012), available at 
http://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/fisc0912.pdf [http://perma.cc/TP7C-JB9Q]; see also 
Raj De, Nat’l Sec. Agency Gen. Couns., Statement at the Privacy and Civil Liber-
ties Oversight Board: Public Hearing Regarding the Surveillance Program Oper-
ated Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 26 (Mar. 
19, 2014) (“Upstream collection refers to collection from the, for lack of a better 
phrase, Internet backbone rather than Internet service providers.”). 
 10. [Redacted], 2011 WL 10945618, at *10 n.26. 
 11. Id. 
 12. See How Disclosed NSA Programs Protect Americans, and Why Disclosure 
Aids Our Adversaries: Hearing Before the H. Permanent Select Comm. on Intelli-
gence, 113th Cong. (2013) (Statement of General Keith Alexander, Director of the 
National Security Agency). 
 13. Press Release, Office of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, DNI Declassifies Intel-
ligence Community Documents Regarding Collection under Section 702 of the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) (Aug. 21, 2013), http://www.dni.gov/ 
index.php/newsroom/press-releases/191-press-releases-2013/915-dni-declassifies-
intelligence-community-documents-regarding-collection-under-section-702-of-
the-foreign-intelligence-surveillance-act-fisa [http://perma.cc/LH9A-HKP2]; Cover 
Letter from James Clapper, Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, Announcing the Document 
Release (Aug. 21, 2013), http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/DNI%20Clapper 
%20Section%20702%20Declassification%20Cover%20Letter.pdf [http://perma.cc/ 
M62Q-36D5]. 
 14. Press Release, Office of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, supra note 13; Cover 
Letter from James Clapper, supra note 13 (declassifying two memorandum opin-
ions issued by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, communications be-
tween the Administration and Congress on the existence and operation of the 
programs, and the Section 702 minimization procedures). 
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tal number of Section 702 orders issued, and targets thereby af-
fected, on an annual basis.15 
Although much of the information about PRISM and upstream 
collection remains classified, what has been made public suggests 
that these programs push statutory language to its limit, even as 
they raise critical Fourth Amendment concerns.16 Accordingly, 
this Article proceeds in three Parts: the evolution of Section 702, a 
statutory analysis of PRISM and upstream collection, and the at-
tendant constitutional concerns. 
The Article begins by considering the origins of the current 
programs and the relevant authorities—particularly the transfer 
of part of the President’s Surveillance Program, instituted just af-
ter September 11, to the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
(FISA). It outlines the contours of the 2007 Protect America Act, 
before its replacement in 2008 by the FISA Amendments Act 
(FAA).17 The first Part ends with a brief discussion of the current 
																																																																																																																						
 15. Press Release, Office of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, DNI Clapper Directs 
Annual Release of Information Related to Orders Issued Under National Security 
Authorities (Aug. 29, 2013), http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/post/59719173750/ 
dni-clapper-directs-annual-release-of-information [http://perma.cc/AU38-AM4C]. 
The first such report, issued June 26, 2014, indicated that there was only one order 
annually issued under 702, affecting some 89,138 targets. See http:// 
icontherecord.tumblr.com/transparency/odni_transparencyreport_cy2013 [http:// 
perma.cc/FG3W-PTZQ]. 
 16. Some of the most important documents that have thus far been released in 
relation to this program include: Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Sec-
tion 702, 50 U.SC § 1881a (2012); NAT’L SEC. AGENCY/CENT. SEC. SERV., EXHIBIT A: 
PROCEDURES USED BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY FOR TARGETING NON-
UNITED STATES PERSONS REASONABLY BELIEVED TO BE LOCATED OUTSIDE THE 
UNITED STATES TO ACQUIRE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION PURSUANT TO 
SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978, AS 
AMENDED, (2007) [hereinafter NSA TARGETING PROCEDURES], available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/jun/20/exhibit-a-procedures-
nsa-document [http://perma.cc/E2NG-PU9P]. 
 17. For important contributions to the statutory and constitutional discussion of 
the FAA and the potential for further FISA reform prior to the release of the 
Snowden documents, see William C. Banks, Programmatic Surveillance and FISA: Of 
Needles in Haystacks, 88 TEXAS L. REV. 1633 (2010); Orin S. Kerr, Updating the For-
eign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 225 (2010); David S. Kris, Mod-
ernizing the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Progress to Date and Work Still to 
Come, in LEGISLATING THE WAR ON TERROR: AN AGENDA FOR REFORM, 217 (Ben-
jamin Wittes, ed., 2009); Richard A. Posner, Privacy, Surveillance, and Law, 75 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 245 (2008); Paul M. Schwartz, Reviving Telecommunications Surveillance 
Law, U. CHI. L. REV. 287 (2008); Mark D. Young, Electronic Surveillance in an Era of 
Modern Technology and Evolving Threats to National Security, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y 
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state of foreign intelligence collection under Executive Order 
12,333, outside either FISA or the FAA. 
The Article next turns to statutory issues related to targeting, 
post-targeting analysis, and the retention and dissemination of 
information. It argues that the NSA has sidestepped FAA re-
strictions by adopting procedures that allow analysts to acquire 
information not just to or from, but also “about” targets. In its for-
eignness determination the agency assumes, absent evidence to 
the contrary, that the target is a non-U.S. person located outside 
domestic bounds. And weak standards mark the foreign intelli-
gence purpose determination. Together, these elements allow for 
the broad collection of U.S. persons’ international communica-
tions, even as they open the door to the interception of domestic 
communications. In regard to post-targeting analysis, the Article 
draws attention to the intelligence community’s use of U.S. per-
son information to query data obtained under Section 702, effec-
tively bypassing protections Congress introduced to prevent re-
verse targeting. The Article further notes in relation to retention 
and dissemination that increasing consumer and industrial reli-
ance on cryptography means that the NSA’s retention of encrypt-
ed data may soon become the exception that swallows the rule. 
In its constitutional analysis, the Article finds certain practices 
instituted under Section 702 to fall outside acceptable Fourth 
Amendment bounds. Although lower courts had begun to recog-
nize a domestic foreign intelligence exception to the warrant 
clause, in 1978 Congress introduced FISA to be the sole means via 
which domestic foreign intelligence electronic intercepts could be 
undertaken. Consistent with separation of powers doctrine, this 
shift carried constitutional meaning. Internationally, practice and 
precedent prior to the FAA turned on a foreign intelligence excep-
tion. But in 2008 Congress altered the status quo, introducing indi-
vidualized judicial review into the process. Like FISA, the FAA 
carried constitutional import. 
																																																																																																																						
REV. 11 (2011). See also Jonathan D. Forgang, Note, “The Right of the People”: The 
NSA, the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance of Amer-
icans Overseas, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 217 (2009); Stephen Vladeck, More on Clapper 
and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Exception LAWFARE (May 23, 2012, 3:32 PM), 
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/05/more-on-clapper [http://perma.cc/8ZW7-
83VX]. 
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If that were the end of the story, one could argue that the inci-
dental collection of U.S. persons’ information, as well as the inter-
ception of domestic conversations ought to be regarded in Justice 
Jackson’s third category under Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer.18 Renewal in 2012, however, points in the opposite direc-
tion. The NSA’s actions, for purposes of the warrant clause, ap-
pear to be constitutionally sufficient insofar as foreign intelligence 
gathering to or from non-U.S. persons is concerned. The tipping 
point comes with regard to criminal prosecution. Absent a foreign 
intelligence purpose, there is no exception to the warrant re-
quirement for the query of U.S. persons’ international or domestic 
communications. 
Although a warrant is not required for foreign intelligence col-
lection overseas, the interception of communications under Sec-
tion 702 must still comport with the reasonableness requirements 
of the Fourth Amendment. A totality of the circumstances test, in 
which the significant governmental interest in national security is 
weighed against the potential intrusion into U.S. persons’ privacy, 
applies. The incidental collection of large quantities of U.S. per-
sons’ international communications, the scanning of content for 
information “about” non-U.S. person targets, and the interception 
of non-relevant and entirely domestic communications in multi-
communication transactions, as well as the query of data using 
U.S. person identifiers, fall outside the reasonableness component 
of the Fourth Amendment. 
The Article concludes by calling for renewed efforts to draw a 
line between foreign intelligence gathering and criminal law and 
to create higher protections for U.S. persons, to ensure that the 
United States can continue to collect critical information, while 
remaining consistent with the right to privacy embedded in the 
Fourth Amendment. 
I. THE EVOLUTION OF SECTION 702 
Section 702 is a product of history—one influenced by the Bush 
Administration’s response to September 11. The President initially 
looked to constitutional authorities to support a wide-ranging 
surveillance program. Subsequent efforts to move the collection of 
																																																																																																																						
 18. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
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international content to a statutory basis led to a redefinition of 
“facility” and new statutory language. Part of the impetus for the 
2008 FAA related to ways in which technology had evolved: Sur-
veillance previously controlled by executive order increasingly 
found itself within a FISA framework. Congress thus sought to 
modernize the law, creating higher protections for U.S. persons’ 
privacy in the process . Renewed in 2012, the 2008 FAA is set to 
expire in 2017. 
A. The President’s Surveillance Program 
On October 4, 2001, the President authorized the NSA to col-
lect two different types of bulk information: metadata and con-
tent.19 The former gave the agency the ability to identify terror-
																																																																																																																						
 19. Authorization for Specified Electronic Surveillance Activities During a Lim-
ited Period to Detect and Prevent Acts of Terrorism Within the United States, Oct. 
4, 2001, cited in OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., NAT’L SEC. AGENCY CENT. SEC. 
SERV., WORKING DRAFT ST-09-0002, at 1, 7–8, 11, 15 (2009) [hereinafter WORKING 
DRAFT], available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/jun/27/ 
nsa-inspector-general-report-document-data-collection [http://perma.cc/M3FC-
QMHN]. The Obama Administration has publicly confirmed the inclusion of In-
ternet and telephony metadata, and telephony content, as part of the President’s 
Surveillance Program, but not Internet content. See Press Release, Director of Na-
tional Intelligence, DNI Announces the Declassification of the Existence of Collec-
tion Activities Authorized by President George W. Bush Shortly After the Attacks 
of September 11, 2001 (Dec. 21, 2013) [hereinafter Declassification Press Release], 
available at http://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/191-press-
releases-2013/991-dni-announces-the-declassification-of-the-exisitence-of-
collection-activities-authorized-by-president-george-w-bush-shortly-after-the-
attacks-of-september-11,2001 [http://perma.cc/8L7R-386U]; Unclassified Declara-
tion of Frances J. Fleisch, National Security Agency, Jewel v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 
No. 08-cv-4373-JSW (N.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2013) [hereinafter Fleisch Declaration], 
available at https://www.eff.org/files/2013/12/21/fleisch2013jewelshubert.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/6LHT-LS7X] (using language identical to DNI press release). See 
also OLC-132, Memorandum from a Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the 
Office of Legal Counsel to the counsel to the President, regarding a request from 
the White House for OLC’s views regarding what legal standards might govern 
the use of certain intelligence methods to monitor communications by potential 
terrorists, Oct. 4, 2001, noted by Second Redacted Declaration of Steven G. Brad-
bury, Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Justice, 511 F. Supp. 2d 56 (D.D.C. 2007), 
available at https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/safefree/aclu_v_doj_ 
2nd_declaration_steven_bradbury.pdf [http://perma.cc/B7L2-8DCV]. Note that for 
purposes of this paper, I cite to the Working Draft of the NSA Inspector General 
report, released by the Guardian on June 27, 2013. Some caution, however, should 
be exercised in relying wholly on this report, as the government has not formally 
declassified the report’s contents and acknowledged its accuracy. The Administra-
tion has, however, confirmed other documents released by the Guardian at the 
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ist-related activity through contact chaining (the process of 
building a network graph that modeled communication pat-
terns of targets and their associates).20 The latter provided raw 
intelligence. 21  The NSA focused on telephony and Internet 
sources for each kind of information, with four categories re-
sulting: (1) telephony metadata; (2) Internet metadata; (3) te-
lephony content; and (4) Internet content.22 
The Administration initially based the President’s authority to 
conduct the President’s Surveillance Program on three legal theo-
ries: (1) the President’s inherent Article II authorities as Com-
mander in Chief; (2) the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military 
Force (AUMF); (3) and the War Powers Resolution (WPR).23 In 
March 2004, a classified review of the program by the Office of 
Legal Counsel (OLC) determined that there was legal support for 
three of the four types of collection included in the President’s 
Surveillance Program. OLC found that bulk Internet metadata 
collection appeared to be prohibited by FISA and Title III.24 The 
President thus rescinded the authority to collect bulk Internet 
metadata and gave the NSA one week to terminate the program.25 
Although known to a small number of people within the execu-
tive branch, it was not until a New York Times article was pub-
lished in December 2005 that the public became aware of the ex-
istence of the President’s Surveillance Program. 26  As concern 
																																																																																																																						
time, and so I proceed, in part, on the assumption that the report is accurate, with 
the appropriate cautions in place. 
 20. WORKING DRAFT, supra note 19, at 13. 
 21. Id. at 15. 
 22. Within a month, the President’s Surveillance Program, renewed thereafter at 
thirty to sixty day intervals, became operational. Id. at 11. 
 23. See, e.g., President’s Radio Address, WHITE HOUSE, Dec. 17, 2005, available at 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/12/ 
20051217.html [http://perma.cc/Z88M-4CS3]; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LEGAL AU-
THORITIES SUPPORTING THE ACTIVITIES OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY DE-
SCRIBED BY THE PRESIDENT (2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/ 
whitepaperonnsalegalauthorities.pdf [http://perma.cc/GL5C-T7H2]; Letter from 
William E. Moschella, Assistant Attorney General, to Sen. Pat Roberts, Chair, Sen-
ate Select Committee on Intelligence et al. (Dec. 22, 2005), available at https:// 
www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/doj122205.pdf [http://perma.cc/Z3CA-U7ZP]. 
 24. OLC issued opinions on this matter Mar. 15, 2004, May 6, 2004, and July 16, 
2004. WORKING DRAFT, supra note 19, at 37. 
 25. Id. at 38. 
 26. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/politics/ 
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increased, the Attorney General sent a five-page missive to key 
congressional leaders justifying the program. The problem, ac-
cording to the letter, was that FISA lacked the flexibility needed to 
identify potential threats.27 At that time, only a narrow part of the 
program’s contours was public: the NSA’s interception of (some) 
telephone content between the United States and overseas.28 Dur-
ing his end-of-the-year press conference, President Bush stated 
that the program was limited to international communications to 
and from known terrorists and their associates.29 Pressed for the 
legal rationale behind what became known as the Terrorism Sur-
veillance Program (TSP), the Bush Administration cited the three 
legal theories (Article II, the 2001 AUMF, and the WPR).30 
In the face of mounting pressure, the legal basis for the compo-
nent parts of the President’s Surveillance Program gradually al-
tered.31 On May 24, 2006, the NSA transferred the bulk collection 
																																																																																																																						
16program.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 [http://perma.cc/8PT9-JGKE] (“Months 
after the Sept. 11 attacks, President Bush secretly authorized the National Security 
Agency to eavesdrop on Americans and others inside the United States to search 
for evidence of terrorist activity without the court-approved warrants ordinarily 
required for domestic spying, according to government officials.”). See also Eric 
Lichtblau & James Risen, Spy Agency Mined Vast Data Trove, Officials Report, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 24, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/24/politics/24spy.html? 
pagewanted=all [http://perma.cc/99QY-P9BX] (“The National Security Agency has 
traced and analyzed large volumes of telephone and Internet communications 
flowing into and out of the United States as part of the eavesdropping program 
that President Bush approved after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks to hunt for evidence 
of terrorist activity, according to current and former government officials.”). 
 27. Terry Frieden, Administration Defends NSA Eavesdropping to Congress, CNN 
(Dec. 23, 2005, 10:51 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/12/23/justice.nsa/ 
index.html [http://perma.cc/KP62-EZS7]. The letter was sent to Senators Pat Rob-
erts (R-KS) and John Rockefeller (D-WV), as well as Reps. Peter Hoedstra (R-MI) 
and Jane Harman (D-CA). 
 28. Lichtblau & Risen, Spy Agency Mined Vast Data Trove, supra note 26. 
 29. Frieden, supra note 27. 
 30. See supra note 23. 
 31. See, e.g., Josh Meyer & Joseph Menn, U.S. Spying is Much Wider, Some Suspect, 
L. A. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2005, at A1 (citing the potential wholesale collection of com-
munication data outside of FISA and discussing the consequent threat to citizens’ 
privacy); Shane Harris, FISA’s Failings, NAT’L J., Apr. 8, 2006, at 59; Leslie Cauley, 
NSA Has Massive Database of Americans’ Phone Calls, USA TODAY, May 11, 2006, 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-05-10-nsa_x.htm [http://perma.cc/ 
Y25W-P9DZ]; Seymour M. Hersh, Listening In, NEW YORKER, May 29, 2006, 
http://www.newyorker.com/archiva/2006/05/29/060529ta_talk_hersh [http://perma.cc/ 
M6XN-GNTY]. Calls for reform also emerged. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Op-Ed., 
A New Surveillance Act, WALL ST. J., Feb. 15, 2006, at A16 (arguing for reforms to 
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of telephony metadata to FISA’s Section 501 “tangible things” 
provisions (as amended by USA PATRIOT Act Section 215).32 
Then in July 2007 the NSA transferred the Internet metadata pro-
gram to FISA’s Pen Register/Trap and Trace authorities. It operat-
ed until December 2011, when it was discontinued for failure to 
deliver sufficient operational value to the NSA.33 
The remaining collection programs of the President’s Surveil-
lance Program, focused on content, proved more troublesome. To 
transfer them to a different statutory basis, the government would 
have to find a legal theory to support the NSA’s addition and 
withdrawal of thousands of foreign targets for content collec-
tion.34 The initial solution came in a redefinition of the language of 
FISA. That redefinition was followed by temporary statutory 
changes, and finally, a broad understanding of the 2008 FAA. 
B. Redefinition of “Facility” under FISA 
DOJ’s immediate solution to finding a statutory basis for the 
content portion of the President’s Surveillance Program appears 
																																																																																																																						
FISA to take account of new and emerging technologies); K.A. Taipale & James 
Jay Carafano, Op-Ed., Fixing Surveillance, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2006, at A15. 
 32. USA PATRIOT Act, Sec. 215, amending FISA Sec. 501, codified at 50 U.S.C. 
§ 1861 (2012) (Access to certain business records for foreign intelligence and inter-
national terrorism investigations). For the original order for Verizon, see In re 
Application of the Fed. Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the Prod. 
of Tangible Things from [Telecommunications Providers] Relating to [REDACT-
ED], Order, No. BR-05 (FISA Ct. May 24, 2006), available at https:// 
www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/docket_06-05_1dec201_redacted.ex_-
_ocr_0.pdf [http://perma.cc/5QVN-VU3T] (released by court order as part of the 
Electronic Frontier Foundation’s FOIA litigation). Note that the specific telecom-
munications company from which such records were sought were redacted, as 
well as the remaining title; however, the government also released an NSA report 
that provided more detail on the title of the Order. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., 
NAT’L SEC. AGENCY/CENT. SEC. SERV., ST-06-0018, REPORT ON THE ASSESSMENT OF 
MANAGEMENT CONTROLS FOR IMPLEMENTING THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SUR-
VEILLANCE COURT ORDER: TELEPHONY BUSINESS RECORDS (2006) (see page 94 of 
1846 and 1862 Production, Mar. 5, 2009), available at http://www.dni.gov/ 
files/documents/section/pub_Feb%2012%202009%20Memorandum%20of%20US.p
df [http://perma.cc/U3W4-YDC7]. 
 33. See Declassification Press Release, supra note 19; Fleisch Declaration, supra 
note 19. For detailed discussion of the legality and constitutionality of the Section 
215 program and, by analogy, the transfer of Internet Metadata to PRTT, see 
Laura K. Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection: Statutory and Constitutional Considera-
tions, 37 HARV. J.L. PUB. POL’Y 757 (2014). 
 34. WORKING DRAFT, supra note 19, at 40. 
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to have turned on a new definition of “facility” as that term was 
employed in FISA. From being understood narrowly in its tradi-
tional sense—as a particular telephone number—DOJ began to 
interpret it to mean a central server at telecommunications service 
providers’ facilities, a shift that exponentially increased the 
amount of information that could be collected. 
FISA, at the time, specified that orders approving electronic 
surveillance include: 
(A) the identity, if known, or a description of the specific 
target of the electronic surveillance identified or described in 
the application pursuant to [50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(3)]; 
(B) the nature and location of each of the facilities or places at 
which the electronic surveillance will be directed, if known; 
(C) the type of information sought to be acquired and the 
type of communications or activities to be subjected to the 
surveillance; 
(D) the means by which the electronic surveillance will be ef-
fected and whether physical entry will be used to effect the 
surveillance; 
(E) the period of time during which the electronic surveil-
lance is approved; and 
(F) whenever more than one electronic, mechanical, or other 
surveillance device is to be used under the order, the author-
ized coverage of the device involved and what minimization 
procedures shall apply to information subject to acquisition 
by each device.35 
Any order approving electronic surveillance must direct: 
(A) that the minimization procedures be followed; 
(B) that, upon the request of the applicant a specified com-
munication or other common carrier, landlord, custodian, or 
other specified person, or in circumstances where the Court 
finds, based upon specific facts provided in the application, 
that the actions of the target of the application may have the effect 
of thwarting the identification of a specified person, such other per-
sons, furnish the applicant forthwith all information, facili-
ties, or technical assistance necessary to accomplish the elec-
tronic surveillance in such a manner as will protect its 
																																																																																																																						
 35. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(c) (2012). 
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secrecy and produce a minimum of interference with the 
services that such carrier, landlord, custodian, or other per-
son is providing that target of electronic surveillance; 
(C) that such carrier, landlord, custodian, or other person 
maintain under security procedures approved by the Attor-
ney General and the Director of National Intelligence any 
records concerning the surveillance or the aid furnished that 
such person wishes to retain; and 
(D) that the applicant compensate, at the prevailing rate, 
such carrier, landlord, custodian, or other person for fur-
nishing such aid.36 
The italicized portions of the above passages reflect changes 
made by the 2001 USA PATRIOT Act and 2002 Intelligence Au-
thorization Act, to enable the government to conduct roving wire-
taps in cases where the target was attempting to avoid detection 
by repeatedly changing telephones.37 Congress explained the ra-
tionale behind adding the new language: 
The multipoint wiretap amendment to FISA in the USA PA-
TRIOT Act (Section 206) allows the FISA court to issue ge-
neric orders of assistance to any communications provider 
or similar person, instead of to a particular communications 
provider. This change permits the Government to imple-
ment new surveillance immediately if the FISA target 
changes providers in an effort to thwart surveillance. The 
amendment was directed at persons who, for example, at-
tempt to defeat surveillance by changing wireless telephone 
providers or using pay phones.38 
																																																																																																																						
 36. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(c)(2)(B) (2012). Note that the clause “furnish the applicant 
forthwith all information, facilities, or technical assistance necessary to accom-
plish the electronic surveillance in such a manner as will protect its secrecy and 
produce a minimum of interference with the services” reflects changes made by 
the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-177, 
§ 108, 120 Stat. 192, 203–04 (2006), codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1805(c)(3) (2012)). 
 37. Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-108 (2001); USA 
PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56. See also ELIZABETH B. BAZAN, THE FOR-
EIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT: AN OVERVIEW OF THE STATUTORY 
FRAMEWORK AND U.S. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT AND U.S. 
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT OF REVIEW DECISIONS, CRS REPORT 
FOR CONGRESS 24 (2007), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL30465.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/R5N4-LSTQ]. 
 38. H.R. REP. NO. 107-328, at 24 (2001). 
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The aim was to ensure that where a particular target (such as a 
foreign power or its agents) was the object of foreign intelligence 
collection, and where that target was attempting to avoid detection, the 
government had some flexibility in switching carriers or tele-
phone lines to continue to keep the target under surveillance.39 
In 2005 Congress underscored the need for specificity regarding 
the facilities or places to be placed under surveillance by adding 
new language: 
An order approving an electronic surveillance under this sec-
tion in circumstances where the nature and location of each of 
the facilities or places at which the surveillance will be di-
rected is unknown shall direct the applicant to provide notice 
to the court within ten days after the date on which surveil-
lance begins to be directed at any new facility or place, unless 
the court finds good cause to justify a longer period of up to 
60 days, of— 
(A) the nature and location of each new facility or place at 
which the electronic surveillance is directed; 
(B) the facts and circumstances relied upon by the applicant to 
justify the applicant’s belief that each new facility or place at 
which the electronic surveillance is directed is or was being 
used, or is about to be used, by the target of the surveillance; 
(C) a statement of any proposed minimization procedures 
that differ from those contained in the original application or 
order, that may be necessitated by a change in the facility or 
place at which the electronic surveillance is directed; and 
(D) the total number of electronic surveillances that have been 
or are being conducted under the authority of the order.40 
This wording underscored the importance of the Executive 
Branch being able to articulate which facility would be placed un-
der surveillance and the procedures to be followed to ensure min-
imal collection of non-relevant and non-target communications. In 
such cases, the government would have to provide information 
about where the intercept would occur. A facility was understood 
																																																																																																																						
 39. See also 147 CONG. REC. S10990 (statement of Senator Feinstein); Edward C. 
Liu, Cong. Research Serv., R40138, Amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Sur-
veillance Act Extended Until June 1, 2015 (2011), available at available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/R40138.pdf [http://perma.cc/C5UD-2VA7]. 
 40. USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-177, 
Mar. 9, 2006, § 108, 120 Stat. 192 (2006), codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1805(c)(3) (2012). 
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to mean a particular place (such as a home, where a land line was 
located), a particular telephone number, or a particular computer 
that was likely to be used by a foreign power or an agent thereof. 
According to a leaked working draft of the NSA’s Inspector 
General report, in order to move the content collection involved in 
the President’s Surveillance Program to a more secure legal foot-
ing, from mid-2005 to January 2007, DOJ worked with NSA to 
redefine facility.41 Instead of understanding the word in the tradi-
tional sense, (as a specific telephone number or email address), 
DOJ argued that it should be understood as a “general gateway” 
or “cable head.”42 
This change expanded the amount of information that could be 
obtained by the government under FISA. The Internet consists of 
a number of interconnected networks that allow computers to 
communicate. A “gateway” is the entrance point from one net-
work to another, or a node, which converts one protocol stack into 
another. It is thus an essential feature in most routers (although 
other devices may also function as gateways). Routers may trans-
fer, accept, and relay packets of information, but they are limited 
to networks using similar protocols. Gateways, however, can ac-
cept packets that are formatted for one protocol and convert it in-
to another protocol format. They house routing databases, which 
determine the flow of information. A “cable head,” in turn, in-
cludes computer systems, databases required to provide Internet 
access, and the cable modem termination system (CMTS), which 
is a system of devices that sends and receives digital signals on a 
cable network. The mechanism resides at a phone company’s cen-
tral location, linking customer connections to a single point. 
																																																																																																																						
 41. See WORKING DRAFT supra note 19, at 41; Letter from Alberto R. Gonzales, 
U.S. Attorney Gen., to Patrick Leahy, U.S. Senator, & Arlen Specter, U.S. Senator 
(Jan. 17, 2007), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2007_cr/fisa011707 
.html [http://perma.cc/C75E-J9KW] (“In the spring of 2005 . . . the Administration 
began exploring options for seeking . . . FISA Court Approval. . . . These orders 
are innovative, they are complex, and it took considerable time and work for the 
Government to develop the approach that was proposed to the Court and for the 
Judge on the FISC to consider and approve these orders.”). 
 42. WORKING DRAFT, supra note 19, at 41 (noting the DOJ ultimately decided “to 
pursue a FISC order for content collection wherein the traditional FISA definition 
of a ‘facility’ as a specific telephone or email address was changed to encompass 
the gateway or cable head that foreign targets use for communications”). 
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Redefining facility to include gateways held by the telecom-
munications company, as well as the cable head and CMTS (in-
stead of, more narrowly, specific telephone numbers or Inter-
net protocol addresses associated with particular computers), 
exponentially increased the amount of content that could be 
obtained by the government. Instead of just obtaining the con-
tent carried by a single telephone line, or to and from a particu-
lar computer address, the government could obtain the content 
of all telephone calls or Internet content run through telecom-
munication companies’ routers. 
The new interpretation did not immediately gain acceptance. 
The NSA inspector general’s draft report explains, “After 18 
months of concerted effort and coordination, the FISC ultimate-
ly accepted the theory for foreign selectors but rejected it for 
domestic selectors.”43 
On January 10, 2007, FISC signed two separate orders: the 
Foreign Telephone and Email Order and a domestic content 
order.44 One week later, Attorney General Alberto Gonzales 
																																																																																																																						
 43. Id. at 41–42. A “selector” is a particular communications facility analysts 
determine is used by a target. Although examples of selectors commonly given by 
officials tend to be e-mail addresses and telephone numbers, in light of the broad-
er definition of “facility” adopted with regard to the PAA, it is not clear whether a 
selector under the FAA may include servers, gateways, or cable heads. If it did, 
however, it would be at odds with the assertion that if a U.S. person is determined 
to be a user of a selector, the selector may not be tasked to Section 702 acquisition. 
PCLOB REPORT, supra note 2, at 33. In Judge Bates’s October 2011 opinion, he 
writes, “With regard to ‘about’ communications, the Court previously found that 
the user of the tasked facility was the ‘target’ of the acquisition, because the gov-
ernment’s purpose in acquiring such communications is to obtain information 
about that user.” [Redacted], 2011 WL 10945618, at *14 (FISA Ct. Oct. 3, 2011). He 
continues, “the communication is not acquired because the government has any 
interest in the parties to the communication, other than their potential relationship 
to the user of the tasked facility . . . ” Id. This suggests that the continued use by 
the government of e-mails and telephone numbers as examples of what is being 
placed under surveillance is misleading. The NSA “tasks” selectors to collect 
communications. In contrast, the people who use the selectors are “targets.” Selec-
tors may not be key words (for example, “Tularemia” or “gelignite”); nor may 
they be names of targeted individuals (for example, “Jane Smith”). Once a selector 
has been tasked under the targeting procedures, it is forwarded to an electronic 
service provider to begin acquisition. PCLOB REPORT, supra note 2, at 33. 
 44. Foreign Content Order, Jan. 10, 2007 and Domestic Content Order, Jan. 10, 
2007, cited in WORKING DRAFT, supra note 19, at 41–42. For additional sources not-
ing the ending of the President’s Surveillance Program in January 2007 see also S. 
REP. NO. 110-209, at 4 (2007); Letter from Att’y Gen. Alberto Gonzales to Sen. Pat-
rick Leahy and Sen. Arlen Specter (Jan. 17, 2007); Declassification Press Release, 
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wrote to the Senate Judiciary Committee, indicating that a FISC 
judge had issued orders moving the Terrorism Surveillance 
Program to FISA.45 
According to the NSA Inspector General, the domestic content 
order did not have an immediate or significant impact on collec-
tion.46 The Foreign Telephone and Email Order, however, appears 
to have immediately and negatively affected the number of selec-
tors that could be used with regard to collection.47 
Under the order, FISC authorized the government to intercept 
communications passing through listed facilities where the gov-
ernment had made a probable cause determination regarding one 
of the communicants, and the e-mail addresses and telephone 
numbers were reasonably believed to be used by individuals out-
side domestic bounds.48 At renewal, a different FISC judge ap-
proved the program under the condition that the court, as op-
posed to the government, made the probable cause determination 
with regard to the telephone numbers and e-mail addresses to be 
used to conduct surveillance.49 Although the renewal statute pro-
																																																																																																																						
supra note 19; Fleisch Declaration, supra note 19 (suggesting that TSP transitioned 
to FISA in January 2007). 
 45. Letter from Alberto R. Gonzales, U.S. Attorney Gen., to Sens. Patrick Leahy, 
U.S. Senator, & Arlen Specter, U.S. Senator, supra note 41. Although the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Michigan had entered summary judgment 
for plaintiffs, finding the warrantless wiretapping in TSP unconstitutional and 
entering a permanent injunction barring further operation of TSP, in July 2007 the 
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the suit for lack of standing. ACLU v. 
NSA, 493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2007), rev’g ACLU v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. 
Mich. 2006). According to Gonzales, the order authorized “the Government to 
target for collection international communications into or out of the United States 
where there is probable cause to believe that one of the communicants is a mem-
ber or agent of al Qaeda or an associated terrorist organization.” Id. 
 46. WORKING DRAFT, supra note 19, at 42. It did, however, slow the process 
down to where, by January 2009, there was only a single selector directed towards 
collection. The FBI subsequently assumed responsibility for the Domestic Content 
Order before the FISC. Id. While attention has been paid post-June 2013 to Section 
702, significantly less focus has been drawn to the Domestic Content Order. 
 47. Id.  
 48. Declassified Certification of Attorney General Michael B. Mukasey at ¶37, in 
In re National Security Agency Telecommunications Records Litigation, MDL Dkt. 
No. 06-1791-VRW (N.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2008) [hereinafter 2008 Mukasey Declara-
tion], available at http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/0505/AG%20Mukasey% 
202008%20Declassified%20Declaration.pdf [http://perma.cc/ZZS9-YCLF]. See also 
PCLOB REPORT, supra note 2, at 17. 
 49. 2008 Mukasey Declaration, supra note 48, at ¶38. 
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vided for newly discovered telephone numbers and e-mail ad-
dresses to be added in advance of the court order, the intelligence 
agency expressed concern that the alteration and additional ad-
ministrative burden was creating an “intelligence gap.”50 Simul-
taneously, a parallel effort appears to have been underway to 
compel private U.S. companies to turn over communications of 
individuals suspected of terrorist activities located overseas. 51 
Subject to traditional FISA, a backlog in applications appears to 
have developed.52 
Accordingly, in April 2007, the Director of National Intelli-
gence, J.M. McConnell, submitted a proposal to Congress to 
amend FISA to make it easier for the executive branch to target 
U.S. interests abroad. 
C. The Protect America Act 
Four months after McConnell’s proposal, Congress passed the 
Protect America Act (PAA), easing restrictions on the surveillance 
of foreigners where one (or both) parties were located overseas.53 
In doing so, it removed such communications from FISA’s defini-
tion of “electronic surveillance,” narrowing the term to include 
only domestic communications. The attendant restrictions, such 
as those related to probable cause that the target be a foreign 
power or an agent thereof, or likely to use the facilities to be 
placed under surveillance, or specifications related to the facility 
in question, dropped away. 
																																																																																																																						
 50. PCLOB REPORT, supra note 2, at 18. 
 51. There is some confusion in the public literature about the programs under-
way. While the Draft IG report refers only to a foreign content order and a domes-
tic content order, the PCLOB Report does not mention the domestic content order, 
instead discussing the Foreign Telephone and Email Orders and a parallel project, 
using traditional FISA to compel private companies to assist in obtaining the 
communications of individuals overseas, suspected of engaging in international 
terrorism, and using U.S.-based communication service providers. Compare 
WORKING DRAFT, supra note 19, at 42, with PCLOB REPORT, supra note 2, at 17–18. 
 52. PCLOB REPORT, supra note 2, at 17–18. See William C. Banks, Responses to the Ten 
Questions, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 5007, 5012 (2009) (“[A] different FISC judge decid-
ed in May 2007 not to continue approval of what had been the TSP under FISC super-
vision, and apparently determined that at least some of the foreign communications 
acquired in the United States are subject to individualized FISA processes. After a 
backlog of FISA applications developed, the Bush administration successfully per-
suaded Congress to pass statutory authorization for the program.”). 
 53. Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-55, § 2, 121 Stat. 552 (2007). 
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The PAA removed FISC from supervising the interception of 
communications that began or ended in a foreign country (out-
side of the international communications of individuals targeted 
under traditional FISA for surveillance). Instead, the Attorney 
General and the Director of National Intelligence could authorize, 
for up to one year, the acquisition of communications “directed 
at” persons reasonably believed to be outside the United States, 
where five criteria were met: (1) Reasonable procedures were in 
place for determining that the acquisition concerned persons 
reasonably believed to be located outside the United States; (2) 
The acquisition did not constitute electronic surveillance (it did 
not involve solely domestic communications); (3) The acquisi-
tion involved obtaining the communications data from or with 
the assistance of a communications service provider who had 
access to communications; (4) A significant purpose of the ac-
quisition was to obtain foreign intelligence information; and (5) 
Minimization procedures outlined in FISA would be used.54 
It therefore became easier to establish that the target was locat-
ed outside the United States. No individualized showing to the 
court was required. Instead, the presence of reasonable proce-
dures to ascertain the location of the person would suffice. 
Whether or not an individual could be placed under surveillance 
turned on geography, not on whether the target was a foreign 
power, or an agent of a foreign power, as was previously required 
by FISA for electronic surveillance as defined under FISA. 
The PAA required the Attorney General to submit targeting 
procedures to FISC and to certify that the communications to be 
intercepted were not purely domestic in nature.55 Once certified, 
FISC was required to grant the order.56 The statute gave immunity 
to service providers for providing information, facilities, or assis-
																																																																																																																						
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at § 3. 
 56. Id. Twice a year the Attorney General would be required to inform the Intel-
ligence and Judiciary Committees of the House and Senate of incidents or non-
compliance with the directive issued by the Attorney General or Director of Na-
tional Intelligence, incidents of noncompliance with FISC-approved procedures, 
and the numbers of certifications or directives issued during the reporting period. 
Id. 
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tance to the government in its exercise of authority under the 
PAA.57 
Efforts by a telecommunications company to challenge the stat-
ute on Fourth Amendment grounds later failed.58 FISC held that 
while the service provider had standing, the PAA, as applied, sat-
isfied the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement.59 
Intended to operate for six months, the PAA expired in Febru-
ary 2008, when the executive and legislative branches reached an 
impasse over whether retroactive immunity should be extended 
to businesses implicated in TSP.60 Cases attempting to hold pri-
vate industry responsible began to make their way through the 
courts. 
D. The FISA Amendments Act 
After months of deadlock, Congress finally agreed to provide 
telecommunications companies with blanket, retroactive immuni-
ty.61 In July, 2008, the legislature enacted the FISA Amendments 
																																																																																																																						
 57. Id. at § 6 (“Notwithstanding any other law, no cause of action shall lie in any 
court against any person for providing any information, facilities, or assistance in 
accordance with a directive under this section.”). 
 58. See In re Directives Pursuant to § 105b of the Foreign Intelligence Surveil-
lance Act, 551 F.3d 1004, 1009-16 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Various bills were proposed in the interim. See, e.g., FISA Amendments Act 
of 2008, S. 2248, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 61. A number of Members opposed the final bill because of its inclusion of ret-
roactive immunity. The issue was a pressing one, since more than 40 lawsuits had 
been filed against telecommunications providers. 154 CONG. REC. S6426 (daily ed. 
July 8, 2008). Attendant concerns included the constitutionality of the President’s 
Surveillance Program, separation of powers concerns (whether the legislature 
could preempt the courts and strip them of jurisdiction and the impact of doing so 
on the rule of law), and the failure of Congress to construct an alternative remedy, 
as well as whether the vote on retroactive immunity could, in essence, be delegat-
ed to a minority of the whole. See, e.g.,154 CONG. REC. H5740 (daily ed. June 20, 
2008) (statement of Rep. McGovern); 154 CONG. REC. H5773 (daily ed. June 20, 
2008) (statement of Rep. Blumenauer) ; 154 CONG. REC. H5773, H5763 (daily ed. 
June 20, 2008) (statements of Rep. Nadler); 154 CONG. REC. H5762 (daily ed. June 
20, 2008) (statement of Rep. Lofgren); 154 CONG. REC. H5768 (daily ed. June 20, 
2008) (statement of Rep. Inselee); 154 CONG. REC. 5769 (daily ed. June 20, 2008) 
(statement of Rep. Conyers); 154 CONG. REC. H5771 (daily ed. June 20, 2008) 
(statement of Rep. Eshoo); 154 CONG. REC. H5772 (daily ed. June 20, 2008) (state-
ment of Rep. Levin); 154 CONG. REC. H5773 (daily ed. June 20, 2008) (statement of 
Rep. Dingell); 154 CONG. REC. H5773 (daily ed. June 20, 2008) (statement of Rep. 
Hall); 154 CONG. REC. S6410-6413 (daily ed. July 8, 2008) (statements of Sens. Spec-
ter & Whitehouse); 154 CONG. REC. S6424-S6425 (daily ed. July 8, 2008) (statement 
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Act (FAA).62 The statute was hailed as a bipartisan solution to the 
tension among new technologies, the protection of civil rights, 
and the preservation of U.S. national security.63 Codified as Title 
																																																																																																																						
of Sen. Levin). But see 154 CONG. REC. H5773 (daily ed. June 20, 2008) (statement 
of Rep. Boswell); 154 CONG. REC. S6416 (daily ed. July 8, 2008) (statement of Sena-
tor Warner); 154 CONG. REC. S6425 (daily ed. July 8, 2008) (statement of Sen. 
Chambliss) (explicitly supporting the FAA on immunity grounds). 
The bill passed the House on June 20, 2008. Final Vote Results for Roll Call 437, 
H.R. 6304, FISA Amendments Act of 2008, June 20, 2008, available at 
http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2008/roll437.xml [http://perma.cc/DM2P-JCCH]. But 
the issue of retroactive immunity continued to dog the proceedings. Senators Russ 
Feingold and Chris Dodd blocked the bill via filibuster June 26, 2012, delaying a 
vote until after the July 4, 2012 recess. Senators Block Consideration of Wiretap Bill, 
CNN, June 26, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/US/06/26/senate.fisa/ [http:// 
perma.cc/2X3Q-DJKV]. (Feingold objected on grounds of the violation of civil 
liberties; Dodd’s objections centered on constitutional questions and the impact of 
retroactive immunity on the rule of law. Id.) On July 8, 2008, Senator Specter un-
successfully offered an amendment altering the liability protections to require the 
district court to assess the constitutionality of the President’s warrantless wire-
tapping program before cases against telecommunications companies could be 
dismissed. 154 CONG. REC. S6410-S6412 (daily ed. July 8, 2008) (statement of Sena-
tor Specter). Senator Dodd offered an amendment to strike the immunity provi-
sions altogether; however, the Senate rejected the amendment 66 to 32. 154 CONG. 
REC. S6427 (daily ed. July 8, 2008) (introducing the amendment) and U.S. Senate 
Roll Call Votes, 110th Cong., 2nd Sess., July 9, 2008, available at 
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congr
ess=110&session=2&vote=00164 [http://perma.cc/ANP9-H5HP] (Senate voting 
against the amendment). Three hours later, the Senate voted on (and passed) the 
FAA 69 to 28. U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 110th Cong., 2nd Sess., July 9, 2008, availa-
ble at http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm? 
congress=110&session=2&vote=00168 [http://perma.cc/KR4R-WMC7]. 
The Ninth Circuit subsequently found the immunity granted to telecommunica-
tions companies to be constitutionally sufficient with regard to the legislative 
process followed, nondelegation doctrine, independent decision-making authority 
of the courts, and due process. In re National Security Agency Telecommunica-
tions Records Litigation, 671 F.3d 881 (9th Cir. 2011), affirming in part and reversing 
in part In re National Security Agency Telecommunications Records Litigation, 633 
F. Supp. 2d 949 (N. D. Cal. 2009, reconsideration denied by In re National Security 
Agency Telecommunications Records Litigation, No. 06-1791, 2009 WL 2171061 
(N.D. Cal. July 20, 2009). 
 62. FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (2008). 
 63. See, e.g., 154 CONG. REC. H5739 (daily ed. June 20, 2008) (statement of Rep. 
Arcuri) (commending majority leader Mr. Hoyer, Minority Whip Blunt, Chairman 
Reyes, and others, for reaching bipartisan and bicameral agreement on FISA and 
noting that the legislation is the result of several months of deliberation between 
the House and the Senate, Democrats and Republicans, and Congress and the 
White House); 154 CONG. REC. H5739 (daily ed. June 20, 2008) (statement of Rep. 
Hastings) (noting the bipartisan nature of the bill and underscoring the im-
portance of updating FISA for current technologies: “This bill is not perfect, but it 
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VII of FISA, the legislation strengthened and weakened protec-
tions for U.S. persons’ international communications. A brief dis-
cussion of the three most important statutory provisions added by 
the FAA (FISA Sections 702, 703, and 704) helps to establish a ba-
sis for subsequent analysis of PRISM and upstream collection. 
1. Section 702 
FISA Section 702 empowers the Attorney General (AG) and the 
Director of National Intelligence (DNI) jointly to authorize, for up 
to one year, “the targeting of persons reasonably believed to be 
located outside the United States to acquire foreign intelligence 
information.”64 Five limitations apply. Acquisition may not inten-
tionally (a) target a person known to be located in the United 
States;65 (b) target an individual reasonably believed to be located 
outside the United States, if the actual purpose is to target an in-
dividual reasonably believed to be located in domestic bounds;66 
(c) target a U.S. person reasonably believed to be outside domestic 
bounds;67 or (d) obtain wholly domestic communications.68 In ad-
dition, (e), all acquisition must be conducted consistent with the 
Fourth Amendment.69 
Procedurally, five steps must be followed for acquisition to 
commence. First, the AG and DNI must adopt targeting and min-
imization procedures consistent with the statutory requirements.70 
																																																																																																																						
takes vital steps to modernize FISA to reflect 21st century cell phone and Internet 
technology, and to protect our Nation from today’s determined and sophisticated 
terrorist threats.”); Editorial, A Better Surveillance Law, WASH. POST, June 20, 2008, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/06/19/AR2008061903078.html, [http://perma.cc/GN89-
LYMH] (“Congressional leaders of both parties should be commended for draft-
ing legislation that brings the country’s surveillance laws into the 21st century 
while protecting civil liberties and preserving important national security prerog-
atives.”). 
 64. FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, § 702, 122 Stat. 2436, 
2438 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1881(a) (2006 & Supp. V 2007-2012)). 
Except as otherwise noted, § 702 mirrors the definitions adopted in FISA for the 
terms “agent of a foreign power,” “foreign intelligence information,” “foreign 
power,” and “person.” Id. 
 65. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(b)(1) (2012). 
 66. Id. § 1881a(b)(2). 
 67. Id. § 1881a(b)(3). 
 68. Id. § 1881a(b)(4). 
 69. Id. § 1881a(b)(5). 
 70. Id. § 1881a(d)–(e). 
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Second, the two officials must provide FISC with a written certifi-
cation and any supporting affidavits, attesting that there are pro-
cedures in place reasonably designed to ensure that the acquisi-
tion is limited to targeting individuals outside of the United States 
and to prevent the intentional acquisition of domestic communi-
cations, and that the minimization procedures meet the require-
ments of the statute.71 They must guarantee that guidelines have 
been adopted to ensure compliance with the statutory limita-
tions.72 They also must attest that “a significant purpose of the ac-
quisition is to obtain foreign intelligence information.”73 Third, the 
targeting and minimization procedures must be provided to the 
Congressional intelligence committees, as well as the Committees 
on the Judiciary of the Senate and the House of Representatives.74 
FISC is limited in the role it can play with regard to reviewing 
the certification, as well as the targeting and minimization proce-
dures. As long as the certification elements are present, the target-
ing procedures are reasonably designed to ensure that acquisition 
targets persons are reasonably believed to be outside the United 
States and do not knowingly intercept domestic communications, 
the minimization procedures are statutorily consistent, and the 
procedures are consistent with the Fourth Amendment, “the 
Court shall enter an order approving the certification and the use, 
or continued use . . . ” of an acquisition.75 
The FAA created numerous reporting requirements. At least 
twice a year, the Attorney General and DNI must assess compli-
ance with the targeting and minimization procedures and submit 
the assessments to FISC, House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence (HPSCI) and the Senate Select Committee on Intelli-
gence (SSCI), and the House and Senate Committees on the Judi-
ciary.76 The inspectors general of DOJ and the IC agency using 
Section 702 authorities are authorized to review compliance with 
																																																																																																																						
 71. Id. § 1881a(g)(2)(A)(i)–(ii). 
 72. Id. § 1881a(g)(2)(A)(iii)–(iv). 
 73. Id. § 1881a(g)(2)(A)(v). 
 74. Id. § 1881a(f). 
 75. Id. § 1881(i)(3)(A) (emphasis added). The inclusion of FISC in the process of 
international intercepts of electronic communications for foreign intelligence pur-
poses departs from previous practice under Executive Order, in which the courts 
played no role. Thus, having a judicial role created stronger protections; however, 
the role accorded to FISC was still limited. 
 76. Id. § 1881a(l)(1). 
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the targeting and minimization procedures, and required to re-
view (a) the number of intelligence reports containing U.S. per-
sons’ identities disseminated to other agencies; and (b) the num-
ber of targets later determined to be located in the United States.77 
The IG reports are provided to the AG, the DNI, and the same 
Congressional committees receiving the AG and DNI targeting 
and minimization reports.78 In addition, the head of each IC agen-
cy obtaining information under Section 702 must annually review 
the programs to ascertain whether foreign information has been, 
or will be, obtained from the acquisition.79 The annual review 
must also consider the number of intelligence reports disseminat-
ed to other agencies containing references to U.S. persons, the 
number of targets later ascertained to be located within the Unit-
ed States, and a description of any procedures approved by the 
DNI relevant to the acquisition, the adequacy of the minimization 
procedures.80 This review must then be provided to FISC, the At-
torney General, the DNI, the Congressional intelligence commit-
tees, and the Committees on the Judiciary of the House of Repre-
sentatives and the Senate. 81  Finally, every six months, the 
Attorney General must inform the intelligence and judiciary 
committees of any certifications submitted consistent with Section 
702, the reasons for exercising the authority, any directives issued 
in conjunction with the acquisition, a description of the judicial 
review during the reporting period of the certifications as well as 
targeting and minimization procedures (including copies of or-
ders or pleadings submitted in connection with such reviews that 
contain a significant legal interpretation of the law), any actions 
taken to challenge or enforce a directive issued, any compliance 
reviews, and a description of any incidents of noncompliance.82 
The FAA created an opportunity for telecommunications com-
panies served with orders to challenge the request for infor-
mation.83 FISC may only grant such petition where the request for 
																																																																																																																						
 77. Id. § 1881a(l)(2)(A)–(C). 
 78. Id. § 1881a(l)(2)(D). 
 79. Id. § 1881a(l)(3)(A). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. § 1881a(l)(3)(C). 
 82. Id. § 1881f. 
 83. See id. § 1881a(h)(4)(A) (“An electronic communication service provider re-
ceiving a directive issued pursuant to paragraph (1) may file a petition to modify 
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information is unlawful.84 Otherwise, the electronic communica-
tion service provider must provide the information or risk being 
held in contempt of court.85 Either the government or the provider 
may appeal to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Re-
view (FISCR), with final review by the Supreme Court.86 
2. Sections 703 and 704 
Section 702 focused on the targeting of non-U.S. persons 
abroad. Sections 703 and 704 addressed the targeting of U.S. per-
sons outside of the United States for electronic surveillance and 
other types of acquisitions. By incorporating these provisions into 
the statute, Congress departed from previous practice, where the 
targeting of all persons overseas had been conducted under the 
auspices of Executive Order 12,333.87 
As a threshold matter, Section 704 prevents the intelligence 
community from targeting a U.S. person who is reasonably be-
lieved to be outside the country unless FISC or another provision 
in FISA authorize it to do so.88 The limit applies where the target 
of the surveillance has a reasonable expectation of privacy and, if 
the activity were conducted within the country for law enforce-
																																																																																																																						
or set aside such directive with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, which 
shall have jurisdiction to review such petition.”). 
 84. See id. § 1881a(h)(4)(C). 
 85. See id. § 1881a(h)(4)(G). 
 86. See id. § 1881a(h)(6). 
 87. Exec. Order 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200 § 2.3 (1982). For discussion of this order, see 
infra Part I.E. 
 88. 50 U.S.C. § 1881c(a)(2) (2012). (“No element of the intelligence community 
may intentionally target, for the purpose of acquiring foreign intelligence infor-
mation, a United States person reasonably believed to be located outside the Unit-
ed States under circumstances in which the targeted United States person has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required if the acquisi-
tion were conducted inside the United States for law enforcement purposes, un-
less a judge of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court has entered an order 
with respect to such targeted United States person or the Attorney General has 
authorized an emergency acquisition pursuant to subsection (c) or (d), respective-
ly, or any other provision of this chapter.”) See also EDWARD C. LIU, CONG. RE-
SEARCH SERV., R42725, REAUTHORIZATION OF THE FISA AMENDMENTS ACT 8 (2013) 
(“As an initial matter, § 704(a)(2) prohibits the intelligence community from tar-
geting a U.S. person who is reasonably believed to be abroad unless authorized by 
the FISC or another provision of FISA.”) 
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ment purposes, a warrant would be required.89 Section 704 thus 
appears to cover physical searches as well as electronic inter-
cepts.90 As a practical matter, what this means is that where the 
NSA knows a U.S. person is located overseas, and that person is the 
target of the intercept, it may only engage in electronic surveillance 
(as statutorily defined) consistent with FISA. 
The steps outlined in Section 703 apply only to electronic sur-
veillance, or the acquisition of stored electronic communications 
or data, that would traditionally require an order under FISA if 
the acquisition were conducted inside the United States.91 That is, 
where a U.S. person is located outside the country, and acquisi-
tion is to occur inside the country, the government must use Sec-
tion 703. Where both target and the acquisition are outside the 
United States, Section 704, whose standards are weaker than those 
of Section 703, applies.92 
The procedures to be followed generally reflect the structure 
employed by traditional FISA with regard to electronic surveil-
lance and physical search. The government must submit an appli-
cation to FISC identifying the target, as well as the facts and cir-
cumstances upon which the government relies for probable cause 
that the target is a foreign power or an agent thereof.93 The Court 
also must ascertain that there is probable cause to believe that the 
target is located outside the United States.94 
																																																																																																																						
 89. 50 U.S.C. § 1881c(a)(2) (2012). See also LIU, supra note 88, at 8 (“This prohibi-
tion only applies in circumstances where the target has a reasonable expectation 
of privacy and a warrant would be required if the acquisition was conducted in 
the United States for law enforcement purposes.”) 
 90. The Congressional Research Service explains, “Whether a ‘reasonable expec-
tation of privacy’ exists depends upon whether an ‘individual manifested a sub-
jective expectation of privacy in [a] searched object’ and whether ‘society is will-
ing to recognize that expectation as reasonable.’ Although such a determination is 
inherently dependent upon the particular circumstances in a given case, it is likely 
that activities like physical searches and wiretaps conducted on foreign soil would 
require authorization from the FISC based on the target’s ‘reasonable expectation 
of privacy.’” Id. (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001)). 
 91. See 50 U.S.C. § 1881b(a)(1) (2012). 
 92. See id. § 1881a(a). 
 93. Id. §§ 1881b(b)–(c), 1881c(b)–(c). There are short-term provisions in the event 
of emergency situations. Within seven days, the government must make formal 
application to the court. Id. §§ 1881b(d), 1881c(d). 
 94. Id. § 1881c(c). 
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The central difference between Sections 703 and 704 is that, in 
certain respects, less specificity is required under the latter.95 The 
government need not assert that the information to be obtained 
cannot be garnered via normal investigative means. Section 704 
also requires that FISC approve the minimization procedures only 
in regard to the dissemination of acquired information, as opposed 
to Section 703, which requires minimization procedures to be ap-
plied with regard to both acquisition and retention.96 
Unlike traditional FISA, which requires that applications identi-
fy the facilities to be searched or subject to electronic surveillance, 
and probable cause that the facilities are or will be used by the 
target, Sections 703 and 704 have no such equivalent.97 And unlike 
Section 702, under Sections 703 and 704 only the government is 
authorized to appeal the determination of FISC either to FISCR or 
to the Supreme Court.98 
E. Executive Order 12,333 
In 1978, Congress excluded three types of foreign intelligence 
collection from FISA: (1) electronic communications outside U.S. 
borders, (2) intelligence in the U.S. and overseas falling outside 
the statutory definition of “electronic communications,” and (3) 
incidental collection of U.S. persons’ communications.99 HPSCI 
																																																																																																																						
 95. Note, however, that the same standard of probable cause is required. 
 96. Compare 50 U.S.C. § 1881c(c)(1)(C) with 50 U.S.C. § 1881b(c)(1)(C). 
 97. Compare 50 U.S.C. § 1801, with 50 U.S.C. § 1881a. 
 98. 50 U.S.C. § 1881b(f) (2012). 
 99. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-1283(I), at 50 (1978) (“[T]his bill does not afford protec-
tions to U.S. persons who are abroad, nor does it regulate the acquisition of the 
contents of international communications of U.S. persons who are in the United 
States, where the contents are acquired unintentionally. The committee does not 
believe that this bill is the appropriate vehicle for addressing this area.”); S. REP. 
NO. 95-701, at 7 & n.2, 34–35 & n.16 (1978). In 1978 the definition of “electronic 
surveillance” limited FISA to four types of collection. First, the acquisition of the 
contents of any wire or radio communication obtained by “intentionally target-
ing” a particular, known U.S. person located within domestic bounds. 50 U.S.C. 
§ 1801(f)(1) (2012). Second, the acquisition of the contents of a wire communica-
tion to or from someone located in the United States, where the collection takes 
place on domestic soil. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f)(2) (2012). Third, the intentional collec-
tion of the contents of some radio communications where “the sender and all in-
tended recipients are located within the United States.” 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f)(3) 
(2012). Fourth, the installation and use of other surveillance devices, on U.S. soil, 
directed at monitoring or acquiring information other than wire or radio commu-
nications. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f)(4) (2012). 
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explained, “[T]he standards and procedures for overseas surveil-
lance may have to be different than those provided in this bill for 
electronic surveillance within the United States or targeted against 
U.S. persons who are in the United States.”100 At the same time, 
the legislature was careful to hedge. HPSCI noted, at least with 
regard to intelligence community activities abroad: 
The fact that S.1566 does not bring the overseas surveil-
lance activities of the U.S. intelligence community within 
its purview . . . should not be viewed as congressional au-
thorization of such activities as they affect the privacy in-
terests of Americans. The committee merely recognizes at 
this point that such overseas surveillance activities are 
not covered by this bill.101 
Instead, the framing for these foreign intelligence collection ac-
tivities (foreign-to-foreign electronic communications, foreign in-
telligence collection at home and abroad outside of FISA’s defini-
tion of “electronic communications,” and the incidental collection 
of U.S. persons’ communications) came from Executive Order 
12,333.102 Issued by President Reagan in 1981, this order required 
each agency to establish procedures, approved by the Attorney 
General, to govern collection methods.103 
The order offered heightened protections for U.S. persons. It re-
quired that the Attorney General “approve the use for intelligence 
purposes, within the United States or against a United States per-
son abroad, of any technique for which a warrant would be re-
quired if undertaken for law enforcement purposes.”104 Surveil-
lance could only be undertaken where the Attorney General had 
“determined in each case that there [was] probable cause to be-
lieve that the technique is directed against a foreign power or an 
agent of a foreign power.”105 For the military, for instance, to en-
gage in foreign intelligence collection on U.S. persons, an applica-
tion to the Attorney General must be made consistent with DOD 
																																																																																																																						
 100. H.R. REP. NO. 95-1283(I), at 50–51 (1978). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200, § 2.4 (1982). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at § 2.5. 
 105. Id. 
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regulations.106 Procedures adopted in the early 1980s required that 
the applicant include a statement of facts demonstrating probable 
cause and necessity, as well as the period for which surveillance 
was being sought.107 
All electronic surveillance had to take place consistent with 
FISA and Executive Order 12,333.108 The order directed the intelli-
gence community to “use the least intrusive collection techniques 
feasible within the United States or directed against United States 
persons abroad.” 109  The physical surveillance of U.S. persons 
overseas for foreign intelligence purposes, in turn, could only be 
conducted where the purpose was “to obtain significant infor-
mation” that otherwise could not reasonably be acquired.110 
The order included institutional protections. It prohibited the 
CIA from conducting electronic surveillance within domestic 
bounds (outside of counterintelligence investigations of military 
personnel).111  Within the United States, the FBI had the lead, 
“provided that no foreign intelligence collection by such agencies 
may be undertaken for the purpose of acquiring information con-
cerning the domestic activities of United States persons.”112 And 
all domestic physical surveillance of U.S. persons had to be under-
taken by the FBI.113 
One of the chief complaints of the Bush Administration that 
spurred the introduction of the PAA and, subsequently, the FAA, 
was that changes in telecommunications technologies meant that 
communications that had previously fallen under the less restric-
tive contours of Executive Order 12,333 had gradually been 
brought within FISA. In 2006, the Director of National Intelli-
gence, Admiral Mike McConnell, argued that, as a result, the in-
telligence community was not collecting some two-thirds of the 
																																																																																																																						
 106. U.S. Dep’t of Def. Dir. 5240.1-R, Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD 
Intelligence Components that Affect United States Persons, Proc. 5, Pt. 2.3 (1982). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200, § 2.5. 
 109. Id. at § 2.4. 
 110. Id. at § 2.4(d). 
 111. See id. at § 2.4(a). The order also excepted searches of non-U.S. person 
property lawfully in the CIA’s possession. Id. at § 2.4(b)(2). 
 112. Id. at § 2.3(b). 
 113. See id. at § 2.4(c). But note the exception of government employee-related 
investigations. Id. 
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foreign intelligence information that it had collected before.114 
Three technology-based arguments helped to drive the demand 
for FISA reform.115 The resulting FAA supplanted Executive Or-
der 12,333, in some ways, with a statutory framing. In other ways, 
it left the existing 12,333 authorities intact. The end result is rele-
vant to analyzing the scope of the FAA and the NSA’s programs 
under Section 702. 
1. Shifting Communications and FISA Modernization 
The arguments put forward in support of modernizing FISA 
are of varying strength. The strongest claim relates to the nature 
of e-mail communications.116 Congress explicitly exempted for-
eign-to-foreign wire communications from FISA’s remit. The ex-
clusion made sense: the voice transmission of a British subject in 
London, calling a French citizen in Paris, at no point crossed U.S. 
borders. It would be impractical and cumbersome to expect the 
intelligence community to obtain court approval for every inter-
ception of foreign intelligence between foreign nationals overseas. 
By grounding the exception in territorial limits, Congress thus 
acted consistently with Fourth Amendment doctrine—reserving, 
in the process, the potential to act where U.S. persons’ privacy 
might be at stake. 
The same types of communications exempted from FISA, how-
ever, in the modern age of e-mail, had begun to fall within tradi-
tional FISA. For instance, U.S. Internet Service Providers (ISPs) 
store e-mail on servers in the United States. The same British sub-
ject, if she accesses her email from London (pulling it from a serv-
er within the United States), suddenly falls within FISA—even 
when the e-mail she is retrieving is sent by the same French citi-
zen in Paris. In other words, merely by using an American ISP, 
																																																																																																																						
 114. 158 CONG. REC. H5891 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 2012) (statement of Rep. Smith). 
 115. David S. Kris & J. Douglas Wilson, National Security Investigations and 
Prosecutions § 16:3 (2012) [hereinafter Kris & Wilson, NSIAP]. 
 116. Open/Closed Hearing: FISA Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 110th 
Cong. (2007) (statement of John M. McConnell, Director of National Intelligence); 
see also 154 CONG. REC. H5756–57 (daily ed. June 20, 2008) (Letter from Michael 
Mukasey, Attorney General, and J.M. McConnell, Director of National Intelli-
gence, to Hon. Nancy Pelosi, Speaker, House of Representatives (June 19, 2008)); 
154 CONG. REC. S6400–01 (daily ed. July 8, 2008) (Letter from Michael Mukasey, 
Attorney General, and J.M. McConnell, Director of National Intelligence, to Hon. 
Harry Reid, Majority Leader, Senate (July 7, 2008)). 
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non-citizens could obtain the protections of the more rights-
protective FISA framework—even where such persons had no 
other ties to the United States and presented a classic foreign intel-
ligence threat (and would otherwise be covered by the less rigor-
ous contours of Executive Order 12,333). Exacerbating the prob-
lem was the difficulty of determining where the user was 
located—inside the U.S. or on foreign soil—a consideration cru-
cial to determining whether the intelligence community must first 
approach FISC for an order. 
The other two arguments put forward in support of moderniz-
ing FISA were less robust. First, the government argued that the 
transition from satellite to fiber optic cables for trans-oceanic 
communications meant that international communications, previ-
ously carried by radio waves (exempted from FISA unless the 
target was a particular, known, U.S. person on domestic soil), be-
gan to fall within FISA’s wire communications provisions. 117 
While accurate in its assertion that fiber optic cable communica-
tions came within FISA’s remit, it was an exaggeration to say that 
Congress did not expressly contemplate this in 1978. The Com-
mittee explained at the time: “It is the committee’s intent that ac-
quisition of the contents of a wire communication, without the 
consent of any party thereto, would clearly be included” in the 
definition of “wire communication.” It continued, “Excluded 
would be . . . commercial broadcasts, as well as ham radio and 
citizen band radio broadcasts.”118 Also exaggerated was the claim 
that most communications at the time of FISA’s enactments were 
carried on radio waves, as opposed to fiber optic cables.119 The 
government further over-emphasized the change in terms of the 
trend.120 
Second, the government argued that the difference of a mile 
or two should not matter with regard to whether the U.S. inter-
cepted communications offshore or within U.S. borders.121 The 
intelligence community might need the assistance of a U.S. 
																																																																																																																						
 117. KRIS & WILSON, NSIAP, § 16:3. 
 118. S. Rep. No. 95-701, at 34 (1978). 
 119. See KRIS & WILSON, NSIAP, § 16:3, citing § 16.4 (“A review of telecommunica-
tions history . . . shows this claim to be exaggerated: the transition from satellite to 
cable was neither as dramatic, nor as unanticipated, as the government argued.”). 
 120. Id. 
 121. For discussion of this point, see KRIS & WILSON, NSIAP, § 16.5. 
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company. The location of the actual intercept was a matter of 
accident, not design—and entirely outside the government’s 
control. The location turned on where the company had chosen 
to concentrate the flow of traffic. So, where previously the 
wiretap offshore would not trigger the protections of tradition-
al FISA, the same wiretap just inside US borders would—even 
where the same conversation or communication was being ob-
tained. The problem with this argument is that it was precisely 
the point of FISA to draw a line at the border of the country. 
Trying to move that line a matter of feet and call it a day fell 
short of understanding the point of the statute. 
In light of all three arguments, Members of Congress began to 
focus on the need to “modernize” FISA.122 The FAA, however, 
still only reaches electronic communications as defined in FISA. 
Other forms of foreign intelligence collection continue to be gov-
erned by executive order. 
2. Executive Order 13,470 
Executive Order 12,333 has thrice been amended.123 The most 
recent, in July 2008, drew attention to areas outside the traditional 
foreign intelligence emphasis.124 
The new order emphasized that intelligence collection should 
be conducted in a manner consistent with the intelligence priori-
ties set by the President, with “[s]pecial emphasis” given to de-
tecting and countering not just espionage, but “[t]hreats to the 
																																																																																																																						
 122. See, e.g., 154 CONG. REC. S6379 (daily ed. July 8, 2008) (statement of Sen. 
Cardin) (“Congress must indeed make needed changes to FISA to account for 
changes in technology and rulings from the FISA Court involving purely interna-
tional communications that pass through telecommunications routes in the United 
States.”); 154 CONG. REC. H5759 (daily ed. June 20, 2008) (statement of Sen. Blunt) 
(“We modernized the law to adapt to changes in technology since the 1978 FISA 
statute. The bill would accomplish all this while adding new protections and 
strengthening the individual liberties and privacy protections of Americans.”); 
154 CONG. REC. H5767 (daily ed. June 20, 2008) (statement of Rep. Pelosi) (“[W]e 
all recognize the changes in technology necessitate a change in the legislation, and 
this legislation today modernizes our intelligence-gathering system by recogniz-
ing and responding to technological developments that have occurred since the 
original FISA Act in 1978.”). 
 123. Exec. Order No. 13,284, 68 Fed. Reg. 4,075 (Jan. 23, 2003); Exec. Order No. 
13,355, 69 Fed. Reg. 53,593 (Aug. 27, 2004); Exec. Order No. 13,470, 73 Fed. Reg. 
45,325 (July 30, 2008). 
 124. Exec. Order No. 13,470, 73 Fed. Reg. 45,325. 
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United States and its interests from terrorism; and [t]hreats to the 
United States and its interests from the development, possession, 
proliferation, or use of weapons of mass destruction.” 125  The 
amendments directed the intelligence community to take into ac-
count state, local, and private sector responsibilities and require-
ments “when undertaking the collection and dissemination of in-
formation and intelligence.” 126  In addition, the new order 
incorporated the Director of National Intelligence into the intelli-
gence infrastructure.127 
Some of the language signaled a shift in how the NSA would be 
using its authority under the FAA. Where previously the order 
prohibited the dissemination of unminimized Signals Intelligence 
(SIGINT) pertaining to U.S. persons, the new order allowed dis-
semination subject to procedures developed by the DNI in coor-
dination with the Secretary of Defense and approved by the At-
torney General.128 This change enabled other agencies to obtain 
SIGINT to ascertain whether the information could be kept, at 
which point it becomes subject to that agency’s U.S. person 
rules (pursuant to the first part of Executive Order 12,333, Sec-
tion 2.3).129 The sharing and evaluation of unminimized SIGINT 
data thus appears to create an internal process that can be 
thought of as a form of intelligence “discovery.” Although the 
previous order required that intelligence be collected in a manner 
consistent with the restrictions in FISA and Executive Order 
12,333, the amendments only required that information be collect-
ed subject to restrictions in FISA.130 This change made a differ-
																																																																																																																						
 125. Id. at § 2, Pt. 1.1(d). 
 126. Id. at § 2, Pt. 1.1(f). 
 127. See id. at § 2, Pts. 1.3–1.6. 
 128. Compare Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200, § 2.3 (1982), with Exec. Order 
No. 13,470, 73 Fed. Reg. 45,325, § 3(p). The new order replaced all references to 
“agencies” with “elements,” referring to entities with intelligence responsibilities. 
 129. The relevant DNI/DOD/AG procedures, if they have been developed, have 
not been declassified. 
 130. Compare Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200, § 2.5 (“Electronic surveillance, 
as defined in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, shall be conducted 
in accordance with that Act, as well as this Order.”), with Exec. Order No. 13,470, 
73 Fed. Reg. 45,325, § 3(y) (deleting sentence quoted in prior citation and replac-
ing with: “The authority delegated pursuant to this paragraph, including the au-
thority to approve the use of electronic surveillance as defined in the Foreign In-
telligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, shall be exercised in accordance 
with that Act.”). 
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ence. The FAA, for instance, amended FISA to allow for U.S. per-
son data to be retained to protect life and property, and for the 
NSA to retain encrypted communications. Under Executive Order 
12,333’s more general guidelines, these practices would not have 
been allowed; however, they appear now to fall within the scope 
of intelligence agencies’ authorities. 
Some of the regulations implementing Executive Order 12,333 
have been made publicly available.131 But many of the guidelines, 
and the programs conducted under the order, remain veiled from 
public scrutiny. Even Congress has limited view. Although the 
procedures approved by the Attorney General under the order 
must be provided to the Congressional intelligence committees,132 
SSCI Chairman, Senator Dianne Feinstein, has acknowledged that 
the committee does not conduct extensive oversight of intelli-
gence gathering conducted under the order’s auspices.133 
The Snowden documents provide some detail on different 
ways in which the order appears to be interpreted and used. Ac-
cessing social network data or stored information (for example, 
address book contacts, “buddy lists,” and draft e-mails) may fall 
within Executive Order 12,333, insofar as FISA does not apply.134 
																																																																																																																						
 131. See, e.g. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, The Attorney 
General’s Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations (Sept. 29, 2008), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/readingroom/guidelines.pdf [http://perma.cc/G8XH-
UMRY]. A Fact Sheet explaining the new Domestic Operations Guidelines is 
available at: http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2008/October/08-ag-889.html [http:// 
perma.cc/X5HC-ZAVM] (addressing the FBI’s primary investigative activities 
within the United States related to law enforcement, counterintelligence, and col-
lection of foreign intelligence). For a thoughtful discussion of how these guide-
lines differ from their predecessors see Kris & Wilson, NSIAP, §§ 2.16–2.18. 
 132. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200, § 3.3. 
 133. Barton Gellman & Ashkan Soltani, NSA Infiltrates Links to Yahoo, Google 
Data Centers Worldwide, Snowden Documents Say, WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 2013, availa-
ble at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-infiltrates-
links-to-yahoo-google-data-centers-worldwide-snowden-documents-say/2013/10/ 
30/e51d661e-4166-11e3-8b74-d89d714ca4dd_story.html [http://perma.cc/JR36-
2V45]. Kris & Wilson note that there is an additional statutory requirement that 
the President keep the congressional intelligence committees “fully and currently 
informed of the intelligence activities of the United States.” See 50 U.S.C. § 413 
(2012). They point out, however, that the Bush Administration made concerted 
efforts to protect what was seen as the President’s inherent constitutional authori-
ties with regard to foreign affairs—including not informing Congress of certain 
activities. See generally KRIS & WILSON, NSIAP, § 2.7. 
 134. For slides detailing collection of this data and released by Edward Snow-
den, see Barton Gellman & Matt DeLong, The NSA’s Problem? Too Much Data, 
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For example, Section 703 applies to stored electronic data ac-
quired in the United States in the process of targeting U.S. persons 
overseas. It would thus cover the acquisition of U.S. persons’ 
buddy lists on U.S. soil.135 FISA would not, however, govern the 
overseas acquisition of buddy lists of non-U.S. persons located 
abroad. This acquisition would come within Executive Order 
12,333. Similarly, to the extent that social network information, 
such as Instagram postings, fall outside FISA’s definition of elec-
tronic surveillance or stored communications, regardless of 
whether a U.S. person is located inside or outside the country, col-
lection would be governed by the weaker restrictions of Executive 
Order 12,333. 
These other types of programs can potentially yield significant 
amounts of information. The NSA appears to be collecting e-
mail address books for most major webmail companies, and 
storing the information in multiple databases.136 According to 
the Washington Post, the yield is “hundreds of millions of contact 
lists from personal e-mail and instant messaging accounts 
around the world.”137 On any representative day, in turn, the 
NSA appears to collect approximately half a million buddy lists 
and inboxes (which frequently include the first part of the mes-
sages that have been sent).138 
Another example of collection under Executive Order 12,333 is 
the interception of content flowing between data centers overseas. 
In October 2013, the Washington Post reported that the NSA was 
collecting hundreds of millions of records, ranging from metadata 
to content, transiting fiber optics cables between Google and Ya-
hoo data centers.139 The principal tool used to analyze the infor-
																																																																																																																						
WASH. POST, available at http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/world/the-nsas-
overcollection-problem/517/#document/p4/a126384 [http://perma.cc/PG4G-FRH8]. 
 135. See FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, § 703(a), 122 Stat. 
2436, 2448 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1881(b) (2012)). 
 136. See Gellman & DeLong, supra note 1344, at slide on p. 3. MARINA centers 
on internet metadata; MAINWAY focuses on telephone metadata for contact 
chaining; and PINWALE concentrates on written content. Id. 
 137. Barton Gellman & Ashkan Soltani, NSA Collects Millions of E-mail Address Books 
Globally, WASH. POST, Oct. 14, 2013, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
world/national-security/nsa-collects-millions-of-e-mail-address-books-
globally/2013/10/14/8e58b5be-34f9-11e3-80c6-7e6dd8d22d8f_story.html 
[http://perma.cc/3FQX-AYST]. 
 138. Gellman & DeLong, supra note 134, at slide on p. 4. 
 139. Gellman & Soltani, NSA Infiltrates Links, supra note 133. 
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mation, MUSCULAR, appears to be operated jointly with the 
U.K.’s Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ).140 
The collection of information held on the cloud, outside U.S. bor-
ders, shifts the program outside the FISA framework.141 
With GCHQ in mind, it is worth noting an additional exception 
to both FISA and Executive Order 12,333: to the extent that it is 
not the United States engaged in the collection of information, 
but, rather, one of our allies, rules that otherwise limit the U.S. 
intelligence community may not apply. From the language of the 
order, it appears that the United States may receive or benefit from 
other countries’ collection of information on U.S. citizens, where it 
does not actively participate in the collection or specifically re-
quest other countries to carry out the collection at its behest.142 In 
turn, the United States can provide information about foreign citi-
zens to their governments that their intelligence agencies, under 
their domestic laws, might otherwise be unable to collect. To the 
extent that the programs underway are extended to the closely 
allied “Five Eyes” (Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, the 
United States, and New Zealand), structural demarcations offer a 
way around the legal restrictions otherwise enacted to protect cit-
izen rights in each region. 
II. PROGRAMMATIC COLLECTION143 
Almost immediately after passage of the FAA, members of 
Congress, scholars, and others began criticizing Section 702 be-
																																																																																																																						
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. The order states with regard to indirect participation, “No element of the Intel-
ligence Community shall participate in or request any person to undertake activities 
forbidden by this Order.” Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200, § 2.12 (1982), as amend-
ed by Exec. Order No. 13,470, 73 Fed. Reg. 45,325, § 3(ii) (July 30, 2008). This prohibits 
the intelligence community from actively participating in collection, or requesting 
other countries to engage in collection, outside the confines of the order; however, it 
does not appear to prohibit the intelligence community from simply receiving or bene-
fiting from other countries’ actions in this regard. 
 143. By “programmatic collection” I refer to a method of collection involving 
indiscriminate surveillance. The scanning of e-mail communications for reference 
to selectors, targets, or key words, is thus programmatic. It is not limited to the 
communications of particular individuals but, rather, monitors the communica-
tions of all individuals passing through particular points. 
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cause of the potential for the government to use the authorities to 
engage in programmatic surveillance.144 
In 2009 prominent national security law Professor William 
Banks explained, “the FAA targets do not have to be suspected of 
being an agent of a foreign power or, for that matter, they do not 
have to be suspected of terrorism or any national security offense, 
so long as the collection of foreign intelligence is a significant pur-
pose of the surveillance.”145 Surveillance could be directed at a 
person, organization, e-mail address, or even “an entire ISP or 
area code.”146 He noted, “the surveillance permitted under the 
FAA does not require that the Government identify a particular 
known facility where the intercepted communications occur.”147 
These provisions represented a sea change from how FISA had 
previously worked (albeit introducing, for the first time, statutory 
restrictions in an area previously governed by Executive Order). 
U.S. persons’ communications now could be incidentally collected 
under the statute, on a large scale, without many of the protec-
tions in traditional FISA.148 
Banks presciently pointed out the most likely way in which the 
new authorities would be used: 
Although details of the implementation of the pro-
gram . . . are not known, a best guess is the Government uses 
a broad vacuum cleaner-like first stage of collection, focus-
ing on transactional data, where wholesale interception oc-
curs following the development and implementation of fil-
tering criteria. Then the NSA engages in a more 
particularized collection of content after analyzing mined 
data . . . [A]ccidental or incidental acquisition of U.S. persons 
inside the United States [will] surely occur[], especially in 
light of the difficulty of ascertaining a target’s location.149 
For Professor Banks, part of the problem was that the nature of 
international information flows meant that it would be impossible 
																																																																																																																						
 144. See, e.g., Banks, supra note 52. 
 145. Id. at 5013–14. 
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 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 5014. 
 149. Id. at 5014–15. 
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to tell if an individual is located overseas or within domestic 
bounds.150 
Banks was not the only one to question the implementation of 
Section 702. Cases began to appear, raising facial and as applied 
constitutional challenges. Problems characteristic of relying on 
Article III courts in the context of surveillance came to the fore. In 
Clapper v. Amnesty International, plaintiffs alleged that Section 702 
violated the targets’ Fourth Amendment rights because it allowed 
for the acquisition of international communications absent an in-
dividualized court order supported by probable cause.151 The Su-
preme Court dismissed the suit for lack of standing—that is, the 
absence of any concrete injury. It did not reach the merits of the 
Fourth Amendment claim.152 
The FAA was set to expire at the end of 2012. By early Febru-
ary, James Clapper, the Director of National Intelligence, and At-
torney General Eric Holder had informed Congressional leaders 
that reauthorization of the FAA was “the top legislative priority of 
the national Intelligence Community.” 153  The Administration 
credited the FAA with the production of “significant intelligence 
that is vital to protect the nation against international terrorism 
																																																																																																																						
 150. Id. at 5015. In another article, he laid out guidelines for reform: Namely, 
that any applications for programmatic surveillance be based on a demonstration 
that the proposed information collection is material to specific counterterrorist or 
intelligence investigations, that alternative techniques are not available, and that it 
is likely that the program will generate the necessary information. Banks, supra 
note 17, at 1637. Higher protections for personally identifiable information, and its 
dissemination, and FISC review of the programs for First and Fourth Amendment 
implications proved equally important. Banks, supra note 17, at 1637. 
 151. 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013). 
 152. Id. 
 153. Letter from DNI James Clapper and AG Eric Holder to John Boehner, 
Speaker of the House; Harry Reid, Majority Leader, U.S. Senate; Nancy Pelosi, 
Democratic Leader, U.S. House of Representatives, Mitch McConnell, Republican 
Leader, U.S. Senate (Feb. 8, 2012), available at http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/ 
pdfs112th/dni_ag_letter.pdf [http://perma.cc/24FR-BEJ3]. This statement resur-
faced repeatedly over the next six months. See, e.g., Letter from Kathleen Turner, 
Director of Legislative Affairs ODNI and Ronald Weich, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral Office of Legislative Affairs, DOJ, to Dianne Feinstein, Chair, and Saxby 
Chambliss, Vice Chair, Senate Select committee on Intelligence, (May 4, 2012), 
available at http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Ltr%20to%20HPSCI%20Chairman 
%20Rogers%20and%20Ranking%20Member%20Ruppersberger_Scan.pdf [http:// 
perma.cc/9PDN-P9MC] (writing that reauthorization of the FAA was “the top legis-
lative priority of the Intelligence Community.”). 
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and other threats.”154 Offering classified briefings and attaching an 
unclassified annex, Clapper and Holder wrote, “We are always 
considering whether there are changes that could be made to im-
prove the law in a manner consistent with the privacy and civil 
liberties interests of Americans.”155 But their “first priority” was 
“reauthorization of these authorities in their current form.”156 
The NSA’s inability to provide the number of American citi-
zens’ communications intercepted under the act became a matter 
of public debate. In May 2012 Senators Ron Wyden and Mark 
Udall raised concerns about what they referred to as a “back 
door” in the statute.157 In June 2012 SSCI noted numerous sena-
tors’ concern about the IC’s inability to provide an estimate of the 
number of individuals whose communications had been inter-
cepted.158 Attention was further drawn to the lack of information 
about whether the NSA had attempted to search Americans’ 
communications without a warrant.159 By the end of July 2012, 
more than a dozen senators had joined a letter to Director of Na-
tional Intelligence James R. Clapper, expressing alarm “that the 
intelligence community has stated that ‘it is not reasonably possi-
ble to identify the number of people located inside the United 
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 157. On May 4 2012, Senators Wyden and Udall wrote a letter to the Inspector 
General (IG) of the NSA as well as the IG of the Intelligence Community, request-
ing an estimate of “how many people inside the United States have had their 
communications collected or reviewed under the authorities granted by § 702[?]” 
Letter from Ron Wyden, U.S. Sen. and Mark Udall, U.S. Sen. to IG of the Intelli-
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 158 S. REP. NO. 112-174 (2012), available at https://www.fas.org/irp/congress/ 
2012_rpt/faa-extend.html [http://perma.cc/3PDP-DRDT]. 
 159. Udall Calls on Intelligence Director to Provide Answers before Senate Debate on 
FISA Amendments Act, MARK UDALL (July 26, 2012), http://www.markudall. 
senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=2586 [http://perma.cc/SDM2-3K25]. 
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States whose communications may have been reviewed’ under 
the FAA.’”160 
These concerns did not stop the legislation from progressing. 
Congress did not hold any hearings on the renewal bill.161 Efforts 
to amend the legislation failed.162 On September 12, 2012, with 
minimal debate, the House voted to reauthorize the FAA 301-
118.163 The Senate passed the bill at the end of December 2012, 73 
to 23.164 President Obama signed the legislation, extending the 
FAA until Dec. 31, 2017.165 
Six months later, the Snowden documents again forced Section 
702 into the public discussion. The information that has since 
emerged raises statutory and constitutional concerns with regard 
to three areas: targeting, post-targeting analysis, and the use and 
dissemination of information. 
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 165. FISA Amendments Act Reauthorization Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-238. 
126 Stat. 1631 (2012). 
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A. Targeting 
As aforementioned, Section 702 places four limitations on ac-
quisition, each of which is meant to restrict the amount of infor-
mation that can be obtained by the government.166 The NSA has 
sidestepped these statutory restrictions in three important ways: 
first, it has adopted procedures that allow analysts to acquire in-
formation “about” selectors (that is, communications modes used 
by targets) or targets, and not merely communications to or from 
targets (or selectors employed by targets), or information held by 
targets themselves. Second, it has created a presumption of non-
U.S. person status: That is, if an individual is not known to be a 
U.S. person (and thus exempted from Section 702 and treated ei-
ther under Sections 703 and 704 or under traditional FISA, de-
pending on the location), then the NSA assumes that the individ-
ual is a non-U.S. person. Third, the NSA has failed to adopt 
standards that would require it to ascertain whether a target is 
located within domestic bounds. Instead, the agency, having 
looked at the available evidence, absent evidence to the contrary, 
assumes that the target is located outside the United States. These 
interpretations work together to undermine Congress’s addition 
of Sections 703 and 704, even as they open the door to more exten-
sive collection of domestic communications. 
In 2008 Congress anticipated that U.S. person information 
would inadvertently be collected under Section 702. This is in part 
why it included minimization procedures, as well as limits on 
what could be collected. Most Members, however, do not appear 
to have contemplated broad, programmatic collection that would 
undermine protections introduced in Sections 702 and 703. 167 
Those who did articulate this possibility voted against the bill. 
																																																																																																																						
 166. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(b)(1)–(4) (2012). The government may not (a) target indi-
viduals known to be in the United States, (b) engage in reverse targeting (that is, 
target someone outside the U.S. where the purpose is to acquire information 
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munications. The statute also requires that acquisition be performed in a manner 
consistent with the Fourth Amendment. Id. 
 167. Although it could be argued that, in light of TSP, Members should have 
anticipated the potential for programmatic collection, it is important to recognize 
that at the time the 2008 FAA was introduced, many Members still had very little 
information about the extent of the previous programs. It was on these grounds 
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Even if Congress did not initially appreciate the potential for 
programmatic collection, however, certainly by 2012 the intelli-
gence community had made enough information available to 
Congress for Members to make an informed decision. This does 
not mean that all Members were fully informed. But to the extent 
that Members selected not to access the material or to take a pub-
lic stand on the matter, particularly in light of the legislature’s 
reading of its authorities with regard to classification, fault lies 
with Congress. 
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court failed to step into 
the gap. In 2011, FISC realized the implications of the NSA’s in-
terpretation of to, from or about (TFA) collection. However, in 
light of the seriousness of the NSA’s aim (protecting national se-
curity), and the limitations imposed by the types of technologies 
being used, the Court read the statute in a manner that found the 
targeting procedures to be consistent with the statute. 
To the extent that NSA’s TFA and assumptions regarding the 
target’s foreignness undermine the law as it is written, the legisla-
ture failed to perform effective oversight. Congress similarly ne-
glected to uphold the limit placed on the intelligence community 
to not knowingly collect domestic conversations. Instead, it relied 
on FISC to do so—a task that the Court failed to do. In a classified 
environment, when so much information is cloaked from public 
view, it becomes even more important for the government to en-
sure that the authorities as they are publicly presented are con-
sistent with the manner in which they are being exercised. 
1. Information To, From, and About Targets 
The FAA focuses on acquisition with reference to the status and 
location of the target. It is silent on the relationship between the 
target and the information (whether only information held by the 
target, or communications to which the target is a party, may be 
obtained). In the absence of explicit language, the NSA has inter-
preted Section 702 to enable the agency to obtain information 
“about” targets. 
The NSA’s 2009 targeting procedures state that the agency may 
seek “to acquire communications about the target that are not to 
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companies. See generally, 154 CONG. REC. H5740-5773 (daily ed. June 20, 2008). 
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or from the target.” 168  The minimization procedures similarly 
acknowledge the collection of information related to entities of 
interest.169 They explain, “As communication is reviewed, NSA 
analyst(s) will determine whether it is a domestic or foreign 
communication to, from, or about a target and is reasonably be-
lieved to contain foreign intelligence information or evidence of a 
crime.”170 The 2011 minimization procedures retain this focus.171 
In implementing the procedures, the NSA draws a distinction 
between PRISM and upstream collection. In the context of the 
former, the NSA states that it only collects information to or from 
a target using selectors linked to that individual. It does not collect 
communications that are merely “about” a selector (and, by im-
plication, a target).172 The leaked targeting procedures, however, 
make no such distinction between PRISM and upstream collec-
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ligence Surveillance Act Section 702, (2014), available at http://www.dni.gov/ 
files/documents/0421/702%20Unclassified%20Document.pdf [http://perma.cc/ 
4TMV-Y55S] [hereinafter NSA’S IMPLEMENTATION REPORT] (stating that to, from, 
or about collection occurs during what “has generally been referred to as Up-
stream collection” and employs not keywords or particular terms, but communi-
cations modes, such as e-mail addresses or telephone numbers). 
 171. See, e.g., regarding segregated upstream collection information: Nat’l Sec. 
Agency/Cent. Sec. Serv., Exhibit B: Minimization Procedures Used by the National 
Security Agency in Connection with Acquisitions of Foreign Intelligence Infor-
mation Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
1978, as Amended § 3(b)(4) (2011), available at http://www.dni.gov/files/ 
documents/Minimization%20Procedures%20used%20by%20NSA%20in%20 
Connection%20with%20FISA%20SECT%20702.pdf [http://perma.cc/LKY3-J7CR] 
[hereinafter 2011 MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES] (“As a communication is reviewed, 
NSA analyst(s) will determine whether it is a domestic or foreign communication 
to, from or about a target and is reasonably believed to contain foreign intelli-
gence information or evidence of a crime.”); Id. at 3–4 (“NSA analysts seeking to 
use . . . a discrete communication within an Internet transaction that contains mul-
tiple discrete communications will assess whether the discrete communica-
tion . . . is to, from, or about a tasked selector”). 
 172. PCLOB HEARING, supra note 3 at 70. See also NSA DCLPO Report, at 5; 
PCLOB REPORT, supra note 2, at 33. 
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tion, leaving it to the NSA, as a matter of policy, to determine 
when to apply about collection.173 
The NSA adopts a different position with regard to upstream 
collection. The program involves two types of communications: 
telephone and Internet. For the former, as with PRISM, the gov-
ernment states that it only uses to/from, and not “about” inter-
cepts.174 Like the decision with regard to PRISM, this appears to 
be a matter of internal policy. The targeting procedures lay out the 
steps to be taken when the NSA elects to intercept “communica-
tions about the target.” 
For Internet communications, in contrast, the NSA does 
acknowledge that it intercepts communications “about” selec-
tors. 175  The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board 
(PCLOB) explains, “An ‘about’ communication is one in which 
the tasked selector is referenced within the acquired Internet 
transactions, but the target is not necessarily a participant in 
the communication.”176 
																																																																																																																						
 173. NSA TARGETING PROCEDURES, supra note 16, at 1–2 (“[I]n those cases where 
NSA seeks to acquire communications about the target that are not to or from the 
target, NSA will either employ an Internet Protocol filter to ensure that the person 
from whom it seeks to obtain foreign intelligence information is located overseas, 
or it will target Internet links that terminate in a foreign country.”) 
 174. Memorandum Opinion, 2011 WL 10945618, at *5, cited in PCLOB REPORT, 
supra note 2 at 36. 
 175. See, e.g., Memorandum Opinion, 2011 WL 10945618, at *5–6 (discussing the 
government’s representation regarding upstream collection), cited in PCLOB RE-
PORT, supra note 2, at 37. It is worth noting here a discrepancy: according to the 
leaked procedures, the NSA may seek to acquire information “about the target.” 
NSA TARGETING PROCEDURES, supra note 16, at 1–2. The government currently 
appears to understand this to mean “about the selector.” This may be consistent 
with subsequent targeting procedures introduced by the NSA and approved by 
FISC; but the documents that would shed more light on this remain classified. 
Which of these is accurate carries implications for privacy. It is a very different 
enterprise for the NSA to intercept communications based on reference to a per-
son (a target), versus reference to a target’s telephone number or e-mail. 
 176. PCLOB REPORT, supra note 2, at 37. See also Memorandum Opinion, 2011 
WL 10945618, at *5; Joint Statement of Lisa O. Manaco, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral, National Security Division, Department of Justice, et al., Hearing Before the 
House Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence: FISA Amendments Act Reau-
thorization, at 7 (Dec. 8, 2011) (statement of Brad Wiegmann, Deputy Assistant 
Attorney General, National Security Division, DOJ), available at http:// 
www.dni.gov/files/documents/Joint%20Statement%20FAA%20Reauthorization%
20Hearing%20-%20December%202011.pdf [http://perma.cc/XP8U-DRWA]; PCLOB 
HEARING, supra note 3, at 55. 
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PCLOB’s discussion is based in part on classified documents: 
specifically, a September 2008 FISC opinion in which the court 
agreed with the government that by collecting information about 
the selector, the target of the intercept was still the individual as-
sociated with the selector.177 PCLOB noted that FISC had previ-
ously relied upon a congressional report to state that the “target” 
of a traditional FISA order “is the individual or entity . . . about 
whom or from whom information is sought.”178 
There are numerous grounds on which the government’s inter-
pretation of TFA can be challenged. Traditional FISA does not 
apply to communications “about” targets. The legislation is spe-
cific about the facilities to be placed under surveillance, requiring 
that the government establish probable cause that the target will 
actually be using such facilities. The 2002 FISCR opinion cited by 
PCLOB, moreover, pre-dated the introduction of Section 702. In 
addition, the court’s reference to information about the target was 
dicta, and not central to the decision, which related instead to 
whether the primary purpose of the investigation for which in-
formation was sought could be criminal in nature. Without being 
able to read the 2008 FISC opinion, which presumably focused on 
the inclusion of “about,” it is difficult to further assess the strength 
of the government’s argument and the court’s response. 
What is clear is that the inclusion of “about” communications 
significantly expands the volume of Internet intercepts under Sec-
tion 702. By 2011, NSA was acquiring approximately 26.5 million 
Internet transactions per year as part of its upstream collection.179 
Three points related to the volume and intrusiveness of the re-
sulting surveillance deserve notice. First, to obtain “about” com-
munications, because of how the Internet is constructed, the NSA 
must monitor large amounts of data.180 That is, if the NSA may 
																																																																																																																						
 177. PCLOB REPORT, supra note 2, at 37. 
 178. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 740 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) (quoting H.R. Rep. 
95-1283, at 73 (1978); see also PCLOB March 2014 Hearing Transcript, at 55 (state-
ment of Brad Wiegmann, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, National Security 
Division, DOJ) (confirming that FISC held that targeting includes communications 
about a particular selector that are not necessarily to or from that selector). Cited 
in PCLOB REPORT, supra note 2, at 38, note 137. 
 179. Memorandum Opinion, 2011 WL 10945618, at *26. 
 180. See also Charlie Savage, NSA Said to Search Content of Messages to and From 
U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/08/us/broader-
sifting-of-data-abroad-is-seen-by-nsa.html?ref=todayspaper&pagewanted=all&_ 
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collect not just e-mail to or from the target’s e-mail account 
(badguy@ISP.com), but, in addition, other communications hap-
pening to mention badguy@ISP.com that pass through the collec-
tion point, then the NSA is monitoring a significant amount of 
traffic. And the agency is not just considering envelope infor-
mation (for example, messages in which the selector is sending, 
receiving, or copied on the communication) but the actual content 
of messages.181 
Second, wholly domestic conversations may become swept up 
in the surveillance simply by nature of how the Internet is con-
structed. Everything one does online involves packets of infor-
mation. Every Web site, every e-mail, every transfer of documents 
takes the information involved and divides it up into small bun-
dles. Limited in size, these packets contain information about the 
sender’s IP address, the intended receiver’s IP address, something 
that indicates how many packets the communication has been 
divvied up into, and what number in the chain is represented by 
the packet in question.182 
Packet switched networks ship this information to a common 
destination via the most expedient route—one that may, or may 
not, include the other packets of information contained in the 
message. If a roadblock or problem arises in the network, the 
packets can then be re-routed, to reach their final destination. 
Domestic messages may thus be routed through international 
servers, if that is the most efficient route to the final destination. 
What this means is that even if the NSA applies an IP filter to 
eliminate communications that appear to be within the United 
States, it may nevertheless monitor domestic conversations by 
nature of them being routed through foreign servers. In this man-
ner, a student in Chicago may send an e-mail to a student in Bos-
																																																																																																																						
r=0 [http://perma.cc/W94H-VFN6] (discussing to, from, or about collection and 
noting, “To conduct the surveillance, the N.S.A. is temporarily copying and then 
sifting through the contents of what is apparently most e-mails and other text-
based communications that cross the border.”). 
 181. See, e.g., PCLOB REPORT, supra note 2, at 38 (“The NSA cannot, however, 
distinguish in an automated fashion between ‘about’ communications that in-
volve the activity of the target from communications that, for instance, merely 
contain an email address in the body of an email between two non-targets.”). 
 182. The data is contained in the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol 
(TCP/IP) used by the Internet. What is a Packet?, HOW STUFF WORKS, 
http://computer.howstuffworks.com/question525.htm [http://perma.cc/WF7S-WQ5N]. 
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ton that gets routed through a server in Canada. Through no in-
tent or design of the individual in Chicago, the message becomes 
international and thus subject to NSA surveillance. 
Third, further collection of domestic conversations takes place 
through the NSA’s intercept of what are called multi-
communication transactions, or MCTs. It is important to distin-
guish here between a transaction and a communication. Some 
transactions have only single communications associated with 
them. These are referred to as SCTs. Other transactions contain 
multiple communications. If even one of the communications in 
an MCT falls within the NSA’s surveillance, all of the communica-
tions bundled into the MCT are collected. 
The consequence is of significant import. FISC estimated in 
2011 that somewhere between 300,000 and 400,000 MCTs were 
being collected annually on the basis of “about” communica-
tion—where the “active user” was not the target. So hundreds 
of thousands of communications were being collected that did 
not include the target as either the sender or the recipient of the 
communication.183 
																																																																																																																						
 183. PCLOB REPORT, supra note 2 at 38. In July 2014 the Washington Post made 
headlines when it focused on the scope of communications caught in the system. 
The article noted that ordinary Internet users significantly outnumber targeted for-
eigners. Barton Gellman, Julie Tate, and Ashkan Soltani, In NSA-intercepted data, 
Those Not Targeted Far Outnumber the Foreigners Who Are, WASH. POST, July 5, 2014, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/in-nsa-intercepted-data-
those-not-targeted-far-outnumber-the-foreigners-who-are/2014/07/05/8139adf8-
045a-11e4-8572-4b1b969b6322_story.html [http://perma.cc/T5UE-MKBZ]. Following 
a four month investigation based on documents leaked by Edward Snowden, the 
Post found that nine out of ten account holders found in a cache of conversations 
had not themselves been the target of any investigation. Id. The story, however, 
failed to distinguish between individuals in direct contact with targets and those 
subject to “about” collection. For further critique of the article see Bob Cesca, Sig-
nificant Holes Emerge in the Washington Post’s NSA Story After It’s Too Late, THE 
DAILY BANTER, Jul. 8, 2014, http://thedailybanter.com/2014/07/significant-holes-
emerge-washington-posts-nsa-story-late/ [http://perma.cc/2A9X-Y4K2]. For a re-
sponse to this and other critiques see Barton Gellman, How 160,000 intercepted 
Communications Led to Our Latest NSA Story: the Debrief, WASH. POST. July 11, 2014, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/your-questions-
answered-about-the-posts-recent-investigation-of-nsa-surveillance/2014/07/11/ 
43d743e6-0908-11e4-8a6a-19355c7e870a_story.html [http://perma.cc/7GH3-AQ23]. 
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2. Foreignness Determinations 
Targeting procedures require NSA analysts to make a determi-
nation regarding the location and legal status of a potential target 
(together referred to as the “foreignness determination”).184 Two 
related interpretations have allowed the NSA to push the statuto-
ry limits: first is the assumption, having looked at the evidence 
available, that a target outside the United States or in an unknown 
location is a non-U.S. person, absent evidence to the contrary; sec-
ond, where the target is not known to be inside the United States, 
the NSA presumes that the target is located outside domestic bor-
ders. These assumptions raise question about the level of due dil-
igence required to ascertain status and location, tilt the deck in 
favor of allowing collection, and create, in at least some cases, a 
circular pattern. 
The FAA is largely silent about what burden must be borne by 
the government to establish whether the target is a U.S. person. 
Instead, Section 702 directs the Attorney General to adopt target-
ing procedures reasonably designed (a) to ensure acquisition is 
limited to persons reasonably believed to be outside U.S.; and (b) 
to prevent the acquisition of domestic communications.185 
In other words, the statute only requires that the NSA not know 
(a) that the target is in the U.S.; or (b) that it is intercepting entirely 
domestic communications. There is nothing in the targeting re-
quirements requiring intelligence agencies to take certain steps to 
ascertain whether the target is a U.S. person or what must be done 
to ascertain the target’s location. 
Sections 703 and 704, which are designed to deal with U.S. per-
sons, say nothing in turn about what is required to demonstrate 
whether a target either is or is not a U.S. person.186 Instead, these 
provisions address situations where the applicant has probable 
cause to believe that the target is a person outside the United 
States and is a foreign power, an agent of a foreign power, or an 
officer or employee thereof.187 
																																																																																																																						
 184. Legal status means whether a target is a U.S. person or a non-U.S. person. 
 185. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(d) (2012). 
 186. 50 U.S.C. § 1881b(b) (2012). 
 187. 50 U.S.C. § 1881b(b)(C) (2012) (containing Section 703); id. § 1881c(c)(B) 
(containing Section 704). 
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In the absence of statutory guidance, the NSA interprets the 
statute to allow the agency to assume that the target is a non-U.S. 
person where there is not sufficient evidence to the contrary.188 
The NSA’s minimization procedures explain: 
A person known to be currently outside the United States, or 
whose location is unknown, will not be treated as a United 
States person unless such person can be positively identified 
as such, or the nature or circumstances of the person’s com-
munications give rise to a reasonable belief that such person 
is a United States person.189 
Thus, an important question is what specific steps must the NSA 
take in order to determine the legal status of the target.190 
The Targeting Procedures do not set a high bar. When referring 
to databases or other surveillance systems that could be consulted 
to determine whether the target is a U.S. person or a non-U.S. per-
son, the document uses the word “may”—the present tense artic-
ulation of a mere possibility. As an auxiliary verb, it adds a func-
tional meaning to the resultant clause—specifically, in the case of 
“may,” to intone possibility in a manner that equally incorporates 
the possibility of “may not.” The NSA thus may consult its data-
bases to determine whether a target is a U.S. person. It also may 
decide not to. At no point does the document itself suggest what 
the NSA “must” do.191 
																																																																																																																						
 188. NSA TARGETING PROCEDURES, supra note 16, at 4 (“In the absence of specif-
ic information regarding whether a target is a United States person, a person rea-
sonably believed to be located outside the United States or whose location is not 
known will be presumed to be a non-United States person . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 189. 2009 MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES, supra note 169, at § 2(j)(2). 
 190. PCLOB HEARING, supra note 3, at 41. 
 191. In response to public concerns about the use of a majority “foreignness” 
test, the NSA’s new Privacy and Civil Liberties Officer reported in April 2014 that 
the agency employs a totality of circumstances test:  
This is not a 51% to 49% ‘foreignness’ test. Rather the NSA analyst will 
check multiple sources and make a decision based on the totality of the 
information available. If the analyst discovers any information indicating 
the targeted person may be located in the U.S. or that the target may be a 
U.S. person, such information must be considered. In other words, if 
there is conflicting information about the location of the person or the 
status of the person as a non-U.S. person, that conflict must be resolved 
before targeting can occur. 
NSA’S IMPLEMENTATION REPORT, supra note 170, at 4. 
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Once analysts have information about the target, the next ques-
tion is how to weigh the evidence. Here, the test employed ap-
pears to be a totality of the circumstances. As Raj De, General 
Counsel of the NSA, explained: 
[A]n analyst must take into account all available infor-
mation . . . [A]n analyst cannot ignore any contrary infor-
mation to suggest that that is not the correct status of the 
person . . . [A]ny such determination is very fact-specific to 
the particular facts at hand.192 
De illustrated the point with reference to a hypothetical used in 
the NSA’s internal training manual: Say that an analyst has four 
pieces of information, two of which suggest U.S. person status 
and two of which indicate non-U.S. person status. A majoritarian 
test would be insufficient.193 De explained that, “[o]ne must take 
into account the strength, credibility, and import of all relevant 
information.” 194 Once deciding, “analysts have an affirmative ob-
ligation to periodically revisit the foreignness determination.”195 
It does not appear that analysts are required to document the 
basis for the non-U.S. person determination.196 This practice dif-
fers from that adopted in relation to location determinations. Ac-
cording to a 2012 declassified (and heavily redacted) compliance 
report, after making a location determination, analysts are re-
quired to “document in the tasking database a citation to the in-
formation that led them to reasonably believe that a targeted per-
son is located outside the United States.”197 The citation entered 
																																																																																																																						
 192. PCLOB HEARING, supra note 3, at 41. 
 193. See also NSA’s Implementation Report, supra note 170 at 4 (“This is not a 
51% to 49% ‘foreignness’ test.”); PCLOB Report, supra note 2, at 44 (“The govern-
ment has stated, and the Board’s review has confirmed, that this is not a ‘51% to 
49% test.’”). 
 194. PCLOB HEARING, supra note 3, at 42. 
 195. Id. 
 196. See, e.g., PCLOB REPORT, supra note 2, at 46 (“[A]s a matter of NSA policy, 
as opposed to a requirement in the NSA targeting procedures, NSA analysts doc-
ument the assessed non-U.S. person status of the target, but analysts do not sepa-
rately document the basis for this non-U.S. person determination.”). 
 197. Att’y Gen. & Dir. of Nat’l intelligence, Semiannual Assessment of Compli-
ance with Procedures & Guidelines Issued Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act, Reporting Period: June 1, 2012–Nov. 30, 2012, at A-5 
(2013) [AUG. 2013 SEMIANNUAL ASSESSMENT], available at http://www.dni.gov/files/ 
documents/Semiannual%20Assessment%20of%20Compliance%20with%20 
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“is a reference that includes the source of the information [RE-
DACTED].” Such source records cited are “contained in a variety 
of NSA data repositories” or consist of “lead information” from 
other agencies, “such as disseminated intelligence reports.”198 The 
inclusion of this information enables oversight personnel “to lo-
cate and review the information that led the analyst to his/her rea-
sonable belief.”199 PCLOB sidestepped concern about the failure of 
the NSA to document the legal status determination on the 
grounds that “[i]n general . . . the non-U.S. person analysis is 
based upon same information that underlies the determination 
regarding the target’s location.”200 
The board failed to consider how the assumed commonality 
undermines an important check on the collection of intelligence: 
namely, the ability to subject the determination to a meaningful 
level of review. This was precisely the board’s criticism with re-
gard to NSA’s omission of evidence documenting the foreign in-
telligence purpose of collection.201 It is not clear why the same 
analysis would not apply. 
Like the legal status determination, the specific steps required 
to make a location determination are not included in the statute. 
The targeting procedures, in turn, come down on the side of 
greater flexibility for the NSA. The agency “may also review in-
formation in its databases” to ascertain if the target is overseas.202 
It is not required to do so. Similarly, the “NSA may also apply 
technical analysis concerning the facility from which it intends to 
acquire foreign intelligence information . . . .”203 It is under no pro-
cedural obligation to do so.204 It is thus unclear, for both status and 
																																																																																																																						
procedures%20and%20guidelines%20issued%20pursuant%20to%20Sect%20702 
%20of%20FISA.pdf [http://perma.cc/TN8X-8E9W]. 
 198. Id. at A-6. 
 199. Id. at A-5. The text continues, “Analysts must also identify the foreign 
power or foreign territory about which they expect the proposed targeting will 
obtain foreign intelligence information.” Id. 
 200. PCLOB REPORT, supra note 2, at 46. 
 201. See infra part II.A.3. 
 202. NSA TARGETING PROCEDURES, supra note 16, at 2. 
 203. Id. at 3. 
 204. Emphasis, instead, is placed on the back-end. 2009 MINIMIZATION PROCE-
DURES, supra note 169, at § 3(d)(1): 
In the event that NSA determines that a person is reasonably believed to 
be located outside the United States and after targeting this person learns 
that the person is inside the United States, or if NSA concludes that a 
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location determinations, what level of due diligence is required, 
with the deck tilted in favor of acquisition.205 
It is not clear the extent to which statutory vagueness influences 
the scope of collection. As a practical matter, there may not be 
many cases in which the NSA lacks information about the target’s 
identity. Some sort of information must be available to ascertain 
that the information to be collected is of some foreign intelligence 
value. Precisely what level of information is sufficient, however, is 
not (at least as a public matter) clear. For the cases in which the 
only information available is that of a selector, only two assump-
tions are possible: Either one presumes that the individual is for-
eign and thus commences acquisition, or one presumes that the 
target is a U.S. person and thus falls within Sections 703–704. If 
the individual is known to be outside the United States, under a 
rational basis standard, it is logical to assume that he or she is 
more likely to be a non-U.S. person than a U.S. person. A substan-
tially higher percentage of individuals outside the U.S. are non-
U.S. persons. But in order for this to hold, the NSA must know at 
																																																																																																																						
person who at the time of targeting was believed to be a non-United 
States person is in fact a United States person, the acquisition from that 
person will be terminated without delay. 
 205. PCLOB states (without citation), “The government has stated that in mak-
ing this foreignness determination the NSA targeting procedures inherently im-
pose a requirement that analysts conduct “due diligence” in identify-
ing . . . relevant circumstances.” PCLOB REPORT, supra note 2, at 43. The board 
also notes that “a failure by an NSA analyst to conduct due diligence in identify-
ing relevant circumstances regarding the location and U.S. person status of a Sec-
tion 702 target is a reportable compliance incident to the FISC.” Id., at 43. Howev-
er, the board does not specify how the agency ensures due diligence even as it 
notes that “[w]hat constitutes due diligence will vary depending on the target . . . 
.” Id., at 43–44. Without more information, it is difficult to assess how much lee-
way is granted. Press reports suggest that the NSA assumes foreignness where the 
selector is being accessed from a foreign IP address, or where international loca-
tions are embedded in Yahoo tracking cookies—the former being common for 
Americans traveling abroad or using proxies to redirect data traffic, and the latter 
notoriously regarded in the advertising world as unreliable indicators of location. 
See Barton Gellman, Julie Tate, and Ashkan Soltani, In NSA-intercepted data, those 
not targeted far outnumber the foreigners who are, WASH. POST (July 5, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/in-nsa-intercepted-
data-those-not-targeted-far-outnumber-the-foreigners-who-are/2014/07/05/ 
8139adf8-045a-11e4-8572-4b1b969b6322_story.html [http://perma.cc/KY7W-
KYB6]. Without more publicly available information, the strength of these claims 
is difficult to evaluate. 
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the outset that the individual is outside the U.S. The circularity of 
the assumptions adopted by the NSA thus matter. 
At some level, as a matter of status and location, the default 
makes sense. Intelligence collection at the point of communication 
is a binary system. Failure to intercept the conversation may mean 
a (permanent) loss of the information. Under this approach, it is 
better to make the assumption and to collect the information, put-
ting more emphasis on post-tasking review by ODNI and DOJ 
and purge requirements, if a target is later found to be a U.S. per-
son or located within domestic bounds. 
But there are dangers of approaching intelligence collection in 
this manner. Certainly, the structure creates a disincentive for due 
diligence to affirmatively ascertain the status or location of the 
target—one, in this case, reinforced by judicial fiat. 
3. Foreign Intelligence Purpose Determination 
Once a foreignness determination is made, NSA analysts must 
ascertain “how, when, with whom, and where” the target com-
municates.206 From this, the analyst identifies “specific communi-
cations modes,” obtaining identifiers linked to the target—
subsequently referred to as “selectors.” For each selector, NSA 
analysts must determine the expected foreign intelligence infor-
mation, as well as information that would lead one to reasonably 
conclude that the selector is associated with a non-U.S. person 
outside the United States.207 
The vagueness of what is understood as foreign intelligence in-
formation is of note.208 The NSA Director of Civil Liberties and 
																																																																																																																						
 206. NSA’S IMPLEMENTATION REPORT, supra note 170, at 4. 
 207. Id. at 4–5. See also PCLOB REPORT, supra note 2, at 45. 
 208. The term “foreign intelligence information” is not defined in the Section 
702 Minimization Procedures. The procedures define “foreign communications” 
broadly to mean “a communication that has at least one communicant outside of 
the United States.” 2009 MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES, supra note 169, at § 2. The 
term is, however, defined in traditional FISA as: 
(1) information that relates to, and if concerning a United States person is 
necessary to, the ability of the United States to protect against— 
(A) actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign 
power or an agent of a foreign power; 
(B) sabotage, international terrorism, or the international proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign 
power; or 
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Privacy ties the contours of what qualifies to a Section 702 certifi-
cation.209 One semiannual assessment notes merely that the for-
eign power or foreign territory about which information is being 
sought must be documented.210  Although the targeting proce-
dures, as of the time of writing, are still classified, PCLOB report-
ed in July 2014 that they “include a non-exclusive list of factors 
that the NSA will consider in determining whether the tasking of 
a selector will be likely to result in foreign intelligence information 
falling within one of the Section 702 certifications.”211 However, 
unlike the location portion of the foreignness determination, ana-
lysts are not required under the targeting procedures to document 
the reasons that led the analyst to make the foreign intelligence 
purpose determination. 
PCLOB recognized the weakness of this approach: 
In the Board’s view, this reduced documentation regarding 
the foreign intelligence purpose determination results in a 
less rigorous review by the NSA’s external overseers of the 
																																																																																																																						
(C) clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or network 
of a foreign power or by an agent of a foreign power; or 
(2) information with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that 
relates to, and if concerning a United States person is necessary to— 
 (A) the national defense or the security of the United States; or 
 (B) the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States.  
50 U.S.C. § 1801(e) (2012). 
 The items listed under (1) are consistent with FISA and, in particular, the criminal 
aspects of behavior that the statute is meant to address. They key to establishing the 
target of surveillance as a foreign power (or an agent thereof), or the involvement of 
the target (if a U.S. person) in illegal activities (such as sabotage, international terror-
ism, or the international proliferation of WMD). Item (2), in contrast, is much less pre-
cise. The terminology speaks to the importance of intelligence generally and U.S. na-
tional security and foreign affairs interests—areas that may incorporate broad swathes 
of information. A strong argument could be made, for instance, that conversations 
related to international trade, economic stability, other countries’ foreign policy goals, 
new technologies, energy security, and food security all constitute foreign intelligence. 
See, e.g., Laura Poitras et al., Ally and Target: US Intelligence Watches Germany Closely, 
DER SPIEGEL ONLINE INTERNATIONAL (Aug. 12, 2013, 12:44 PM), http:// 
www.spiegel.de/international/world/germany-is-a-both-a-partner-to-and-a-target-of-
nsa-surveillance-a-916029.html [http://perma.cc/M5FT-SMHK] (citing an April 2013 
NSA document as highlighting these intelligence priorities for U.S. surveillance of 
European Union). As such, they are legitimate interests to be pursued under the exer-
cise of Section 702 authorities, as applied overseas to non-U.S. persons. 
 209. NSA’S IMPLEMENTATION REPORT, supra note 170, at 4. 
 210. AUG. 2013 SEMIANNUAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 197, at A-5. 
 211. PCLOB REPORT, supra note 2, at 45. 
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foreign intelligence purpose determinations than the NSA’s 
foreignness determination.212 
4. Result of Statutory Interpretations 
The component statutory interpretations, particularly TFA and 
the assumptions that mark the foreignness determination, un-
dermine the protections created for U.S. persons in Sections 703 
and 704 of the statute. They make it possible for the NSA to obtain 
significant amounts of American citizens’ communications. 
Until the FAA, the surveillance of U.S. persons outside domes-
tic bounds took place under the weaker standards of Executive 
Order 12,333. Part of the purpose of the FAA was thus to increase 
the protections afforded to U.S. persons travelling abroad.213 The 
way in which Section 702 is being used, however, allows the NSA 
to bypass Section 703 by making assumptions about legal status 
and location and potentially subjecting U.S. persons to surveil-
lance without meeting the requirements of Section 703. 
The amount of information at stake is not insubstantial. For 
years, the volume of intercepts under Section 702 has been one of 
the principal concerns of legislators familiar with the program. 
Senators have consistently expressed unease about the intelli-
gence community’s claim that it is impossible to quantify how 
many Americans’ communications have been implicated in the 
operation of Section 702.214 What has gradually become clear is 
																																																																																																																						
 212. Id. at 46. 
 213. In Section 703, to target a U.S. person overseas, the government must sub-
mit an application to FISC identifying the target and the facts and circumstances 
undergirding probable cause that the target is a foreign power or an agent of a 
foreign power. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1881b(b)-(c), 1881c(b)-(c) (2012). There are short-term 
provisions in the event of emergency situations; within seven days, however, the 
government must make formal application to the court. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1881b(d), 
1881c(d). The government must establish probable cause that the target is located 
outside the United States—a higher standard than required under Executive Or-
der 12,333, which only dictated that the AG determine that the technique was 
being used against a foreign power or an agent thereof. Id. 
 214. This statement has been made by ODNI, the NSA IG, and the IC IG. See Letter 
from I. Charles McCullough, III, IG of the Intelligence Cmty., to Senators Ron Wyden 
and Mark Udall, Washington, DC (June 15, 2012), available at http://www. 
wired.com/images_blogs/dangerroom/2012/06/IC-IG-Letter.pdf [http://perma.cc/ 
H7ME-CQCZ] (“I defer to [the NSA IG’s] conclusion that obtaining such an estimate 
[of ‘how many people inside the United States have had their communications collect-
ed or reviewed under the authorities granted by section 702’] was beyond the capacity 
of his office and dedicating sufficient additional resources would likely impede the 
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that the program significantly more expansive than initially un-
derstood.215 
																																																																																																																						
NSA’s mission.”). Part of the unease stems from the fact that the NSA had been able to 
provide a rough estimate of domestic communications, in classified form, to FISC. 
Judge Bates asked the NSA to undertake a manual review of a statistical subsection of 
transactions collected through upstream intercepts in the first six months of 2011. 
Based on the results, Bates estimated that the NSA was collecting up to 56,000 citizen 
communications annually (46,000 of which consisted entirely of U.S. citizens’ commu-
nications—in other words, Single Communication Transactions—and 10,000 of which 
became part of Multiple Communication Transactions). [Redacted], 2011 WL 
10945618, at *11 (FISA Ct. Oct. 3, 2011). See also Senator Ron Wyden, Keynote address 
at Cato Institute: NSA Surveillance: What We Know; What to do About It (Oct. 9, 
2013), available at http://www.cato.org/events/nsa-surveillance-what-we-know-what-
do-about-it [http://perma.cc/E4XJ-VCR9]. 
 215. Following the initial release of the PRISM slides on June 6, 2013, on June 18, the 
NSA issued a Fact Sheet, stating that FISA “allows only the targeting, for foreign intel-
ligence purposes, of communications of foreign persons who are located abroad.” The 
Fact Sheet, which does not have a date on it, was released June 18, 2013. The document 
was quickly withdrawn from the DNI’s website; however, a copy of the can be found 
online. NSA, FACT SHEET ON SECTION 702, available at http://www.wyden. 
senate.gov/news/blog/post/wyden-and-udall-to-general-alexander-nsa-must-correct-
inaccurate-statement-in-fact-sheet [http://perma.cc/3BRU-U9AU]. Consistent with the 
statutory language, the government stated that the purpose of such acquisition could 
not be to obtain information from a particular, known person inside the U.S. What 
followed was an elaborate back-and-forth, in the course of which the extent to which 
U.S. persons’ information had been obtained became more visible. Two days after the 
government’s release of the Fact Sheet, on June 20, 2013, the Guardian released the 
NSA’s Section 702 Targeting Procedures, as well as its Section 702 Minimization Pro-
cedures—in the process undermining the government’s assertion that U.S. persons’ 
privacy was protected. NSA TARGETING PROCEDURES, supra note 16; 2009 MINIMIZA-
TION PROCEDURES, supra note 169. Two days after that, Senators Wyden and Udall 
accused the DNI of a “significant” inaccuracy in the Section 702 fact sheet, particularly 
with regard to how the authority has been interpreted by the US government. Letter 
from Sen. Ron Wyden & Sen. Mark Udall, to Gen. Keith Alexander, Dir., Nat’l Sec. 
Agency (June 24, 2013), available at http://www.wyden.senate.gov/news/blog/post/ 
wyden-and-udall-to-general-alexander-nsa-must-correct-inaccurate-statement-in-fact-
sheet [http://perma.cc/76XS-78JA]. General Alexander replied the following day. Letter 
from Gen. Keith B. Alexander, Dir., Nat’l Sec. Agency, to Sen. Ron Wyden & Sen. Mark 
Udall (June 25, 2013), available at https://www.aclu.org/files/natsec/nsa/20130816/ 
General%20Alexander%20Letter%20re%20NSA%20Fact%20Sheet%20Inaccuracy.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/E3N5-7HCV]. Alexander agreed with the senators that the fact sheet 
“could have more precisely described the requirements for collection under Section 
702.” Id. at 1. As to Wyden and Udall’s second concern (whether the fact sheet implied 
that the NSA had the ability to determine how many American communications it had 
collected), he noted that this question had already been publicly addressed. Id. The 
Guardian followed with a release on June 27, 2013 of a draft NSA inspector general 
report reviewing the President’s Surveillance Program and its transfer to Section 702. 
WORKING DRAFT, supra note 19. From this and subsequent leaked documents, it be-
came clear that the program was more extensive than previously indicated. See NSA 
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5. Congressional Intent 
In 2008 Congress anticipated that the intelligence community 
would inadvertently collect U.S. persons’ communications in the 
process of targeting non-U.S. persons under Section 702. Legisla-
tors acknowledged the possibility, and Congress inserted special 
back-end protections via minimization procedures and the inclu-
sion of explicit limits. But outside of a handful of exceptions, 
members did not publicly anticipate that the executive would en-
gage in such large-scale, programmatic collection, so as to under-
mine Sections 703 and 704.216 Legislators who did publicly recog-
nize the potential for programmatic surveillance opposed the 
statute on precisely those grounds. Not a single member who rec-
ognized the potential for programmatic surveillance defended the 
use of the authorities in this way. 
Even if Congress did not initially understand the implications 
of the FAA, the executive subsequently informed the House and 
Senate Intelligence Committees about PRISM and upstream col-
lection. Congress’s subsequent failure to end the programs—
indeed, its decision to reauthorize the FAA in 2012—suggests that 
the legislature intended the intelligence community to continue 
interpreting the statute in a manner that supported the programs. 
Arguments that the legislature was too hampered by classification 
to either read or respond to intelligence community reports fail to 
appreciate Congress’s interpretation of its own authorities with 
regard to classification. 
a. Minimization and Explicit Limits 
During the legislative debates, not all members of Congress 
appear to have understood the distinction between targeting 
U.S. persons and collecting U.S.-person information more gener-
																																																																																																																						
Prism Program Slides, GUARDIAN, Nov. 1, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/ 
interactive/2013/nov/01/prism-slides-nsa-document [http://perma.cc/5RL4-FPUU]. 
 216. Congress’s aim in drafting these sections was to offer U.S. persons a greater 
degree of privacy than had previously existed under Executive Order. See, e.g., 154 
CONG. REC. S6465 (daily ed. July 9, 2008) (statement of Sen. Rockerfeller) (“[T]he 
bill ensures that when Americans overseas are the target, that a FISA Court judge, 
rather than the Attorney General—in a very important change—decide that there 
is clear authority and probable cause for intelligence agencies to target such an 
individual.”); 154 CONG. REC. H5762 (daily ed. June 20, 2008) (statement of Rep. 
Harman) (“[This bill] expands the circumstances for which individual warrants 
are required, by including Americans outside the U.S.”). 
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ally. Representative Heather Wilson (R-NM) lauded the legisla-
tion on the grounds that it would “protect the civil liberties of 
Americans and continue to require individualized warrants for 
anyone in the United States or American citizens anywhere in 
the world.”217  Representative Anna Eshoo (D-CA) noted that 
“[T]he Administration would have to seek a court order before 
conducting surveillance on U.S. persons abroad.”218 At no point 
did either member acknowledge that at least some acquisition of 
U.S. persons’ communications overseas could occur absent a 
court order, as long as the target was a non-U.S. person. Repre-
sentative Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) said that the bill provided that 
Americans overseas receive the same FISA protections (“includ-
ing an individualized warrant based on probable cause”) as 
Americans within domestic grounds.219 She considered it “a very 
important improvement on the original FISA Act.”220  Similar 
remarks characterize the debate in the Senate. Senator Benjamin 
Cardin (D-MD) stated: “FISA requires the Government to seek 
an order or warrant from the FISA Court before conducting elec-
tronic surveillance that may involve U.S. persons.”221 
Individual legislators notwithstanding, in two respects the final 
legislation reflected a general understanding that, at a minimum, 
in the process of targeting non-U.S. persons, citizens’ information 
might inadvertently be obtained. First, the statute explicitly in-
cluded minimization procedures that addressed how the execu-
tive branch would handle incidental data. Legislators looked to 
these provisions to discount the potential for further inroads into 
privacy. Representative Bob Etheridge (D-NC) thus stated: “This 
bill . . . requires the Government to obtain an individual warrant 
from the FISA Court before conducting surveillance on a United 
States citizen. This warrant must be based on probable cause, and 
																																																																																																																						
 217. 154 CONG. REC. H5763 (daily ed. June 20, 2008) (statement of Rep. Heather 
Wilson). 
 218. 154 CONG. REC. H5771 (daily ed. June 20, 2008) (statement of Rep. Anna Eshoo).  
 219. 154 CONG. REC. H5767 (daily ed. June 20, 2008) (statement of Rep. Nancy 
Pelosi). 
 220. Id. 
 221. 154 CONG. REC. S6379 (daily ed. July 8, 2008) (statement of Sen. Cardin) 
(emphasis added). 
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the provision now includes American citizens abroad as well.”222 
He underscored the role of the FISA Court, noting that FISC’s re-
view of targeting and minimization procedures was to “ensure 
that any inadvertently intercepted communications by American 
citizens are destroyed.”223 Representative Silvestre Reyes (D-TX) 
similarly announced that the FAA requires “warrants for Ameri-
cans anywhere in the world. It also requires the government to 
establish clear guidelines to ensure that no American is the target 
of any surveillance without a warrant.” 224  Representative Jim 
Langevin (D-RI) stated: “Americans will no longer leave their 
constitutional protections at home when working, studying or 
traveling abroad.”225 He minimized the potential interception of 
U.S. persons’ communications, suggesting that they would be 
subject to special legal protections.226 
Second, not only did the statute include minimization require-
ments, but Congress expressly prohibited the acquisition of pure-
ly domestic communications, the targeting of persons within the 
United States, and reverse targeting. The purpose of these limits 
was to ensure that the NSA did not use non-U.S. person targeting 
to collect information on U.S. persons. The statute required the 
Attorney General to adopt guidelines to ensure compliance with 
these limitations.227 
Even here, however, programmatic considerations gave way to 
particularization. Legislators’ consideration of reverse targeting 
was individual. They looked to its prohibition as a way of pre-
venting the government from targeting one or more individuals 
overseas with the aim of obtaining the communications of a spe-
																																																																																																																						
 222. 154 CONG. REC. H5772 (daily ed. June 20, 2008) (statement of Rep. Bobby 
Etheridge). 
 223. Id. 
 224. 154 CONG. REC. H5758 (daily ed. June 20, 2008) (statement of Rep. Silvestre 
Reyes). 
 225. 154 CONG. REC. H5766 (daily ed. June 20, 2008) (statement of Rep. James 
Langevin). 
 226. Id.  
 227. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(f)(1) (2012). See also 154 CONG. REC. S6388 (daily ed. July 
8, 2008). 
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cific person located within U.S. borders.228 For many, this was a 
crucial part of their support for the measure.229 
b. Potential Programmatic Collection As a Point of Opposition 
Some legislators did express opposition to the potential for Sec-
tion 702 authorities to be used on a massive scale, in the process 
collecting significant amounts of U.S. persons’ information. With-
out exception, these legislators opposed the final bill. 
Representative Sheila Jackson Lee from Texas, for instance, 
railed that the compromise bill “fail[ed] to protect American civil 
liberties both at home and abroad.”230 She explained her objection: 
“[The bill] permits the Government to conduct mass, untargeted 
surveillance of all communications, coming into and out of the 
United States, without any individualized review, and without 
any finding of wrongdoing.”231 Representative Bobby Scott (R-
VA) similarly noted: 
The bill actually permits the government to perform mass 
untargeted surveillance of any and all conversations be-
lieved to be coming into and out of the United States with-
out any individualized finding and without a requirement 
that wrongdoing is believed to be involved at all.  
It arguably is not limited just to terrorism. It could be any 
foreign intelligence, which would include diplomacy and 
anything else.232 
Representative Jackie Speier’s statement proved prescient: 
It is fundamentally untrue to say that Americans will not be 
placed under surveillance . . . . The truth is, any American 
will subject their phone and e-mail conversations to the 
broad government surveillance web simply by calling a son 
or daughter studying abroad, sending an email to a foreign 
																																																																																																																						
 228. See, e.g., 154 CONG. REC. H5756 (daily ed. June 20, 2008) (statement of Rep. 
John Conyers); 154 CONG. REC. H5762 (daily ed. June 20, 2008) (statement of Rep. 
Jane Harman). 
 229. See, e.g., 154 CONG. REC. 5768 (daily ed. June 20, 2008) (statement of Rep. 
Nancy Pelosi). 
 230. 154 CONG. REC. H5763 (daily ed. June 20, 2008) (statement of Rep. Sheila Lee). 
 231. Id. 
 232. 154 CONG. REC. H5759 (daily ed. June 20, 2008) (statement of Rep. Robert Scott). 
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relative, even calling an American company whose customer 
service center is located overseas.233 
Speier, a California Democrat, continued: “The bottom line is, 
this FISA bill permits the collection of Americans’ emails and 
phone calls if they are communicating with someone outside of 
the U.S.”234 Representative Rush Holt (D-NJ), a member of HPSCI, 
opposed the bill on similar grounds: “It permits massive warrant-
less surveillance in the absence of any standard for defining how 
communications of innocent Americans will be protected; a fish-
ing expedition approach to intelligence collection that we know 
will not make Americans more safe.”235 Representative Dennis 
Kucinich (D-OH) opposed the legislation for the same reason: 
“There’s no requirement for the government to seek a warrant for 
any intercepted communication that includes a U.S. citizen, as 
long as the program in general is directed towards foreign tar-
gets.”236 Kucinich added: 
Under this bill, violations of Fourth Amendment rights and 
blanket wiretaps will be permissible for the next 4 years. 
Massive and untargeted collection of communications will 
continue . . . .  
Furthermore, it allows the type of surveillance to be applied 
to all communications entering and exiting the United 
States. These blanket wiretaps make it impossible to know 
whose calls are being intercepted by the National Security 
Agency.237 
 These statements stood in sharp contrast to the legislators who 
supported the bill, all of whom discounted the amount and extent 
of incidental information thereby obtained, pointing particularly 
to the minimization procedures as a way to rectify any privacy 
interests thereby implicated. 
 Senator Ben Cardin from Maryland summarized the protections:  
																																																																																																																						
 233. 154 CONG. REC. H5770 (daily ed. June 20, 2008). 
 234. Id. Speier noted: “This is especially true when it comes to emails, because 
the World Wide Web has no area codes, so it is impossible to tell where email 
communications originate from.” Id. 
 235. 154 CONG. REC. H5765 (daily ed. June 20, 2008) (statement of Rep. Rush Holt). 
 236. 154 CONG. REC. H5767 (daily ed. June 20, 2008) (statement of Rep. Dennis 
Kucinich). 
 237. Id. 
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The legislation provides for the inspector general to review 
the targeting and minimization provisions. The targeting is 
when a U.S. citizen, perhaps indirectly, is targeted. And the 
minimization procedures deal with when the intelligence 
community gets information about an American without 
court approval, to minimize the use of that information or to 
seek court approval.238 
Cardin anticipated the potential interception of communica-
tions of an American—not the monitoring of all Americans en-
gaged in international communications. He cabined the 
amount of data (“that information”), and noted that the mini-
mization procedures would further protect the information ob-
tained. Senator Bond similarly discounted the potential for 
programmatic surveillance: 
The bugaboo that this [bill] gives the intelligence community 
the right to listen in on ordinary citizens’ conversations willy-
nilly, without any limitations, is absolutely false. That is why 
we built in the protections in the law. That is why we have the 
layers of supervision to make sure it does not happen.239 
These representations do not reflect how the authorities are be-
ing used. The concept of “incidental” does not suggest broad ac-
quisition. The Oxford English Dictionary, for example, defines 
“incidental” as “accompanying but not a major part of some-
thing” or “Occurring by chance in connection with something 
else.” If the NSA knows that it is collecting entirely domestic con-
versations, it is a stretch of common usage to suggest that such 
acquisition is occurring by chance. The volume of communica-
tions monitored is also at odds with claims that downplay the 
impact of the action in question. 
The NSA’s minimization procedures, in turn, require personnel 
to destroy “inadvertently acquired communications of or concern-
ing a United States person.”240 The Privacy and Civil Liberties 
Board states, “it is not entirely clear what constitutes an “inad-
vertently acquired communication.”241 The Oxford English Dic-
																																																																																																																						
 238. 154 CONG. REC. S6380 (daily ed. July 8, 2008) (statement of Sen. Benjamin 
Cardin). 
 239. 154 CONG. REC. S6396 (daily ed. July 8, 2008) (statement of Sen. Christopher 
Bond). 
 240. 2011 MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES, supra note 171, at § 3 (b)(1). 
 241. PCLOB REPORT, supra note 2, at 62. 
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tionary understands the word “inadvertent” as “Not resulting 
from or achieved through deliberate planning.” It seems clear, 
however, that the NSA and Congress anticipate that the govern-
ment will obtain U.S. persons’ communications under Section 702. 
Calling such interception “inadvertent” does not make it so. 
c. Acquiescence 
Even if Congress did not realize what it was authorizing in 
2008, the intelligence community kept the legislature informed 
about the programs underway. Thus, at a minimum, at the point 
of reauthorization in 2012, Congress agreed to the exercise of au-
thorities in this manner. For this argument to succeed, three 
claims must be satisfied: first, Congress must have been (accurate-
ly) informed about the program, second, Congress must have 
been able to act to stop the program, and, third, Congress must 
have affirmatively continued it. All of these conditions were met. 
Title VII requires that the Attorney General twice a year inform 
the intelligence committees and the Committees on the Judiciary 
of the Senate and the House of Representatives about any certifi-
cations submitted in accordance with Section 702(g), or directives 
issued under Section 702(h), as well as a description of judicial 
review during the reporting period of the certifications and target-
ing and minimization procedures—including a copy of any or-
ders or pleadings in connection with such review containing a sig-
nificant legal interpretation of the provisions of Section 702.242 The 
statute requires that the Attorney General report any actions tak-
en to challenge or enforce a directive, any compliance reviews 
conducted by the Attorney General or the DNI, and a description 
of any incidents of noncompliance.243 In addition, the intelligence 
community must review the number of disseminated intelligence 
reports containing references to a U.S. person, as well as the num-
ber of targets later determined to be located in the United States, 
and provide the information to the intelligence and judiciary 
committees.244 
																																																																																																																						
 242. FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, § 707), 122 Stat. 2436, 
2457 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1881f) (2012)). 
 243. Id. 
 244 . FISA Amendments Act of 2008, § 702(l)(2)–(3) (codified at 50 U.S.C. 
§ 1881a(l)(2)–(3)). 
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There is every reason to believe that the intelligence communi-
ty fulfilled these statutory requirements and that all four com-
mittees were aware of the extent of the programs underway—
particularly after the findings of noncompliance by FISC and the 
court’s rejection of targeting procedures premised on the prob-
lem with MCTs.245 
In order for the argument to be satisfied, though, reporting to a 
part of the whole must sufficiently indicate the acquiescence of 
the many. There are myriad ways in which committees in Con-
gress substitute for the judgment of the whole body. Most Con-
gressional oversight functions are consistent with this approach. It 
falls to the committees charged with oversight to review and con-
sider the manner in which authorities are being used prior to the 
introduction, elimination, alteration, or continuance of authorities 
or appropriations. 
What is different, at least with regard to FISA (albeit consistent 
with other areas of national security law), is the clandestine nature 
of the reporting and the restrictions placed on committee and 
non-committee members who may have access to the infor-
mation. Members may not know of the existence of, or details 
about, programs that would enable them to ask pertinent ques-
tions or to delve further into how authorities are being exercised. 
The result is that Congress may agree to laws without fully un-
derstanding the implications of their actions. 
One could argue that this happens all the time. It is part of the 
good faith exercise that is part and parcel of the legislative pro-
cess. Legislators accord their colleagues, who develop an expertise 
in certain areas, a degree of deference. But one distinction, in re-
gard to national security, is that the stakes are particularly high. 
It is precisely this concern that arose during enactment of the 
FAA in 2008. Congress was being asked to pass legislation that 
gave telecommunication companies indemnity, but only a minori-
ty of the members of both chambers had been briefed on the Pres-
ident’s Surveillance Program. The question, according to Senator 
Specter, was whether the limited briefing amounted to an uncon-
																																																																																																																						
 245. See, e.g., Att’y Gen. & Dir. of Nat’l intelligence, Semiannual Assessment of 
Compliance with Procedures & Guidelines Issued Pursuant to Section 702 of the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Reporting Period: Dec. 1, 2010–May 31, 2011 
(2011) [DEC. 2011 SEMIANNUAL ASSESSMENT]. 
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stitutional delegation of authority.246 For Senator Whitehouse, the 
issue was less one of constitutionality and more one of simple leg-
islative prudence: whether the Senate ought to substitute its good 
faith in the few for a determination that ought to be made by the 
judiciary.247 What was at stake was the rule of law. 
In the case of Section 702, the intelligence community did not 
just keep the committees informed, but prior to the renewal de-
bates, it made its classified briefings widely available to all Mem-
bers of Congress.248 The May 2012 report, for instance, available to 
																																																																																																																						
 246. 154 CONG. REC. S6412 (daily ed. July 8, 2008) (statement and question of 
Sen. Arlen Specter). Senator Rockefeller responded by arguing that 37 members of 
the Senate had been briefed (15 on the Senate Intelligence Committee, 19 on the 
Senate Judiciary Committee (equaling 34, minus 4 crossover members), as well as 
2 leadership on each side, Senator Roberts and the Appropriations Committee 
chairman and vice chair, plus Senator Levin and Senator McCain, who were ex 
officio). Id. (statement of Sen. John Rockefeller). Senator Specter replied that there 
had been 21 House Intelligence Committee members briefed, and as many as 40 
Judiciary Committee members. In the Senate, 15 on the Intelligence Committee 
and 19 on the Judiciary Committee, for a bicameral total of 95—less than 18% of 
the entire Congress. Id. (statement of Sen. Arlen Specter). He further argued that, 
even taking Chairman Rockefeller’s numbers, “you still have a majority of Mem-
bers of Congress who have not been briefed, who are, in effect, delegating their 
authority to vote on a matter where they don’t know what they are granting im-
munity for.” Id. 
 247. 154 CONG. REC. S6412 (daily ed. July 8, 2008) (statement of Sen. Sheldon 
Whitehouse). 
 248. See, e.g., Letter from Kathleen Turner, Dir. of Legislative Affairs ODNI, and 
Ronald Weich, Assistant Attorney Gen. in Office of Legislative Affairs DOJ, to the 
Hon. Dianne Feinstein, Chair, and the Hon. Saxby Chambliss, Vice Chair, Senate 
Select Comm. on Intelligence (May 4, 2012), declassified by the DNI Aug. 21, 2013, 
and available at http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Ltr%20to%20HPSCI%20 
Chairman%20Rogers%20and%20Ranking%20Member%20Ruppersberger_Scan 
.pdf [http://perma.cc/8L76-8U6W] (“We believe that making this document avail-
able to all Members of Congress is an effective way to inform the legislative de-
bate about reauthorization of Title VII of FISA. However, it is critical that Mem-
bers understand the importance to national security of maintaining the secrecy of 
these programs. The enclosed document is being provided on the understanding 
that it will be provided only to Members of Congress (and cleared SSCI, Judiciary 
Committee, and leadership staff), in a secure location in the SSCI’s spaces, and 
consistent with the rules of SSCI regarding review of classified information and 
non-disclosure agreements. Any notes taken by Members or staff may not be re-
moved from the secure location. We also request your support in ensuring that 
Members and staff are well informed regarding the classification and sensitivity 
of this information to prevent any unauthorized disclosures.”). 
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Members of Congress more than a year before the Snowden reve-
lations, detailed PRISM and upstream collection.249 
As to the second claim, could Congress have stopped the pro-
gram if it so wished? The answer to this question is more difficult. 
Congress ostensibly had both private and public mechanisms it 
could employ to subject the program to more scrutiny and to 
change aspects considered repugnant as either a statutory or Con-
stitutional matter. It could have conditioned continuation of the 
authorities, for instance, on curbing TFA collection, or shifting the 
assumptions regarding identity or location. Alternatively, it could 
have suspended funding for the program. It did none of these 
things. The House did not hold any hearings on how the law was 
operating prior to voting on whether to renew the FAA.250 Public-
ly, Congress could have declassified materials, opened the NSA’s 
programs to broader discussion, and subjected the executive to 
citizens’ scrutiny. It chose not to do so. 
Congress and the President disagree over whether and to what 
extent the legislature can make classified information public. 
Congress considers its authority subject only to its own rule mak-
ing, and not to any executive order, statute, or constitutional pro-
vision. The Rules of Procedure for the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence state in relevant part: 
No member of the Committee or of the Committee staff shall 
disclose, in whole or in part or by way of summary, the con-
tents of any classified or committee sensitive papers, materi-
als, briefings, testimony, or other information in the posses-
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 250. See 158 CONG. REC. H5890–H5900 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 2012). 
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sion of the Committee [except as provided in Section 8 of 
Senate Resolution 400 of the 94th Congress.]251 
Section 8 of the abovementioned Senate Resolution allows SSCI to 
publicly disclose any information in its possession after a deter-
mination by vote by the committee that such disclosure would be 
in the public interest.252 (The rules prohibit any disclosure of in-
formation prior to the vote, which must be held within five days 
of any member’s request.253) The Committee, if it votes to release 
information, must notify and consult with the Senate’s Majority 
and Minority Leaders before placing the President on notice.254 If, 
thereafter, the President objects, either the Majority and Minority 
leaders (jointly), or the Select Committee (by majority vote), may 
refer the question of disclosure to the Senate as a whole for con-
sideration.255 The Select Committee also has the authority, under 
its own rules, to share classified information in closed session 
with any members of the Senate it deems necessary.256 
It does not appear that disagreement between the Senate and 
the President has ever led to the invocation of Section 8 with re-
gard to convening the Senate as a whole, in closed proceedings, to 
consider whether to release classified information. But the Senate 
Select Committee regularly makes classified information available 
to non-committee members, subject to the restrictions of Section 
8.257 Nevertheless, its rules prevent non-committee members from 
making the information public.258 
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DURE], § 9.7, available at http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/pdfs113th/sprt1137. 
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 253. S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., § 8(a) (quoted in SSCI RULES OF PROCEDURE, supra 
note 251, Appendix A). 
 254. Id. at § 8(b)(1). 
 255. Id. at § 8(b)(3). 
 256. Id. at § 8(c)(1). 
 257. See, e.g., INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2014, S. REP. 
NO. 113-120 (2013), available at http://beta.congress.gov/congressional-report/ 
113th-congress/senate-report/120/1 [http://perma.cc/9ZMT-VUCZ] (stating, in 
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As a constitutional matter, legislators could read information 
into the public record. The Speech or Debate clause in the U.S. 
Constitution states that members of both Houses of Congress, 
. . . shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of 
the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance 
at the Session of their Respective Houses, and in going to 
and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate 
in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other 
Place.259 
In 1971 Senator Mike Gravel, with the assistance of his Con-
gressional aides, used this clause to read portions of the Pentagon 
Papers on the floor of the Senate and subsequently place all 47 
volumes of the study into the Congressional Record.260 In Gravel v. 
United States, the Supreme Court subsequently found it “incon-
trovertible” that the clause, at a minimum, protects legislators 
“from criminal or civil liability and from questioning elsewhere 
than in the Senate, with respect to the events occurring” in the 
course of Congressional hearings.261 Justice White, writing for the 
Court, explained: 
The Speech or Debate Clause was designed to assure a co-
equal branch of the government wide freedom of speech, 
debate, and deliberation without intimidation or threats 
from the Executive Branch. It thus protects Members against 
prosecutions that directly impinge upon or threaten the leg-
islative process.262 
What this means is that Senators could disclose classified in-
formation from the floor of the Senate by reading it into the rec-
ord. They would be exempt thereafter from criminal or civil lia-
bility; however, they would still be subject to censure by the 
																																																																																																																						
It is also available for review by any Member of the Senate subject to the provi-
sions of Senate Resolution 400 of the 94th Congress (1976).”). 
 258. See S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., § 8 (quoted in SSCI RULES OF PROCEDURE, supra 
note 251, Appendix A). 
 259. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. 
 260. How the Pentagon Papers Came to be Published by the Beacon Press: A 
Remarkable Story Told by Whistleblower Daniel Ellsberg, Dem Presidential Can-
didate Mike Gravel, and Unitarian Leader Robert West, DEMOCRACY NOW, July, 
2, 2007, http://www.democracynow.org/2007/7/2/how_the_pentagon_papers_ 
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 261. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 615 (1972). 
 262. Id. at 616. 
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Senate and could be placed under a Senate investigation for 
breach of ethics.263 
The executive branch has a different read on whether mem-
bers of the legislature could make classified information public. 
This question recently arose in regard to the SSCI report on the 
CIA’s post-9/11 detention and interrogation program.264 In Feb-
ruary 2014 the CIA Director of the Office of Congressional Af-
fairs acknowledged that although the Report was a congression-
al record under SSCI’s control, it contained information 
“originated and classified by the Executive Branch.”265 The exec-
utive did not “consider SSCI’s control over the document to ex-
tend to control over the classification of the information there-
in.”266 Instead, it was the CIA’s position that SSCI would have to 
“submit its Report for a declassification review before it could 
publicly release” a declassified version of the report.267 The De-
partment of Justice similarly noted that declassification review 
was “a necessary precursor to public release.”268 
So, while the Executive Branch has the position that the legis-
lature cannot reveal classified information, the legislature 
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10, ACLU v. CIA, No. 13-01870-JEB (D.D.C. Feb. 28, 2014), Document 17-2. 
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 267. Id. 
 268. Defendant’s Reply in Further Support of Motion to Dismiss at 2, ACLU v. 
CIA, No. 1:13-cv-01870-JEB (D.D.C. Mar. 28, 2014), available at https:// 
www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/19._defendants_reply_in_further_support_
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claims that it has the authority to do so, but it has tied its own 
hands in this regard. 
Perhaps this is the source of the frustration that members 
have expressed who want to air classified information to public 
scrutiny. Senator Leahy of the Senate Judiciary Committee not-
ed, for instance, in wake of the leaks, that the President indicat-
ed that an opportunity presented itself “to have an open and 
thoughtful debate” about the surveillance issues. Leahy wel-
comed that statement, 
. . . because this is a debate that several of us on this commit-
tee, in both parties, have been trying to have for years. Like 
so many others, I’ll get the classified briefings, but then of 
course you can’t talk about them. There’s a lot of these 
things that should be and can be discussed.269 
It is somewhat disingenuous, however, to suggest that the 
Senate needed the President’s permission to have a debate about 
the NSA’s authorities. Leahy, if sufficiently concerned, could 
have used the Speech or Debate Clause to get the matter into the 
public record. 
At the same time, it would be short-sighted to ignore political 
pressure—and the potential for actual censure under the Senate’s 
own rules—for doing so.270 Thus, the furthest legislators appear to 
have felt free to act with regard to the FAA has been to make gen-
eral statements and broad objections. 
At the renewal debates in the House, for instance, Representa-
tive Nadler argued in favor of making a declassified summary of 
FISC opinions including significant constructions of Section 702, 
saying, “Many American citizens and others who have nothing 
to do with foreign intelligence gathering are caught up in this 
surveillance, and government has an obligation to protect their 
rights.”271 He continued, “Disclosure of classified information is 
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not needed to know whether the court performs meaningful 
oversight of the executive branch, applies minimization stand-
ards correctly, and whether or not we ought to amend the 
law.”272 Representative Conyers advised one of his colleagues 
that the programs being conducted “unquestionably” affected 
“citizens on American soil,” warning that “their communica-
tions are regularly intercepted.”273 Representatives in the House 
complained at the lack of transparency about how the powers 
were being exercised, and particularly the Director of National 
Intelligence’s inability to estimate how many Americans’ com-
munications had been obtained.274 
Senators Wyden and Udall, both members of the SSCI, tried to 
walk the line before and during the 2012 renewal debates of the 
FAA. In October 2012, they sent an open letter to General Keith 
Alexander, Director of the National Security Agency, requesting 
that he provide an unclassified clarification of the number of 
American communications intercepted under Section 702.275 The 
senators opposed renewal of the legislation in committee. Senator 
Udall stated during the debates that he did not believe that Con-
gress had “an adequate understanding of the effect this law has 
had on the privacy of law-abiding American citizens.”276 Senator 
Wyden offered an amendment during the debate, with the aim of 
making more information available, so as to better inform the 
public discourse.277 Wyden’s amendment would, inter alia, require 
the intelligence community to estimate the total number of com-
munications to or from the United States acquired under Section 
702, as well as the number of wholly domestic communications 
being collected, and any searches of the data using U.S. person 
information.278 Wyden tried to convey the extent of the programs 
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underway, without going into detail on either PRISM or upstream 
collection. As a member of the Intelligence Committee, he had 
access to information about the programs. But the way he 
couched his amendment was in the context of obtaining “yes or 
no answers” and furthering “real oversight.”279 
Senator Feinstein, rising in opposition, went further than Wy-
den in revealing classified programs, saying that although his 
amendment sounded benign, it was not: 
The goal of this amendment is to make information public 
about a very effective intelligence collection program that is 
currently classified. All of the information has already been 
made available to the Senate Intelligence and Judiciary 
Committees. It is available to all Members. All they have to 
do is read it. It is hundreds of pages of material.280 
Feinstein went on to discuss incidental collection—and a se-
ries of closed hearings held by the Judiciary Committee in 2011 
and 2012.281 
To be sure, there are numerous logistical problems related to 
Congressional access to classified information. To read the mate-
rial, legislators must go to a Sensitive Compartmented Infor-
mation Facility (SCIF), set up for the purpose—a room tucked 
away in the capital, with limited access. Most Members do not 
have staff cleared to read the documents, so it must be the Mem-
bers themselves, whose time is cabined, who review the hundreds 
of pages of materials. They are not allowed to remove material 
from the SCIFs; nor are they allowed to remove any notes they 
make about the material. All of this must remain under lock and 
key. As a result, as Wyden explained on the record, most Mem-
bers of Congress remain “in the dark” about such programs.282 
But these considerations are not the responsibility of the Execu-
tive. They are in the purview of the legislature, as well as the 
broader context of national security concerns. 
The final claim to address is whether Congress affirmatively 
approved of the program. Here, the facts speak for themselves. 
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The legislature voted, and passed, reauthorization of the statute. 
Claims after the fact that they did not avail themselves of the op-
portunity to scrutinize the programs in question do not allow leg-
islators to escape their responsibility to look into the matter before 
affirmatively continuing PRISM and upstream collection in 2012. 
6. FISC Oversight of Targeting Procedures 
FISC first became aware of the implications of the NSA’s inter-
pretation of TFA in 2011.283 The court was surprised by the gov-
ernment’s admission that it would have to intercept significantly 
more content to scan it for relevant information. In its first Section 
702 docket, the government had indicated that the acquisition of 
telephonic communications:  
would be limited to “to/from” communications—i.e., com-
munications to or from a tasked facility. The government 
explained, however, that the Internet communications ac-
quired would include both to/from communications and 
“about” communications—i.e., communications containing 
a reference to the name of the tasked account . . . . Based up-
on the government’s descriptions of the proposed collection, 
the Court understood that the acquisition of Internet com-
munications under Section 702 would be limited to discrete 
“to/from” communications between or among individual 
account users and to “about” communications falling within 
[redacted] specific categories that had been first described to 
the Court in prior proceedings.284 
In reviewing and granting the application for an order, the 
court had not taken into account the NSA’s acquisition of Internet 
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transactions, which “materially and fundamentally alter[ed] the 
statutory and constitutional analysis.”285 
FISC was troubled by the government’s revelations—making it 
the third time in less than three years in which the NSA had dis-
closed a “substantial misrepresentation” on “the scope of a major 
collection program.”286 One of three possibilities held: the court 
was particularly slow, the government had been lying, or the 
government had made a mistake. Regardless, “[t]he government’s 
submissions make clear not only that NSA has been acquiring In-
ternet transactions since before the Court’s approval of the first 
Section 702 certification in 2008, but also that NSA seeks to con-
tinue the collection of Internet transactions.”287 
FISC noted that it is a crime to “engage[] in electronic surveil-
lance under color of law except as authorized” by statute or . . . to 
“disclose[] or use[] information obtained under color of law by 
electronic surveillance, knowing or having reason to know that 
the information was obtained through electronic surveillance not 
authorized” by statute.288 Yet, to the extent that MCTs contained 
communications that the NSA was not supposed to collect (in 
other words, wholly domestic communications), this appeared to 
be precisely what had occurred with regard to the NSA’s up-
stream collection.289 
In its October 2011 memorandum opinion, the court confronted 
two areas: first, targeting procedures as applied to the acquisition 
of communications other than Internet transactions—that is, “dis-
crete communications between or among the users of telephone 
and Internet communications facilities that are to or from a facility 
tasked for collection.”290 As in the past, the court found the target-
ing procedures with regard to non-Internet transactions to be suf-
ficient. Second, the court considered de novo the sufficiency of the 
government’s targeting procedures in relation to Internet transac-
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tions.291 Despite the acknowledgement by the government that it 
knowingly collected tens of thousands of messages of a purely 
domestic nature, FISC found the procedures consistent with the 
statutory language that prohibited the intentional acquisition of 
domestic communications.292 
The court’s analysis of the targeting procedures focused on up-
stream collection.293 At the time of acquisition, the collection de-
vices lacked the ability to distinguish “between transactions con-
taining only a single discrete communication to, from, or about a 
tasked selector and transactions containing multiple discrete 
communications, not all of which may be to, from, or about a 
tasked selector.”294 The court continued: “As a practical matter, 
this means that NSA’s upstream collection devices acquire any 
Internet transaction transiting the device if the transaction con-
tains a targeted selector anywhere within it.”295 Because of the 
enormous volume of communications intercepted, it was impos-
sible to know either how many wholly domestic communications 
were thus acquired or the number of non-target or U.S. persons’ 
communications thereby intercepted. 296  The number of purely 
domestic communications alone was in the tens of thousands.297 
Despite this finding, FISC determined that the targeting proce-
dures were consistent with the statutory requirements that they 
be “reasonably designed” to (1) “ensure that any acquisition au-
thorized under [the certifications] is limited to targeting persons 
reasonably believed to be located outside the United States” and 
(2) “prevent the intentional acquisition of any communication as 
to which the sender and all intended recipients are known at the 
time of the acquisition to be located in the United States.”298 
To reach this conclusion, the court read the statute as applying, 
in any particular instance, to communications of individuals 
“known at the time of acquisition to be located in the United 
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States.”299 As the equipment did not have the ability to distinguish 
between purely domestic communications and international 
communications, the NSA could not technically know, at the time 
of collection, where the communicants were located. From this, the 
court was “inexorably led to the conclusion that the targeting pro-
cedures are ‘reasonably designed’ to prevent the intentional ac-
quisition of any communication as to which the sender and all 
intended recipients are known at the time of the acquisition to be 
located in the United States.”300 This was true despite the fact that 
the NSA was fully aware that it was collecting, in the process, tens 
of thousands of domestic communications.301 As far as the target-
ing procedures were concerned, at least with regard to MCTs, the 
NSA had circumvented “the spirit” but not the letter of the law. 302 
The court’s reading led to an extraordinary result. The stat-
ute bans the knowing interception of entirely domestic conver-
sations. The NSA said that it knowingly intercepts entirely 
domestic conversations. Yet the court found its actions con-
sistent with the statute. 
A few points here deserve notice. First, it is not immediately 
clear why the NSA is unable to determine location at the moment 
of intercept and yet can ascertain the same at a later point. Second, 
in focusing on the technical capabilities of any discrete intercept, 
the court encouraged a form of willful blindness—that is, an effort 
to avoid criminal or civil liability for an illegal act by intentionally 
placing oneself into a position to be unaware of facts that would 
otherwise create liability.303 In light of the court’s interpretation, 
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the NSA has a diminished interest in determining at the point of 
intercept whether intercepted communications are domestic in 
nature. Its ability to collect more information would be hampered. 
So there is a perverse incentive structure in place, even though 
Congress intended the provision to protect individual privacy. 
The Executive Branch kept Congress fully informed about 
FISC’s concerns with regard to MCTs and the collection of domes-
tic conversations. Senator Dianne Feinstein later noted that the 
Intelligence and Judiciary Committees had received more than 
500 pages of information four days after Judge Bates’ opinion, re-
lating to the operation of Section 702.304 Following receipt of the 
information (which addressed domestic communications and the 
knowing interception of U.S. persons’ information), the Senate 
Intelligence Committee held a closed hearing at which the matter 
was discussed. 305  In December 2011, the committees received 
more than 100 more pages of related materials, which became the 
focus of another closed hearing on February 9, 2012.306 
7. Law as Written Versus Law as Applied 
In terms of statutory interpretation and the knowing collection 
of wholly domestic conversations, Congress and FISC knew what 
was happening and allowed PRISM and upstream collection to 
continue. The situation thus could be read as one in which all 
three branches of the government agreed: Congress passed the 
FAA, the intelligence community interpreted and applied it, and 
the judiciary extended its blessing. 
Nevertheless, in light of the highly classified nature of the pro-
grams, and their direct impact on individual rights, there is some-
thing troubling about having the only public portion of the au-
thorities—the law—suggest one thing, when in reality the statute 
is being understood and applied in the opposite manner. In this 
case, for example, the statute’s plain language suggests that a par-
ticularized judicial order is required to intercept U.S. persons’ in-
ternational communications and that the NSA may not knowing-
ly intercept wholly domestic conversations. Yet FISC sanctioned 
the scanning and potential collection of significant portions of U.S. 
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persons’ international communications, absent any particularized 
order, and it allowed the NSA to knowingly collect tens of thou-
sands of wholly domestic conversations. Although national secu-
rity is a matter of the highest importance, given the secrecy in-
volved in the enterprise, one would expect a higher level of due 
diligence from those entrusted with oversight. 
The targeting provisions also raise questions about the role in 
which Congress is placing FISC. In the FAA, Congress for the first 
time inserted a role for the court into the process of obtaining for-
eign intelligence outside the United States, but it also severely cir-
cumscribed FISC’s authority. The court in some ways thus ap-
pears to be acting in the capacity of an oversight body, generally 
ensuring that procedures are in place and asking the NSA to po-
lice itself. Beyond the immediate question about the appropriate 
role for the court, as discussed above.307 
B. Post-Targeting Analysis 
Section 702 makes it illegal to target someone outside the Unit-
ed States, where the purpose of the acquisition is to obtain infor-
mation about a person known to be within domestic bounds. This 
practice, known as “reverse targeting,” was central to Congres-
sional debates.308 Representative Langevin explained that the in-
sertion of FISC would “ensure that the government’s efforts are 
not aimed at targeting Americans, the so-called reverse targeting 
that we’re all concerned about; and that if an American’s commu-
nications is [sic] inadvertently intercepted, it is dealt with in a 
manner that guarantees legal protections.”309 
Despite Congress’ concern about reverse targeting, the NSA in-
stituted and the FISC approved a rule change in October 2011 to 
make it possible to query the content of communications obtained 
under Section 702 using U.S. person names and identifiers for in-
formation obtained via PRISM and upstream telephony collec-
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tion.310 The relevant definition in the 2011 minimization proce-
dures is largely consistent with its 2009 predecessor: 
Identification of a United States person means the name, 
unique title, address, or other personal identifier of a United 
States person in the context of activities conducted by that 
person or activities conducted by others that are related to 
that person. A reference to a product by brand name, or 
manufacturer’s name or the use of a name in a descriptive 
sense, e.g., “Monroe Doctrine,” is not an identification of a 
United States person.311 
 The NSA may query data obtained under Section 702 by using 
the names, titles, or addresses of U.S. persons, or any other infor-
mation that may be related to the individual and his or her activi-
ties. If the intelligence community would like to query the data 
based on, for instance, membership in the Council on Foreign Re-
lations—on the grounds that such queries are likely to yield for-
eign intelligence information—it may now do so. 
In March 2014, the Director of National Intelligence, James 
Clapper, confirmed in a letter to Senator Ron Wyden that the 
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NSA had queried Section 702 data “using U.S. person identifi-
ers.”312 The following month, the NSA’s Privacy and Civil Liber-
ties Officer reiterated Clapper’s statement.313  Pressed during a 
June 2014 hearing for the number of queries using U.S. person 
identifiers, Clapper responded by noting that in 2013, the NSA 
approved 198 U.S. person identifiers for querying the content of 
Section 702 communications, even as it queried Section-702-
acquired metadata approximately 9,500 times.314 
FISC has upheld the reading of the statute supporting use of 
U.S. person identifiers.315 In its October 2011 opinion, the Court 
explained: 
The procedures previously approved by the Court effective-
ly impose a wholesale bar on queries using United States–
Person identifiers. The government has broadened Section 
3(b)(5) to allow NSA to query the vast majority of its Section 
702 collection using United States-Person identifiers, subject 
to approval pursuant to internal NSA procedures and over-
sight by the Department of Justice. Like all other NSA que-
ries of the Section 702 collection, queries using United 
States-person identifiers would be limited to those reasona-
bly likely to yield foreign intelligence information.316 
The Court did not find this problematic. Because the collection 
of the information centered on non-U.S. persons located outside 
the country, it would be less likely, in the aggregate, “to result in 
the acquisition of nonpublic information regarding non-
consenting United States persons.”317 
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As a practical matter, what this rule change means is that U.S. 
person information that is incidentally collected via Section 702 
can now be mined using U.S. person information as part of the 
queries. This circumvents Congress’s requirements in Sections 703 
and 704 that prior to U.S. person information being obtained (and 
therefore prior to it being analyzed), the government be required 
to appear before a court to justify placing a U.S. person under 
surveillance. 
An even more serious consequence arises in the context of crim-
inal law. The FBI stores unminimized Section 702 data together 
with information obtained from traditional FISA orders, allowing 
agents to search both caches of information simultaneously.318 FBI 
queries of Section 702 information may have nothing to do with 
threats to U.S. national security. PCLOB explains, “With some 
frequency, FBI personnel will . . . query [Section 
702] . . . data . . . in the course of criminal investigations and as-
sessments that are unrelated to national security efforts.”319 The 
FBI is subject to no oversight in the process; the Bureau does not 
track the number of queries of Section 702 data using U.S. person 
identifiers.320 
In light of the significant amount of U.S. person communica-
tions obtained through Section 702 collection, the impact of the 
FBI’s policy on citizens’ privacy is not insubstantial. It is thus ra-
ther surprising that PCLOB summarily dismissed the implica-
tions, stating, without citation or supporting evidence: “Anecdo-
tally, the FBI has advised the Board that it is extremely unlikely 
that an agent or analyst who is conducting an assessment of a 
non-national security crime would get a responsive result from 
the query against the Section 702-acquired data.”321 
PCLOB’s response rather misses the point, which is that the 
targeting and use provisions work together to allow the intelli-
gence community to bypass restrictions introduced in Sections 
703 and 704, as well as ordinary criminal law. 
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C. Retention and Dissemination of Data 
One of the most concerning issues that arises in regard to the re-
tention and dissemination of data obtained under Section 702 is 
that the NSA may indefinitely retain encrypted communications. 
In light of increasing public and private use of encryption, the ex-
ception may soon swallow the rule, resulting in fewer protections 
for individual and consumer privacy. In addition, the NSA’s min-
imization procedures allow for incidental information to be kept, 
analyzed, and distributed if found relevant to the authorized pur-
pose of the acquisition under one of two conditions: first, as con-
taining foreign intelligence information, and, second, as contain-
ing evidence of a crime.322 The former is anchored in traditional 
FISA and critical for U.S. national security. The latter is similarly 
consistent with traditional FISA; however, lacking the same pro-
cedural protections that attend searches under Titles I and II of the 
statute, use of information obtained under Section 702 for criminal 
prosecution raises important constitutional questions. 
1. Retention of Encrypted Communications 
For domestic communications, the NSA retains information 
that contains technical data base information and data necessary 
to assess communications security vulnerabilities.323 The minimi-
zation procedures explain that in the context of cryptanalytics, 
“maintenance of technical data bases requires retention of all 
communications that are enciphered or reasonably believed to 
contain secret meaning.”324 Unlike unencrypted communications, 
which are retained for five years from the date of the certification 
authorizing the collection (unless the NSA decides otherwise), 
encrypted communications may be retained for “any period of 
time during which encrypted material is subject to, or of use in, 
cryptanalysis.”325 
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For foreign communications of or concerning U.S. persons, the 
NSA retains encrypted material “for a period sufficient to allow a 
thorough exploitation and to permit access to data that are, or are 
reasonably believed likely to become, relevant to a current or fu-
ture foreign intelligence requirement.”326 There is no limit on the 
amount of time that encrypted information may be kept, as long 
as it continues to be subject to, or of use in, cryptanalysis.327 
The logic behind the default is that the government should not 
be forced to purge data merely because it does not hold the key or 
has been unable to break the code. Considering the likelihood that 
bad actors may try to use encryption to hide the contents of their 
communications, the intelligence community does not want to 
put itself at a disadvantage. 
The problem is that it is not just bad actors who encipher mes-
sages. U.S. citizens and private industry are increasingly using 
encryption to try to protect their materials and communications. 
Windows, for instance, has an Encrypting File System that can be 
used to store information in an encrypted format. Systems like 
Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) can be set up and installed using a 
Firefox plugin, making it easy to encrypt e-mail. In March 2014, 
Google announced that it is now using https encrypted communi-
cations whenever users log in to Gmail, regardless of which Inter-
net connection they are using.328 Nicolas Lidzborski, Gmail’s Se-
curity Engineering Lead explained: 
Today’s change means that no one can listen in on your 
messages as they go back and forth between you and 
Gmail’s servers—no matter if you’re using public WiFi or 
logging in from your computer, phone or tablet. In addition, 
every single email message you send or receive—100% of 
them—is encrypted while moving internally. This ensures 
that your messages are safe not only when they move be-
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tween you and Gmail’s servers, but also as they move be-
tween Google’s data centers—something we made a top pri-
ority after last summer’s revelations.329 
The irony of Google’s actions in light of the NSA’s retention 
policies is hard to miss: in part because the NSA was intercepting 
Gmail and reading it (at which point the agency was required 
under minimization procedures to eliminate irrelevant infor-
mation), the company now encrypts all communications, with the 
result that the NSA can still collect Gmail, but it can now keep it 
indefinitely, simply because it is encrypted at the front end. As-
suming that the NSA has the tools to decrypt the communica-
tions, it is unclear how this provides greater protections for U.S. 
persons’ privacy. Nevertheless, in light of Google’s new policy, 
and calls from consumers for other companies to follow suit, 330 it 
seems that this practice may become standard. 
Not only are we seeing greater individual use of encryption, 
but companies generally are also looking for ways to ensure the 
security of their data. The cost of enabling hardware encryption 
capabilities is falling: from $100 in 2009, by 2012, the cost of ena-
bling hardware encryption capabilities to hard disk drives had 
plummeted to $15.331 Simultaneously, a series of data breaches 
and their enormous cost to companies (quite apart from questions 
related to international consumer confidence in U.S. companies 
post-June 2013), encouraged industry to make greater use of en-
cryption.332  According to a recent market research report, the 
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hardware encryption market is expected to reach some $166.67 
billion by 2018, growing at an incredible CAGR of 62.17% from 
2013 to 2018.333 These trends call attention to the NSA’s back-end 
retention policies with regard to encrypted materials. 
2. Use of Section 702 Data in Criminal Prosecution 
NSA’s minimization procedures place a duty on the NSA to 
turn over any information regarding the commission of a crime to 
law enforcement agencies, if the NSA would like to retain the in-
formation.334 In light of front-end considerations (the inclusion of 
information “about” selectors/targets and the assumption of non-
U.S. person and overseas status), U.S. persons’ international and, 
at times, domestic communications can be monitored, collected, 
and used against them in a court of law, without law enforcement 
ever satisfying Title III requirements. Neither individualized sus-
picion nor insertion of a neutral, third-party magistrate character-
izes Section 702 collection. U.S. persons may not themselves be in 
direct contact with any of the approved targets under Section 702. 
And query of databases using U.S. person identifiers may further 
implicate U.S. persons in criminal activity—even acts unrelated to 
national security. But no individualized judicial process is re-
quired. Courts have in the past found applications under tradi-
tional FISA sufficient.335 But Section 702 includes none of these 
protections, giving rise to both statutory bypass and Fourth 
Amendment concerns. 
III. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
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particularly describing the place to be searched, and the per-
sons or things to be seized.336 
What this language means, as a matter of criminal law, is that 
outside of a limited number of exceptions,337 the search of an in-
dividual’s home, office, or communications is presumptively 
“unreasonable“ (and therefore unconstitutional), unless the gov-
ernment first obtains a warrant from a magistrate. The warrant 
must be based on a finding that the government has probable 
cause to believe that a crime has been, is being, or will be com-
mitted and that a search will uncover evidence relevant to the 
suspected crime.338 
In 1972 the Supreme Court recognized that domestic security 
may merit a different Fourth Amendment standard than criminal 
law. By signaling deference to the political branches, the Court 
acknowledged that in foreign intelligence, constitutional provi-
sions enter into tension: those related to foreign affairs, and those 
involved in investigations. For the former, separation of powers 
considerations have a role to play. While the Fourth Amendment 
might set an outside limit with regard to reasonableness, actions 
of the legislature may be imbued with constitutional meaning. 
In 1972, United States v. U.S. District Court for the Eastern District 
of Michigan.339 (commonly referred to as “Keith”) left open the 
question of what would be constitutionally sufficient for the do-
mestic surveillance of foreign powers or their agents.340 In the ab-
sence of statutory guidance, lower courts began to recognize a 
foreign intelligence exception to the warrant requirement. These 
cases were rooted in U.S. foreign relations and the President’s for-
eign affairs powers. 
But the President shares foreign affairs authority with the legis-
lature, and in 1978, Congress answered the invitation extended in 
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Keith by introducing FISA. It went beyond domestic security mat-
ters to include all surveillance of foreign powers or their agents, 
thus supplanting the exception that the courts had begun to artic-
ulate with a new standard. Congress crafted the legislation to en-
sure that domestic electronic foreign intelligence collection could 
not proceed absent prior judicial review, demonstration of proba-
ble cause, and particularity. FISA was to be the sole means via 
which domestic electronic intercepts could be conducted. 
In the intervening years, not a single court has articulated a 
domestic foreign intelligence exception to the warrant require-
ment.341 FISA, as informed by separation of powers, is the de facto 
Fourth Amendment standard for the contours of the warrant 
clause for electronic intercepts on U.S. soil. 
As a matter of the interception of international communica-
tions, the Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment 
does not apply to non-U.S. persons, who do not have a strong 
attachment to the United States.342 The government is not re-
quired to obtain a warrant prior to conducting searches of such 
individuals outside domestic bounds. Prior to the 2008 FAA, nei-
ther was the government required to obtain a warrant, or any-
thing even approximating a warrant, for the surveillance of U.S. 
persons overseas. 
Sections 703 and 704 of the FAA altered the status quo, requiring 
the government to go to a court to obtain an individualized order, 
prior to targeting a U.S. person overseas. This shift carried consti-
tutional meaning. Congress itself was intensely aware that in 
passing the FAA, it was invoking its authority under separation of 
powers doctrine, to limit the scope of executive action when it 
came to gathering foreign intelligence. 
One could argue that programmatic collection (leading to the 
incidental collection of significant amounts of U.S. persons’ 
communications), TFA, and the monitoring of unrelated com-
munications embedded in MCTs run contrary to Congressional 
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intent under Sections 703 and 704. That is, if Congress intended 
U.S. persons to have a higher level of protection by inserting a 
neutral judicial magistrate to issue an individualized order 
(based on some level of suspicion of wrongdoing) for electronic 
surveillance, then the collection of significant amounts of U.S. 
persons’ communications without these safeguards acts as an 
end-run around the protections. Under Youngstown, this would 
mean that the executive branch’s actions should be considered at 
the lowest ebb. 
The problem with this argument is that even if it might have 
been true in 2008, certainly by the time of the renewal debates, 
there was enough information available to Congress about how 
the executive branch was using the provisions. The decision to 
continue the powers at that point brought the executive branch’s 
actions, at least insofar as the warrant clause is concerned, to the 
highest tier of Jackson’s concurrence. 
The Court’s deference, however, extends only insofar as a war-
rant is required for the collection of foreign intelligence.343 It does 
not extend to the querying of information for law enforcement 
purposes, for the simple reason that, at that point, foreign affairs 
are no longer relevant. Queries occur well within the realm of 
criminal law, where the Court has long insisted on a warrant, out-
side of limited exceptions. Nor do foreign affairs considerations 
reach the reasonableness component of the Fourth Amendment. 
For the former, the failure of the executive to obtain prior judi-
cial authorization, upon a showing of particularity, falls outside 
constitutional constraints. 
For the latter, the test is one of the totality of the circumstances. 
The significant governmental interest in national security must be 
weighed against the potential intrusion into U.S. persons’ privacy. 
The whole picture matters, including programmatic collection 
(resulting in the monitoring and collection of significant amounts 
of U.S. persons’ communications), the scanning of content for in-
formation “about” selectors/targets, and the interception of non-
relevant communications as part of MCTs. Equally important are 
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the protections built into the system at the back-end, to limit the 
acquisition, use, dissemination, and retention of U.S. persons’ 
communications. In light of this analysis, the manner in which 
Section 702 has been implemented falls outside constitutional 
boundaries. 
A. Application of the Warrant Clause in the United States 
The criminal law standard for electronic intercepts derives from 
Katz v. United States,344 in which the Court confronted the impact 
of new technologies on the government’s ability to listen to pri-
vate communications. Recognizing the intrusive potential of elec-
tronic bugs, the Court determined that the Fourth Amendment 
“protects people, not places.”345 Justice Potter Stewart, writing for 
the majority, explained: “What a person knowingly exposes to the 
public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth 
Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, 
even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally 
protected.”346 The “presence or absence of a physical intrusion” 
mattered naught.347 Wiretapping transgressed the reasonable ex-
pectation that the government would not intercept telephone 
calls. To act within the contours of the Fourth Amendment, the 
government must first obtain a warrant, based on a judicial find-
ing of probable cause.348 
Katz dealt with the interception of domestic telephone conver-
sations in a criminal context. It did not address whether and to 
what extent analyses change based on the purpose of the intercept 
(for example, criminal law, domestic security, foreign intelligence, 
or military), the legal status of the individuals whose conversa-
tions are being intercepted (U.S. person v. non-U.S. person), or the 
location of the search and seizure (that is, whether the intercep-
tion takes place wholly within the United States, between the 
United States and overseas, or entirely overseas). 
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1. Criminal Law Versus Domestic Security 
Following Katz, Congress passed Title III of the Omnibus Crime 
Control and Safe Streets Act to govern domestic telephone wire-
taps for ordinary criminal investigations.349 The law created prior 
judicial authorization and established the circumstances under 
which an intercept order could be issued. It requires the court to 
find probable cause that an enumerated offense has been, is being, 
or is about to be committed; probable cause that communications 
regarding the offense will be obtained through the intercept; and 
probable cause that the facilities to be placed under surveillance 
are to be used in conjunction with the enumerated offense or by 
the individual suspected of wrongdoing. 350 The officer applying 
for the warrant must establish that normal investigative proce-
dures have been tried and have failed, (or appear to be unlikely to 
succeed if tried), or to be too dangerous to try.351 The applicant 
must specify the person, location, and type of communications, as 
well as the length of the interception (with a thirty day limit).352 
The legislation restricts wiretaps to the investigation of certain 
specified crimes.353 
Congress excluded matters related to foreign affairs from Title 
III, reserving to the President the latitude necessary to act in this 
domain. The statute explains, 
Nothing contained in this chapter . . . shall limit the constitu-
tional power of the President to take such measures as he 
deems necessary to protect the Nation against actual or po-
tential attack or other hostile acts of a foreign power, to ob-
tain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the 
security of the United States, or to protect national security 
information against foreign intelligence activities.354 
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The collection of foreign intelligence was a concomitant of the 
President’s foreign affairs power.355 
Legislators were careful to note during passage of Title III that 
this language neither amounted to an affirmative grant of authori-
ty nor limited the President’s foreign affairs powers. The only ex-
change on this provision of Title III took place between Senator 
John McClellan (D-AR), who sponsored the bill, and Senators 
Spessard Holland (D-FL) and Gary Hart (D-CO): 
Mr. Holland: [The section] does not affirmatively give any 
power . . . We are not affirmatively conferring any power 
upon the President. We are simply saying that nothing here-
in shall limit such power as the President has under the 
Constitution . . . We certainly do not grant him a thing. 
There is nothing affirmative in this statement. 
Mr. McClellan: Mr. President, we make it understood that 
we are not trying to take anything away from him. 
Mr. Holland: The Senator is correct. 
Mr. Hart: Mr. President, there is no intention here to expand 
by this language a constitutional power. Clearly we could 
not do so. 
Mr. McClellan: Even though intended, we could not do so. 
Mr. Hart: . . . However, we are agreed that this language 
should not be regarded as intending to grant any authority, 
including authority to put a bug on, that the President does 
not have now. In addition, Mr. President, as I think our ex-
change makes clear, nothing in [this section] even attempts 
to define the limits of the President’s national security pow-
er under present law . . . .356 
One reason that question regarding the contours of Title III, and 
its implications for the President’s foreign affairs powers, could 
even arise is because, consistent with separation of powers doc-
trine, legislative action could affect the latitude constitutionally 
afforded to the executive branch. This is at the heart of Jackson’s 
concurrence in Youngstown. 
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 356. 114 CONG. REC. 14751 (1968). The Senate Judiciary Committee Report simi-
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Questions about what standards should govern the collection of 
intelligence for national security purposes (as opposed to ordi-
nary law enforcement) arose in Katz. Justice Byron White, in his 
concurrence, suggested that the presumption against warrantless 
searches could be overcome by pressing need.357 Justice William 
O. Douglas, joined by Justice William J. Brennan, strongly object-
ed: “Neither the President nor the Attorney General is a magis-
trate. In matters where they believe national security may be in-
volved they are not detached, disinterested, and neutral as a court 
or magistrate must be.”358 For Douglas, the executive branch was 
given the responsibility of “vigorously investigat[ing] and pre-
vent[ing] breaches of national security and prosecut[ing] those 
who violate the pertinent federal laws.”359 This hardly qualified 
for neutral observation.360 
Katz ultimately left open the question of “[w]hether safeguards 
other than prior authorization by a magistrate would satisfy the 
Fourth Amendment in a situation involving the national securi-
ty.”361 In 1972 the Supreme Court took up this question insofar as 
domestic security was concerned in Keith.362 The case centered on 
the warrantless wiretap of three individuals suspected of conspir-
ing to bomb the Central Intelligence Agency.363 In an 8–0 decision, 
the Court held that in this circumstance, government officials 
were required to obtain a warrant. The “inherent vagueness of the 
domestic security concept” and the potential for its abuse to 
squash political dissent underscored the importance of the Fourth 
Amendment when the government placed its own citizens under 
																																																																																																																						
 357. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 363–64 (1967) (White, J., concurring) 
(“We should not require the warrant procedure and the magistrate’s judgment if 
the President of the United States or his chief legal officer, the Attorney General, 
has considered the requirements of national security and authorized electronic 
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 358. Id. at 359 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 359. Id. at 359–60. 
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position of adversary-and-prosecutor and disinterested, neutral magistrate.”). 
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 362. United States v. U.S. District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 308 (1972). 
 363. Id. at 299. 
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surveillance. 364  Technology presented a double-edged sword: 
while the government had the responsibility to ensure the safety 
of the people, and it would be “contrary to the public interest” for 
the Government to deny itself the use of new tools that could be 
used against it, neither was it in the people’s best interest to give 
the government untrammeled access to new technologies.365 
Justice Powell’s arguments in Keith echoed those of Douglas in 
Katz: “Fourth Amendment freedoms cannot properly be guaran-
teed if domestic security surveillances may be conducted solely 
within the discretion of the Executive Branch.”366 The Court de-
termined that some sort of “prior judicial approval” was “re-
quired.”367 But the judiciary left it to Congress to determine what 
standards would be sufficient for Fourth Amendment purpos-
es.368 The Court explained, “Different standards may be compati-
ble with the Fourth Amendment if they are reasonable both in 
relation to the legitimate need of Government for intelligence in-
formation and the protected rights of our citizens.”369 In criminal 
law, “probable cause” was the standard against which the consti-
tutional mandate of “reasonableness” was weighed.370  But for 
domestic intercepts the showing of probable cause might reflect 
different requirements, alleging instead “other circumstances 
more appropriate to domestic security cases.”371 Congress may 
prefer “that the request for prior court authorization could, in 
sensitive cases, be made to any member of a specially designated 
court.”372 The time and reporting requirements need not be as 
strict as those in Title III.373 The Court made it clear that Congress 
had the power to determine the contours of a domestic security 
warrant, within the outer limits of reasonableness; that a warrant 
of some sort was required provided a minimum. 
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 366. Id. at 316–17. 
 367. Id. at 324. 
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The Court was careful to limit its decision to cases involving 
“the domestic aspects of national security,” adding, “[w]e have 
not addressed, and express no opinion as to, the issues which may 
be involved with respect to activities of foreign powers or their 
agents.”374 
2. The Domestic Foreign Intelligence Exception 
Before Congress could act, lower courts, looking to Keith, began 
to carve out a foreign intelligence exception to the warrant re-
quirement for domestic surveillance of foreign powers and their 
agents. These cases dealt with matters at the core of the Presi-
dent’s constitutional foreign affairs powers. They also drew a 
sharp line between the standards applied to intelligence gathering 
and those required in the course of criminal investigations. 
One of the most important cases came on the heels of the Vi-
etnam conflict and involved questions at the heart of U.S. interna-
tional relations. David Truong, a Vietnamese citizen and the son 
of a prominent Vietnamese political figure, moved to the United 
States in 1965.375 Eleven years later he met Dung Krall, a Vietnam-
ese-American, who was married to a U.S. Naval Officer and had 
extensive contacts in France.376 During the 1977 Paris negotiations 
between Vietnam and the United States, Truong asked Krall 
(who, unbeknownst to Truong, was a CIA informant), to carry 
classified documents to colleagues in Paris to pass on to the So-
cialist Republic of Vietnam.377 Warrantless surveillance revealed 
that Truong was receiving the classified materials from Ronald 
Humphrey, an American citizen working at the United States’ 
Information Agency.378 Truong and Humphrey were convicted of 
espionage, as well as acting as agents of a foreign government 
without prior notification to the Secretary of State.379 
The 4th Circuit agreed with the decision below, finding a do-
mestic foreign intelligence exception to the warrant requirement, 
so long as the investigation was “primarily” focused on foreign 
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 379. Id. at 912. 
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intelligence.380 At the point where the investigation turned crimi-
nal in nature, however, any information obtained without a war-
rant could be suppressed.381 
The court, distinguishing its holding from Keith, explained that 
requiring a warrant for domestic foreign intelligence investiga-
tions would “unduly frustrate” the President in executing his for-
eign affairs powers: “[A]ttempts to counter foreign threats to the 
national security require the utmost stealth, speed, and secre-
cy.”382 The Fourth Circuit considered the courts ill-placed to sec-
ond-guess the President. It wrote: “[T]he executive possesses un-
paralleled expertise to make the decision whether to conduct 
foreign intelligence surveillance, whereas the judiciary is largely 
inexperienced in making the delicate and complex decisions that 
lie behind foreign intelligence surveillance.”383 
The warrant exception stemmed from the foreign affairs com-
ponent of executive power, outwardly directed at protecting U.S. 
national security.384 Not only did the executive have the expertise, 
but, as a constitutional matter, it was the “pre-eminent authority 
in foreign affairs.”385 Flexibility, practical experience, and constitu-
tional competence worked together to carve out an exception 
where foreign intelligence matters were concerned. 
The Fourth Circuit was careful to limit its holding “to those sit-
uations in which the interests of the executive are paramount.”386 
This meant that the object of the search or surveillance must be a 
foreign power or its agents. The foreign connection was critical. 
Similarly important was the point at which the surveillance 
moved to the criminal realm—in this case, the moment at which 
the criminal division at the Department of Justice became in-
volved. The Court further noted that even if a warrant was not 
necessary, the Fourth Amendment still required that the surveil-
lance be “reasonable.”387 
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Other circuit courts, applying Keith, affirmed the existence of 
a domestic foreign intelligence exception to the warrant 
clause.388 In United States v. Butenko, the Third Circuit recog-
nized that the Constitution accorded the President foreign af-
fairs powers.389 It recognized the danger of allowing Fourth 
Amendment analysis “to be abandoned whenever the Presi-
dent asserts that a particular search and seizure is incident to 
the conduct of foreign affairs.” 390  While national security 
threats may be “of immeasurable gravity,” the court wrote, 
“there would seem to be nothing in the language of the Consti-
tution to justify completely removing the Fourth Amendment’s 
requirements in the foreign affairs field and, concurrently, im-
posing these requirements in all other situations.”391 
In Butenko, the Cold War context loomed large. The court con-
victed a Soviet national, Igor A. Ivanov, and U.S. citizen John Bu-
tenko of passing classified military documents to a foreign gov-
ernment and failing to notify the Secretary of State of their status 
as foreign agents.392 The executive branch’s decision to wiretap the 
two men stemmed from the President’s foreign affairs power. The 
Third Circuit explained: 
As Commander-in-Chief, the President must guard the 
country from foreign aggression, sabotage, and espionage. 
Obligated to conduct this nation’s foreign affairs, he must be 
aware of the posture of foreign nations toward the United 
States, the intelligence activities of foreign countries aimed 
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at uncovering American secrets, and the policy positions of 
foreign states on a broad range of international issues.393 
As the President exercised Article II foreign affairs authorities, 
he obtained broader latitude under the Fourth Amendment than 
he would otherwise have for matters involving ordinary law en-
forcement. 
The Supreme Court has consistently held the view that where 
foreign affairs matters impacting international relations are in-
volved, the executive may have more leeway.394 In United States v. 
Curtiss-Wright, it explained: 
Not only . . . is the federal power over external affairs in 
origin and essential character different from that over inter-
nal affairs, but participation in the exercise of that power is 
significantly limited. In this vast external realm, with its im-
portant, complicated, delicate and manifold problems, the 
President alone has the power to speak or listen as a repre-
sentative of the nation.395 
The President, however, shares foreign affairs powers with 
Congress. To the extent, then, that the President is given greater 
latitude as an aspect of foreign affairs, so, too, may Congressional 
action affect the scope of the authority constitutionally afforded to 
the President. 
3. Concurrent Authorities 
As a constitutional matter, the Executive is not the only 
branch to be entrusted with foreign affairs. To Congress is pro-
vided the ability to collect money to provide for the common 
defense, the authority to regulate commerce with foreign na-
tions, and the power to define and punish piracies and felonies 
on the high seas.396 It falls to the legislature to declare war.397 
Congress may raise and support armies, provide and maintain 
a navy, and make rules for the government and regulation of 
the same.398 It may call forth and organize the militia,399 and it 
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may “make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for 
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers.”400 
Concurrent authority means that the scope of action available 
to either party in some sense rests on the actions of the other. This 
notion lay at the heart of the Founders’ concept of separation and 
balance of powers. Accordingly, Justice Jackson’s third category 
in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer contemplates the poten-
tial for the President to undertake measures “incompatible with 
the expressed or implied will of Congress.”401  In this circum-
stance, the courts should consider the President’s power as “at its 
lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional 
powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the 
matter.”402 Jackson warned: 
Courts can sustain exclusive presidential control in such a 
case only by disabling the Congress from acting upon the 
subject. Presidential claim to a power at once so conclusive 
and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for what is 
at stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional 
system.403 
In Dames & Moore v. Regan, the Court went on to discuss the 
three-part test based on Jackson’s analysis in Youngstown.404 It cau-
tioned against an over-formalistic commitment to the framework, 
even as it recognized the value of thinking about concurrent au-
thorities as a spectrum, within which actions by one branch influ-
enced the scope of the authorities held by the other. 
With this allotment in mind, the courts have traditionally rec-
ognized executive and legislative preeminence in foreign affairs 
and afforded the two branches a certain amount of deference with 
regard to related questions.405 This does not mean that foreign af-
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fairs powers are unlimited.406 But it does suggest that on certain 
matters, the judiciary gives the political branches greater leeway. 
FISA represents one such moment, where an exercise of foreign 
affairs power carried constitutional meaning for the acceptable 
scope of Fourth Amendment protections.407 
4. FISA Replacement of the Warrant Exception 
Congress responded to Keith by enacting the 1978 Foreign Intel-
ligence Surveillance Act.408 It went beyond the Supreme Court’s 
holding by addressing questions related not just to domestic secu-
rity (a subset of national security concerns) but also to foreign 
powers and agents thereof. Congress extended special protections 
to American citizens. The Courts have subsequently found FISA 
to be constitutionally sufficient for Fourth Amendment purposes. 
For U.S. persons to fall within these categories (and thus to be 
targeted under the statute and subject to electronic surveillance), 
Congress required the government to demonstrate some level of 
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criminality and to submit to procedural protections that approxi-
mated the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. 
Traditional FISA defines “foreign power” in three ways: (a) for-
eign entities, (b) groups “engaged in international terrorism or 
activities in preparation therefor,” and (c) entities not substantially 
composed of United States persons that are engaged in the inter-
national proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.409 U.S. per-
sons can only come within (b) and (c), and to qualify under either, 
some level of criminality must be involved: “International terror-
ism” means activities that involve violence or are dangerous to 
human life and are a violation of U.S. criminal law.410 Similarly, 
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a criminal act. 
For a U.S. person to be considered an “agent of a foreign pow-
er,” he or she must similarly engage in criminal activity.411 The 
statute includes in this category any person who: 
(a) knowingly engages in clandestine intelligence gathering 
activities for or on behalf of a foreign power, which activities 
involve or may involve a violation of the criminal statutes of the 
United States; 
(b) pursuant to the direction of an intelligence service or 
network of a foreign power, knowingly engages in any other 
clandestine intelligence activities for or on behalf of such 
foreign power, which activities involve or are about to involve a 
violation of the criminal statutes of the United States; 
(c) knowingly engages in sabotage or international terrorism, or 
activities that are in preparation therefor, for or on behalf of 
a foreign power; 
(d) knowingly enters the United States under a false or fraudu-
lent identity for or on behalf of a foreign power or, while in 
the United States, knowingly assumes a false or fraudulent 
identity for or on behalf of a foreign power; or 
(e) knowingly aids or abets any person in the conduct of ac-
tivities described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C) or know-
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ingly conspires with any person to engage in activities de-
scribed in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C).412 
The acts that qualify U.S. persons as agents of foreign powers are 
criminal in nature. 413 Under traditional FISA, Congress further re-
quires that the government demonstrate probable cause that U.S. 
persons come within one of the above categories.414 The standard 
is slightly different than, but has largely the same effect as, the 
standards required under Title III.415 
The courts have consistently upheld orders issued under FISA 
as constitutional. In United States v. Cavanagh, for instance, a de-
fendant was indicted for attempting to deliver defense infor-
mation to a foreign government.416 His effort to suppress the fruits 
of the search, conducted under traditional FISA, met with zero 
success. The Ninth Circuit held, inter alia, that FISA properly pro-
vides for issuance of warrant by a detached judicial officer and 
that the statute satisfies the Fourth Amendment requirements of 
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 416. 807 F.2d 787, 788 (9th Cir. 1987). 
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probable cause and particularity.417 Similar challenges have met 
with the same result.418 
While these cases center on situations in which foreign intel-
ligence is the primary purpose of the interception of communi-
cations (and an order under traditional FISA was obtained pri-
or to the collection), FISCR has gone further, stating that even 
where the primary purpose of the investigation is criminal in 
nature, the standards encapsulated in traditional FISA are suf-
ficient for Fourth Amendment purposes. In In re Sealed Case, the 
FISA Court of Review found that the government had demon-
strated probable cause to believe that the target, a U.S. person, 
was an agent of a foreign power and otherwise met the basic 
requirements of FISA.419 
5. Recognition of FISA as a Constitutional Limit 
Acknowledging the concurrent authorities of the executive and 
legislative branches with regard to some aspects of foreign affairs, 
FISA nevertheless drew a sharp line at the border of the United 
States. The statute was to be the sole means via which the execu-
tive henceforward conducted domestic foreign intelligence (elec-
tronic) surveillance, as defined in FISA.420 
Congress recognized the constitutional implications of the stat-
ute. During passage of the bill, the House wanted the text to state 
that the procedures established under its auspices represented the 
																																																																																																																						
 417. Id. at 791–92. 
 418. See, e.g., United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 72–74 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding 
that traditional FISA does not violate the Fourth Amendment); In re Kevork, 634 F. 
Supp. 1002, 1010–14 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (same), aff’d. 788 F.2d 566 (9th Cir. 1986); 
United States v. Megahey, 553 F. Supp. 1180, 1185–92 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (same); 
United States v. Falvey, 540 F. Supp. 1306, 1311–14 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (same); Dug-
gan, 743 F.2d at 75 n.5 (“A fortiori we reject defendants’ argument that a FISA 
order may not be issued consistent with the requirements of the Fourth Amend-
ment unless there is a showing of probable cause to believe the target has commit-
ted a crime.”); United States v. Rosen, 447 F. Supp. 2d 538 (E.D. Va. 2006) (hold-
ing, related to Espionage Act prosecution, that disclosure of FISA orders was 
protected and that FISC had probable cause to believe that the targets were for-
eign powers or agents thereof). 
 419. 310 F.3d 717, 720 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) (“The government’s application for a 
surveillance order contains detailed information to support its contention that the 
target . . . is aiding, abetting, or conspiring with others in international terrorism.”). 
 420. Outside of electronic communications, other forms of domestic foreign 
intelligence collection fell subject to Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1981).  
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“exclusive statutory” means for the Executive Branch to conduct 
electronic surveillance, on the grounds that the President retained 
inherent surveillance powers outside the statute. The Senate re-
jected this view, saying that if the President were to engage in 
electronic surveillance outside of FISA, the Courts should consid-
er the action to be consistent with category three of Justice Jack-
son’s concurrence in Youngstown.421 The Senate view carried.422 
Congress was aware that its actions were more than just setting a 
higher Fourth Amendment standard than the Court required. The 
statute carried constitutional meaning; and so Congress made an 
effort to communicate to the judiciary that further executive ac-
tion should be evaluated in light of the constitutional meaning 
created by the new provision. 
Congress went further to underscore its intent: FISA repealed 
the limitation previously noted in Title III, suggesting that Con-
gress did not intend to limit the President’s constitutional authori-
ties.423 FISA was Congress’s express decision to curb executive 
power as a constitutional matter. 
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 422. See H.R. Rep. No. 95-1720, at 35 (1978) (Conf. Rep.) (quoting 343 U.S. at 637) 
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measures as he deems necessary to protect the United States against the over-
throw of the Government by force or other unlawful means, or against any other 
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In order, then, for the Court to overturn FISA, it must disa-
vow some amount of foreign affairs powers to Congress—a 
step the judiciary would be highly reluctant to take. According-
ly, in the thirty-six years that have elapsed since the introduc-
tion of FISA, the Courts have not once upheld a domestic for-
eign intelligence exception to the warrant requirement for 
foreign powers or agents thereof. Instead, it is to FISA itself 
that the Courts look to establish the Fourth Amendment stand-
ard for the warrant requirement when domestic electronic sur-
veillance, as defined by FISA, is of moment.424 
In 2008, Congress again emphasized that FISA was to be the 
exclusive means via which electronic surveillance, as defined in 
the statute, could be conducted. Congressional members un-
derscored the importance of the exclusivity provision as a mat-
ter of constitutional, and not merely statutory, merit. Repre-
sentative Reyes explained, “The language should in no way be 
read to imply that there is an inherent power to conduct sur-
veillance beyond what is expressly authorized by statute.”425 
California Representative Jane Harman, the ranking member of 
the House intelligence committee noted, “FISA is the exclusive 
means by which our government can conduct surveillance. In 
short, no more warrantless surveillance.” 426  Representative 
																																																																																																																						
NO. 95-604, at 17 (1977) (“Most importantly, the disclaimer in 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) 
is replaced by provisions that assure that [FISA], together with [Title III], will be 
the exclusive means by which electronic surveillance covered by [FISA], and the 
interception of wire and oral communications, may be conducted.”) (emphasis in 
original). See also United States v. Biasucci, 786 F.2d 504, 508 n.4 (2d Cir. 1986) 
(noting exclusivity intent of Congress); United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 882 
(7th Cir. 1984). 
 424. One could argue that the reason the Courts did not find a domestic foreign 
intelligence exception in the intervening years is simply because the executive 
branch conceded that it was required to act under FISA and did so. But this claim 
is not accurate. As addressed at the beginning of this Article, post-9/11, President 
Bush instituted the President’s Surveillance Program, citing in support his Com-
mander-in-Chief authorities as sufficient to overcome Fourth Amendment objec-
tions. Congress and at least one court found this claim to be unconstitutional. See 
ACLU v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Mich. 2006), vacated on other grounds, 493 
F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2007). The litigation weighed heavily in the Congressional de-
bates on the FAA, in which the legislature went out of its way to condemn the 
warrantless surveillance on domestic soil and to extend special protections to 
citizens in their overseas communications. 
 425. 154 CONG. REC. H5758 (daily ed. June 20, 2008) (statement of Rep. Reyes). 
 426. 154 CONG. REC. H5762 (daily ed. June 20, 2008) (statement of Rep. Harman). 
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Langevin from Rhode Island, also a member of the Intelligence 
Committee, stated, “FISA is the exclusive means by which the 
executive branch may conduct electronic surveillance on U.S. 
soil. No President will have the power to do an end-run around 
the legal requirements of FISA.”427 Senator Feingold put the 
point most strongly, incredulous that the Bush Administration 
had invoked Article II “to override an absolutely clear, exclu-
sive authority adopted by Congress pursuant to Justice Jack-
son’s third tier of the test set out in his Youngstown opinion.”428 
Section 702 does not include a procedure approximating the 
warrant requirement in traditional FISA. Nor does it meet the 
standards set in Sections 703–704. Yet the NSA is using this provi-
sion to collect significant amounts of U.S. persons’ communica-
tions. It is collecting information “about” targets. And it is moni-
toring non-relevant and, at times, entirely domestic 
communications that happen to be bundled in MCTs. We will re-
turn to these points in a moment. 
B. Application of the Fourth Amendment Overseas 
Non-U.S. persons outside domestic bounds, who lack a “sub-
stantial connection” to the United States, do not benefit from the 
protection of the Fourth Amendment.429 The reasoning underly-
ing this decision raises difficult questions with regard to Section 
702 authorities. Although the court has provided little guidance 
on what would satisfy the test, an appropriate approach to fol-
low would be to require a legal relationship indicating member-
ship in the political community. Physical or virtual contact alone 
is insufficient to satisfy the test. On the flip side, the courts 
should recognize that individuals do not, merely by engaging in 
																																																																																																																						
 427. 154 CONG. REC. H5772 (daily ed. June 20, 2008) (statement of Rep. Lange-
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 429. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 261 (1990). 
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global communications, waive their right to the protections of 
the Fourth Amendment. 
There may be a reduced expectation of privacy in communi-
cating directly with individuals targeted for foreign intelligence 
purposes. But there is no reduced expectation in communicating 
overseas generally—by accident or design—that would allow the 
government to monitor all U.S. persons’ overseas communica-
tions for information “about” an individual or entity of interest. 
Simply by using e-mail, for instance, one does not assume the risk 
that the government will monitor the contents of that e-mail, 
should it happen to travel outside the United States. 
1. Meaningful Contact as a Precursor 
In Verdugo-Urquidez, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the 
Court, concluded that “the people” referred to in the Fourth 
Amendment indicated a particular group—not merely people qua 
people.430 Rehnquist’s reading stemmed from a deeply Aristoteli-
an approach: in other words, one that emphasizes membership in 
the polis (πόλις), or political community, as a concomitant of 
forming a structure of government.431 As members of the polis, 
U.S. persons, both distributively and collectively, obtain the pro-
tections of the constitution. Looked at in this regard, the Constitu-
tion itself embodies the collective organization of “the people” 
into one entity. “U.S. persons” and “the people” are therefore one 
and the same. The “right of the people,” for Rehnquist, thus refers 
to a collective group of individuals “who are part of a national 
community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connec-
tion with this country to be considered part of that community.”432 
Although Justice Anthony Kennedy joined the Court’s opinion, 
providing the critical fifth vote, in his concurrence he explicitly 
rejected Rehnquist’s explanation of “the people.”433 Instead, Ken-
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 431. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, BOOK I (350 BC), trans. by Benjamin Jowett, available at 
http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/politics.1.one.html [http://perma.cc/ERW5-T3AC]; 
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 432. 494 U.S. at 265 (per curiam). 
 433. Id. at 278 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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nedy relied on a more practical argument to find the petitioner’s 
warrant clause assertion untenable: 
The absence of local judges or magistrates available to issue 
warrants, the differing and perhaps unascertainable concep-
tions of reasonableness and privacy that prevail abroad, and 
the need to cooperate with foreign officials all indicate that 
the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement should not 
apply in Mexico as it does in this country.434 
It was the infeasibility of obtaining a warrant overseas that 
made the warrant clause inapposite. Because of the distinction 
drawn by Kennedy in his rationale for joining the majority, lower 
courts have divided on whether to read Verdugo-Urquidez as a 
plurality opinion or not.435 
Very few cases address precisely what constitutes sufficient 
contact with the United States to satisfy the “substantial connec-
tions” aspect of the majority’s decision. Those that do, point in 
seemingly different directions.436 In Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, a 
Mexican national with an expired visitor’s visa went to the U.S. 
consulate in Mexico to obtain a new visa.437 Directed to treat the 
old document as sufficient until the new one arrived, the woman 
came to the United States to visit her mother. The Fifth Circuit 
determined that she had sufficient connections to benefit from the 
protections of the Fourth Amendment as she crossed the bor-
der.438 In contrast, a different court found in United States v. Espar-
za-Mendoza, that an illegal alien, who had previously lived in the 
United States (indeed, had been convicted of a drug offense and 
subsequently deported), who returned without the appropriate 
paperwork and again resided within the country before his arrest 
in Utah, had not established a sufficient connection to benefit 
from the Fourth Amendment.439 
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 438. Id. at 625. 
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The conclusion that a foreign national who lives outside the 
United States, and who enters the country without a valid visa, is 
protected by the Fourth Amendment, appears to be in tension 
with the proposition that a foreign national, who lives in the Unit-
ed States, and re-enters without the appropriate paperwork, does 
not have a sufficient connection to the country to be considered 
within the protections of the Fourth Amendment.440 In both cases, 
the aliens’ connections with the United States are voluntary. In the 
second case, the unlawfulness of the connection creates a carve-
out for membership in the political community. The object of the 
unlawfulness, in other words, is citizenship or legal residency. 
Had the unlawfulness been merely criminal acts unrelated to res-
idency requirements, the individual may well have been a U.S. 
person for purposes of Chief Justice Rehnquist’s analysis. Yet, un-
der Justice Kennedy’s reasoning, it is not clear that the same out-
come would hold. The search in question in the second case oc-
curred on U.S. soil, where none of the practical obstacles cited by 
Kennedy in his concurrence would have come into play. Nor did 
the actions taken by the individual interfere with the United 
States’ authority as a sovereign nation in its conduct of foreign 
affairs. If that is the rationale for determining whether an individ-
ual bears a substantial connection, then geographic location may 
prove the most critical question. 
The lack of clarity at the margins has implications for targets of 
surveillance under Section 702. To the extent that the connections 
to the United States are lawful in regard to citizenship or residen-
cy (in other words, the target is either lawfully present at the time 
of the search or, if located overseas, has a substantial connection 
like citizenship or lawful residency), then, under Rehnquist’s 
analysis, the target is considered one of “the people,” as protected 
by the Fourth Amendment. Congress has already cemented these 
understandings into law: traditional FISA deals with domestic 
surveillance of not just U.S. persons but foreign powers or agents 
of foreign powers, even as Sections 703 and 704 addresses U.S. 
persons overseas.441 
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tions of a sufficient nexus; but the Supreme Court did not include this condition in 
Verdugo-Urquidez. 
 441. Recognition of the continued existence of U.S. persons’ rights when they 
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A gap in constitutional jurisprudence, and in understanding 
the application of Section 702, lies with a third class of individu-
als who may have a substantial connection to the country out-
side of outright citizenship or residency. How are they to be 
treated for purposes of the Fourth Amendment? An individual, 
for instance, with substantial professional, educational, or com-
mercial connections may have a strong relationship with the 
United States. Their actions may be critical to the country’s eco-
nomic growth or strength. Are they to be considered protected 
by the Fourth Amendment? 
Under Rehnquist’s account, the answer appears to be no. They 
are not part of the political community. Professor Orin Kerr has 
proposed that we read Verdugo-Urquidez to include only sufficient 
physical and legal contact with the country—and not to extend to 
online or Internet-based contacts.442 For him, online contacts with 
U.S. servers amount merely to a “‘fortuitous’ circumstance of 
where the Internet provider happens to locate the servers.”443 Cus-
tomers may be located anywhere in the world. As Rehnquist rea-
soned in Verdugo-Urquidez, “the purpose of the Fourth Amend-
ment was to protect the people of the United States against 
arbitrary action by their own government.”444 It was not meant to 
prevent the federal government from acting against aliens outside 
the United States.445 The community forming “the people” is not 
comprised of accidental members of the polis. They rely on the 
Constitution to protect them from the state.446 
This reading of “the people” appears to be right. But unlike 
Kerr, insofar as one considers Fourth Amendment protections as a 
threshold matter, I consider the legal relationship paramount and 
would limit it to a legal formalism establishing the relationship 
between the individual and the political community. That is, an 
individual constituting “the people” may or may not be present 
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 442. Kerr, supra note 434. 
 443. Id. at 21. 
 444. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 266. 
 445. Id. at 266-27. See also Kerr, supra note 434. 
 446. See also Kerr, supra note 434. 
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within the country; but it is the legal framing, stemming from the 
constitutional tenant of the organization of the political entity, that 
creates the right. 
The difficulty, for Section 702 purposes, enters in regard to 
Kennedy’s reliance on the rule that he saw as most consistent with 
the United States’ role as a sovereign nation.447 “[W]e must inter-
pret constitutional protections,” he wrote, “in light of the un-
doubted power of the United States to take actions to assert its 
legitimate power and authority abroad.”448 What is the scope of 
the United States’ legitimate power and authority abroad? To 
what degree is it rooted in the legal status of the individual 
against whom the state is acting? And what is the relationship 
between different forms of legal relationships and membership in 
the political community? 
Let us focus here on the types of relationships most at issue 
with regard to Section 702: global electronic communications. One 
danger in according non-U.S. persons Fourth Amendment rights 
via (substantial) virtual contact with the United States is that indi-
viduals could use such contacts to evade detection.449 Foreign per-
sons could become members of Amazon Prime, communicate 
with associates in the United States via Verizon, and take Massive 
Open Online Courses (MOOCs) from the latest American univer-
sity to offer them, perhaps even in the process obtaining a U.S. 
college or graduate degree. This could then become a shield to 
mask behavior that may undermine U.S. national security. 
One response to this might be that in a global communications 
environment, privacy protections must be thought about in a 
broader sense. It matters little whether a customer is French, 
English, or American. Privacy rights should be extended to cus-
tomers by nature of their dual status with U.S. persons qua cus-
tomers—or even as a concomitant of their rights as people. This 
was the thrust of part of Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight 
Board’s (PCLOB) analysis that suggested privacy be regarded as 
a human right. 
There is a realpolitic argument to be made here as well, which 
ties more directly to U.S. foreign interests. Namely, U.S. failure to 
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ensure privacy protections may lead to a loss in U.S. competitive-
ness. And economic concerns are central to U.S. national security. 
Consider the impact of the public release of information about 
NSA Section 702 surveillance on the U.S. cloud computing indus-
try. There was an immediate, detrimental impact on the strength 
of the U.S. economy. Billions of dollars are now on the line be-
cause of concerns that the services provided by U.S. information 
technology companies are neither secure nor private.450 The In-
formation Technology and Innovation Foundation estimates that 
declining revenues of corporations that focus on cloud computing 
and data storage alone could reach $35 billion over the next three 
years.451 Other commentators, such as Forrester Research analyst 
James Staten, have put actual losses as high as $180 billion by 
2016, unless something is done to restore overseas’ confidence in 
data held by U.S. companies.452 
Failure to extend privacy protections to individuals with sub-
stantial connections to the country via industry would, in this 
view, make it harder, not easier for the United States to assert its 
legitimate power and authority abroad. So, under Kennedy’s rea-
soning, one could argue that Fourth Amendment rights should be 
extended to individuals economically tied to U.S. entities. This 
determination, however, is ultimately one of policy—not law. De-
ciding whether a greater national security threat is entailed in loss 
of competitiveness of U.S. industry, versus loss of protections ex-
tended to non-U.S. persons in the interests of privacy, is part of 
the weighing that must be done by the executive branch in pursu-
ing its interests abroad. In this way, the Rehnquist opinion and 
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the Kennedy concurrence can be read as compatible with not ex-
tending Fourth Amendment rights to individuals lacking a legal 
relationship (in other words, those stemming directly from the 
individual’s status as a member of the political community).453 
This appears to have been the crux of President Obama’s ef-
fort to reassure the international community in January 2014 
that the United States would not use its authority to collect 
trade secrets to advantage U.S. corporations.454 In Presidential 
Policy Directive 28, Obama acknowledged the privacy interests 
held by foreign persons: 
All persons should be treated with dignity and respect, re-
gardless of their nationality or wherever they might reside, 
and all persons have legitimate privacy interests in the han-
dling of their personal information. U.S. signals intelligence 
activities must, therefore, include appropriate safeguards for 
the personal information of all individuals, regardless of the 
nationality of the individual to whom the information per-
tains or where that individual resides.455 
The extent to which U.S. SIGINT follows this prescription boils 
down to policy, not law. As a constitutional matter, the collection 
of information of non-U.S. persons overseas does not need to 
comport with the Fourth Amendment. 
A more serious challenge presents itself in relation to commu-
nications between members of the political community and indi-
viduals who are not otherwise protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment. This is at the heart of Congress’s concern about reverse 
targeting—namely, that the intelligence community would use 
Section 702 to target non-U.S. persons overseas, as a back door to 
gaining access to U.S. persons’ communications.  
To the extent that the interception of U.S. persons’ communica-
tions constitutes a search or seizure within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment, it would appear that, at least at the front-
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end, U.S. persons are entitled to protections.456 The inspection and 
collection of content falls within the meaning of a search and sei-
zure under the Fourth Amendment. 
Just as virtual entry into the United States should not matter for 
purposes of setting a threshold for application of the Fourth 
Amendment to aliens, use of global communications should not 
thereby divest U.S. persons of their constitutional protections. 
This approach is consistent with the geographic focus of the 
Courts in regard to the Fourth Amendment. It does not hinge 
constitutional protections on movement along global communica-
tions networks—itself an untenable proposition in light of how 
information flows over the Internet. 
If the courts, for instance, were to construct a rule that said that 
U.S. persons sending information outside the United States lose 
the protections of the Fourth Amendment in the privacy afforded 
those communications, it would be difficult to police. This rule 
assumes that individuals have control over whether their com-
munications leave domestic bounds. They do not. The Internet is 
constructed to find the most efficient route between two ISP ad-
dresses. This means that even domestic communications may be 
routed internationally. Individuals have no control over how their 
messages are conveyed. At the back end, the government would 
have to be able to ascertain which messages originated within the 
United States and then left U.S. bounds. But the NSA claims that it 
does not have the appropriate technologies to make this call. 
As a result, the effect of this rule would essentially be to assume 
that every time a U.S. person communicates, she loses constitu-
tional protections in the content of those communications. This 
would eviscerate the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. It 
would assume that U.S. persons have no reasonable expectation 
of privacy in their communications, regardless of whether they 
flow across international borders. 
The Supreme Court can avoid this conclusion by underscoring 
the status of the individual as Rehnquist articulated for the major-
ity in Verdugo-Urquidez: emphasizing membership in the political 
community. Where established, the protection of the Fourth 
Amendment applies. 
																																																																																																																						
 456. For discussion of the question of search and seizure in light of Verdugo-
Urquidez, see Kerr, supra note 434. 
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2. Limits of the Warrant Clause Abroad 
Even if the Fourth Amendment applies to U.S. persons located 
outside the United States, it does not necessarily follow that the 
Warrant Clause must be satisfied. As a matter of practice, for 
centuries, the executive engaged in the warrantless surveillance 
of U.S. persons abroad.457 Similarly, between the enactment of 
traditional FISA and the introduction of the FAA, the surveil-
lance of U.S. persons and non-U.S. persons based overseas, for 
foreign intelligence purposes, took place outside statutory con-
tours. Non-U.S. persons fell largely within the President’s Article 
II authorities, even as Executive Order 12,333 provided for the 
same for U.S. persons. 
Accordingly, prior to the FAA, lower courts found the absence 
of a prior warrant for intercepts conducted abroad for criminal 
investigations to be consistent with the Fourth Amendment.458 
There were no statutes on point. Title III has no extraterritorial 
force.459 The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (FRCP), in turn, 
limit the jurisdiction of federal magistrates.460 Although the Su-
preme Court has considered a proposed amendment that would 
provide a way to issue “warrants to search property outside the 
United States,” the Advisory Committee to the 1990 Amendments 
to the FRCP noted that, “it was unclear how federal officers might 
obtain warrants authorizing searches outside the district of the 
issuing magistrate.”461 In the absence of statutory guidance, courts 
relied upon a constitutional analysis. 
In United States v. Barona,462 the Ninth Circuit recognized that 
U.S. persons overseas are covered by the Fourth Amendment—
but only insofar as the search in question meets the standard for 
reasonableness. The Warrant Clause did not apply. 463  Barona 
																																																																																																																						
 457. William F. Brown & Americo R. Cinquegrana, Warrantless Physical Searches for 
Foreign Intelligence Purposes: Executive Order 12,333 and the Fourth Amendment, 35 CATH. 
U. L. REV. 97, 103 (1985) (“Warrantless electronic surveillance has been used by the 
Executive to collect intelligence information since at least the mid-1800s.”). 
 458. See, e.g., United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 492 (9th Cir. 1987). 
 459. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (2012). See also Peterson, 812 F.2d at 492;.Stowe v. 
Devoy, 588 F.2d 336, 341 n.12 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Cotroni, 527 F.2d 708, 
711 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 906 (1976). 
 460. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b) (governing domestic law enforcement investigations). 
 461. Id. 41(a) (1990 Advisory Committee Note). See also Peterson, 812 F.2d at 492. 
462. 56 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 463. Id. at 1096. 
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stemmed from a Drug Enforcement Agency operation (“Opera-
tion Pisces”) conducted at the height of the war on drugs, 1985–
1987.464 Wiretaps led to the eventual conviction of individuals for 
involvement in the worldwide distribution of cocaine.  
In United States v. LaChapelle,465 the court noted that neither the 
Fourth Amendment “‘nor the judicially created exclusionary rule 
applies to acts of foreign officials’.”466 Only two “very limited ex-
ceptions”467 might apply: first, where “the circumstances of the 
foreign search and seizure are so extreme that they ‘shock the [ju-
dicial] conscience,’”468 (a consideration stemming from the judici-
ary’s supervisory powers, employed to ensure “the integrity of 
the criminal justice system”469); and, second, where U.S. agents’ 
participation was “so substantial that the action is a joint venture 
between United States and foreign officials.”470 In Barona, electron-
ic intercepts had been issued consistent with Danish Court proce-
dures, making the operation a joint venture. The court thus relied 
upon Denmark’s legal framework to determine whether the 
search was reasonable, and whether U.S. officials relied in good 
faith upon Danish representations that the actions taken complied 
with foreign law.471 
Barona dealt explicitly with criminal matters. In the foreign in-
telligence context, in 2000 one lower court similarly established 
the applicability of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness stand-
ard for surveillance of U.S. persons overseas, even as it eschewed 
applicability of the warrant requirement.472 Like Barona, the deci-
sion pre-dated the FAA. In United States v. Bin Laden, the Southern 
District of New York (S.D.N.Y.) denied a U.S. citizen’s motion to 
suppress evidence obtained from a warrantless wiretap placed on 
his landline in Nairobi, as well as on his mobile telephone.473 The 
																																																																																																																						
 464. Id. at 1089–90. 
465. 869 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1989). 
 466. Id. at 489 (quoting United States v. Maher, 645 F.2d 780, 782 (9th Cir. 1981)). 
 467. Id. 
 468. Id. at 490 (quoting United States v. Rose, 570 F.2d 1358, 1362. (9th Cir. 
1978)). 
 469. United States v. Barona, 56 F.3d 1087, 1091 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 470. LaChapelle, 869 F.2d at 490. 
 471. Barona, 56 F.3d at 1094. 
 472. United States v. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d 264 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 473. Id. The intercepts had been approved by the Attorney General in 1997. Id. 
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court considered the costs of imposing a warrant requirement on 
surveillance conducted overseas.474 The court reasoned by analo-
gy that a similar “special needs” exception existed with regard to 
foreign intelligence collection overseas.475 The court noted the ar-
gument that “the judicial branch is ill-suited to the task of over-
seeing foreign intelligence collection,” supporting this sentiment 
by referencing the “several persuasive points” made by the Gov-
ernment “about the intricacies of foreign intelligence collection 
conducted abroad,” such as the difficulties of predicting the inter-
national consequences of decisions; the problem of foreign intelli-
gence services and officials being seen as complicit with U.S. ac-
tions; and the danger of notifying enemies by alerting 
government officials sympathetic to their cause of U.S. surveil-
lance actions underway.476 The court further recognized the po-
tential for breaches of security in requiring a warrant prior to for-
eign intelligence collection overseas.477 
Even as it took the above considerations into account, S.D.N.Y. 
separately placed significant weight on the absence of any statutory 
guidance on whether the executive was required to obtain a war-
rant prior to the extra-territorial interception of U.S. persons’ 
																																																																																																																						
 474. Similar considerations mark the discussion of exceptions to the warrant 
requirement within the United States. See, e.g., Veronia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 
U.S. 646, 653 (1995) (upholding high school athlete drug testing and explaining 
the special needs doctrine); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 620 
(1989) (“The Government’s interest in regulating the conduct of railroad employ-
ees to ensure safety . . . presents ‘special needs’ beyond normal law enforcement 
that may justify departures from the usual warrant and probable-cause require-
ments.”); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 876 (1987) (holding that a warrant 
requirement would interfere with the supervision of individuals on probation and 
impede the responsiveness of probation officers); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) 
(upholding patdowns for weapons to protect officer safety); Camara v. Municipal 
Court, 387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967) (imposition of warrant requirement “depends in 
part upon whether the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the 
governmental purpose behind the search.”). 
 475. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 274 (“[I]t is clear that imposition of a warrant 
requirement in the context of foreign intelligence searches conducted abroad 
would be a significant and undue burden on the Executive.”) For discussion of the 
“special needs” exception in defense of warrantless wiretapping outside of FISA, 
see Letter from Assistant Attorney General William Moschella, to Hon. Pat Rob-
erts, Chairman, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and others 4 (Dec. 22, 
2005), available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/readingroom/surveillance6.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/HGJ5-K9QW]. 
 476. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 274–75. 
 477. Id. at 275. 
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communications.478 Just as in Truong and Butenko, absent limits 
established by Congress, the Executive had greater leeway to de-
cide whether and to what extent it engaged in overseas foreign 
intelligence gathering.479 
The court was uncomfortable creating a warrant requirement 
for foreign intelligence collection where the political branches—
and particularly the legislature—had failed to do so. Instead, it 
deferred to the executive and legislative branches as exercising 
broad authority in the field of foreign affairs. Outside of the con-
tours of reasonableness, the shape of foreign intelligence, as a con-
comitant of the field of foreign relations, was to be determined by 
the other branches working in tandem. 
Like Truong, Bin Laden related to electronic surveillance author-
ized by the President (and the Attorney General acting at the Pres-
ident’s behest) for foreign intelligence purposes, in investigations 
targeting foreign powers and their agents. The court was careful 
to note that the point at which the investigation turned into crimi-
nal prosecution provided a hard line: “This exception to the war-
rant requirement applies until and unless the primary purpose of 
the searches stops being foreign intelligence collection.”480 
In 2008 the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review 
found a similar foreign intelligence exception to the warrant re-
quirement for the interception of communications outside the 
																																																																																																																						
 478. Id. (“The final consideration which persuades the Court of the need for an 
exception to the warrant requirement for foreign intelligence collection conducted 
overseas is that there is presently no statutory basis for the issuance of a warrant 
to conduct searches abroad.”). 
 479. See, e.g., United States v. Truong, 629 F.2d 908, 923 (4th Cir. 1980); United 
States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 601. (3d Cir. 1974). Judge Leonard Sand explained, 
“[T]he Court finds that the power of the Executive to conduct foreign intelligence 
collection would be significantly frustrated by the imposition of a warrant re-
quirement in this context. Therefore, this Court adopts the foreign intelligence 
exception to the warrant requirement for searches targeting foreign powers (or 
their agents) which are conducted abroad. As has been outlined, no court, prior to 
FISA, that was faced with the choice, imposed a warrant requirement for foreign 
intelligence searches undertaken within the United States. With those precedents 
as guidance, it certainly does not appear to be unreasonable for this Court to re-
fuse to apply a warrant requirement for foreign intelligence searches conducted 
abroad.” Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 277 (emphasis in original). 
 480. Id. at 278. 
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United States.481 The case centered on provisions of the Protect 
America Act of 2007, which pre-dated the FAA, but which con-
tained measures similar to those now found in the law. The At-
torney General and DNI could authorize electronic intercepts be-
tween the U.S. and overseas where the target of the surveillance 
was believed to be located abroad and a “significant purpose” of 
the surveillance was the collection of foreign intelligence.482 In one 
of the few challenges in FISC to Section 702 or its antecedents, a 
telecommunications provider challenged the PAA on Fourth 
Amendment grounds. 
Although the company claimed a facial challenge to the PAA, 
the court accepted the government’s argument that the constitu-
tional questions being raised related to the statute as applied.483 
The court’s decision thus did not reach the validity of the law in 
different settings. 
FISCR noted that In re Sealed Case did not hold that a foreign in-
telligence exception to the warrant requirement exists; instead, it 
assumed, arguendo, that regardless of whether or not the require-
ments were met, traditional FISA could survive on reasonableness 
grounds.484 For In re Directives, FISCR thus considered de novo, 
whether, by analogy to the special needs doctrine, a similar for-
eign intelligence exception to the warrant requirement exists.485 
The court underscored the exceptional nature of the subject 
matter over which it had jurisdiction: 
For one thing, the purpose behind the surveillances ordered 
pursuant to the directives goes well beyond any garden-
variety law enforcement objective. It involves the acquisition 
from overseas foreign agents of foreign intelligence to help 
protect national security.486 
																																																																																																																						
 481. In re Directives [redacted text] Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign In-
telligence Surveillance Act, (FISA Ct. Rev. Aug. 22, 2008), available at 
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/fiscr082208.pdf [http://perma.cc/9DKP-M3XN]. 
 482. Compare Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-55, 121 Stat. 552 
(2007) (repealed July 10, 2008) with FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 
110-261, § 403, 122 Stat. 2436, 2473 (2008). 
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 484. Id. at 13. 
 485. Id. at 14–15. 
 486. Id. at 15. 
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Even as it recognized that “the government’s interest is particu-
larly intense,” citing In re Sealed Case, the court rejected the argu-
ment that foreign intelligence must be the primary purpose of the 
surveillance: 
[I]n our view the more appropriate consideration is the pro-
grammatic purpose of the surveillances and whether—as in 
the special needs cases—that programmatic purpose in-
volves some legitimate objective beyond ordinary crime con-
trol . . . . Under this analysis, the surveillances authorized by 
the directives easily pass muster. Their stated purpose cen-
ters on garnering foreign intelligence.487 
Because the executive branch stated that the programs in place 
were to protect national security, and there was “no indication” 
that the collection of information was primarily related to ordi-
nary criminal law enforcement, the court would presume a legit-
imate exercise of authority. FISCR added, consistent with Truong, 
that “requiring a warrant would hinder the government’s ability 
to collect time-sensitive information and, thus, would impede the 
vital national security interests that are at stake.”488 
In re Directives, like Bin Laden, was decided prior to the FAA 
and Congress’s introduction of Sections 703 and 704.489 It is diffi-
cult to say how the Court would now come down on the statuto-
ry analysis and the question of foreign powers allocation be-
tween the executive and legislative branches. Nowhere in the six 
pages devoted to the Warrant Clause consideration does the 
court address Youngstown, the failure of the courts to recognize 
any domestic foreign intelligence exception post-FISA, or the 
absence of more particularized statutory requirements. Nor does 
the court consider Verdugo-Urquidez and the application of the 
Fourth Amendment overseas based on whether the target is a 
U.S. person or a non-U.S. person. Perhaps most importantly, the 
court did not address incidental collection. 
																																																																																																																						
 487. Id. at 16. 
 488. Id. at 17. 
 489. But note that the case dealt with the PAA, which in a number of respects, 
was less protective of the rights of U.S. persons. 
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C. Foreign Intelligence, Criminal Prosecution 
If one accepts that the contours of the warrant requirement in 
foreign intelligence gathering are subject to countervailing pres-
sure from separation of powers doctrine, it does not necessarily 
follow that the use of the same information for criminal law pur-
poses, without insertion of a warrant procedure at any point, is 
constitutionally sufficient. Courts have repeatedly emphasized 
the importance of drawing a line between the two spheres. FISCR 
pushed the line furthest, saying that even where the primary pur-
pose was criminal in nature, the information could be obtained as 
long as there was a foreign intelligence aspect. 
Whatever one may say about the constitutionality of different 
aspects of the program underway,490 there is at least one point 
where the current practice of the Administration runs well over 
acceptable limits: query of Section 702 data using U.S. persons’ 
information for purposes of criminal prosecution. 
As mentioned, the FBI comingles traditional FISA and Section 
702 data and routinely queries it, using U.S. person identifiers, as 
part of criminal investigations. Yet none of the justifications of-
fered for exempting collection from the warrant requirement ap-
ply when ordinary criminal investigations are on the line. FISCR 
embraced three reasons to carve out a foreign intelligence excep-
tion: when (a) the purpose of surveillance went beyond “garden-
variety” law enforcement; (b) the government’s interest was “par-
ticularly intense”; and (c) there was a “high degree of probability 
that requiring a warrant would hinder the government’s ability to 
collect time-sensitive information and, thus, would impede the 
vital national security interests that are at stake.”491 None of these 
																																																																																																																						
 490. A good argument could be marshaled, for instance, that while to/from col-
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 491. In re Directives, 551 F.3d at 1011–12. 
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rationales are present in the subsequent query of databases con-
structed of Section 702 data. 
Nor are the practical concerns that limit the warrant clause’s 
applicability in overseas foreign intelligence collection present. In 
Bin Laden, S.D.N.Y. highlighted the intricacies of foreign intelli-
gence acquisition, the difficulty of predicting the international 
impact of seeking a warrant, the problem of foreign intelligence 
officials being seen as complicit, and the danger of notifying ene-
mies by alerting foreign officials to U.S. actions.492 But in the query 
of data already in U.S. government hands, none of the foreign af-
fairs consequences the court contemplated still hold. 
It does not necessarily follow that, just because the information 
has been lawfully obtained, the government has the authority to 
search the data. Two contexts are relevant to Section 702 analysis: 
(a) situations in which information has been lawfully seized, but 
where limits may apply on searches, and (b) situations in which 
information may be fed into a database and retained, with subse-
quent use of the database limited in some way. Nearly two dec-
ades ago, scholars argued that a use restriction could be found in 
the Fourth Amendment. Critiques of this position fail to take ac-
count of the Court’s more recent jurisprudence, which recognizes 
a privacy interest in digital information and creates the potential 
for constitutional restrictions on use. 
1. Lawful Seizure and Subsequent Search of Data 
The Fourth Amendment allows for line drawing between ob-
taining and searching information and further query of the da-
ta. One of the most recent cases illustrating this point is United 
States v. Ganias, a Second Circuit case involving search of in-
formation copied from a hard drive, two years after it was ob-
tained, for purposes other than that for which it was initially 
seized.493 The court held unconstitutional the retention and fur-
ther search of the data, despite the fact that law enforcement 
had returned to a judge to obtain a warrant for the later 
search.494 In Riley v. California, the Supreme Court addressed a 
similar situation in the context of a search incident to arrest, 
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 493. United States v. Ganias, 755 F.3d 125 (2d. Cir. 2014). 
 494. Id. 
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finding that even where a cell phone has been legally seized, 
subsequent query of the device requires judicial intervention.495 
While other cases further support the point, brief discussion of 
Ganias and Riley helps to illustrate the Fourth Amendment 
principle as relevant to the digital realm.496 
In the first case, an accountant, Steve Ganias, provided services 
to a company that the Army hired to maintain a vacant Army fa-
cility in Stratford, Connecticut.497 A confidential informant ad-
vised the Army that evidence of illegal activity was located on 
Ganias’ hard drive. Investigators obtained a warrant to search and 
seize “[a]ll books, records, documents, materials, computer hard-
ware and software and computer associated data relating to the 
business” in question.498 Although Ganias was not a suspect, Ar-
my computer specialists copied all of the information located on 
his hard drives.499 Just over a year later, the Army and the IRS iso-
lated the relevant files but decided to retain the (irrelevant) infor-
mation as well. The government argued that the data had become 
their property. As the government expanded its investigation, it 
began to consider the possibility that Ganias was also involved in 
illegal activity. Three years after having copied the hard drive, the 
IRS, suspecting Ganias of lying on his taxes, obtained another 
warrant to search the data. Convicted of tax evasion, Ganias un-
successfully moved to suppress this evidence.500 
																																																																																																																						
 495. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). 
 496. See, e.g., United States v. Sedaghaty, 728 F.3d 885, 910–13 (9th Cir. 2013) 
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 497. Ganias, 755 F.3d at 128. 
 498. Warrant application, U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut, 
Nov. 17, 2003. 
 499. Ganias, 755 F.3d at 135. 
 500. United States v. Ganias, No. 3:08 Cr. 224, 2011 WL 2532396 (D.Conn. June 
24, 2011). 
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On appeal, the Second Circuit vacated Ganias’s conviction on 
Fourth Amendment grounds. The Court noted that “[l]ike 18th 
Century ‘papers,’ computer files may contain intimate details re-
garding an individual’s thoughts, beliefs, and lifestyle, and they 
should be similarly guarded against unwarranted Government 
intrusion.”501 Off-site review, while necessary, must still be subject 
to the rule of reasonableness. But the same reasons that make off-
site review necessary (for example, storage capacity of media, dif-
ficulties created by encryption, and computer lab workload), do 
not “provide an ‘independent basis’ for retaining any electronic 
data” beyond that specified in the initial warrant.502 
In June 2014, the Supreme Court issued an opinion in another 
case that similarly supports a Fourth Amendment use restriction 
on lawfully obtained information. In Riley v. California, 503  the 
Court held that law enforcement may not, without a warrant, 
search information on a cell phone that had been seized from an 
individual at the time of arrest. Police officers, scrolling through 
the suspect’s address book, had found letters indicating gang 
membership next to a number of names. Further examination of 
the mobile device revealed photographs and videos tying the 
suspect to gang activity. The government subsequently intro-
duced this information as evidence in connection with a shooting. 
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court held that the 
search of digital data in the course of arrest fell outside the war-
rant exception.504 While the police could seize the telephone, they 
could not simply scroll through the information without first ob-
taining a warrant.505 
While the case derives from criminal law and not foreign intel-
ligence law, it is significant for analysis of Section 702 because it 
																																																																																																																						
 501. Ganias, 755 F.3d at 21. 
 502. Id. at 25 (citing United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 
1162, 1171 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc)). 
 503. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). 
 504. Id. 
 505. The Court was careful to note that exceptions to this might exist under the 
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circumstances exception requires a court to examine whether an emergency justi-
fied a warrantless search in each particular case.” Id. 
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recognized a privacy interest in the digital data (a privacy interest 
protected by the Fourth Amendment), and a distinction between 
search of such information and the seizure of the data in the first 
place. A critical question, of course, is whether the activity in 
question, undertaken consistent with Section 702, amounts to a 
search in the first place. In Riley, the Court reserved whether 
“the collection or inspection of aggregated digital information 
amounts to a search under other circumstances.” 506  Setting 
aside for the moment arguments about whether the collection 
of certain types of information qualifies as a search, it is diffi-
cult to deny that the query of a database comprised of non-
publicly-available information (obtained without the targets’ 
consent), to try to find evidence of criminal activity, constitutes 
a search in the most basic sense of the term. Even though the 
government might have legally obtained the information at the 
front end, it could not search the information for evidence of crim-
inal activity absent a warrant, supported by probable cause. 
2. Database Construction 
There are a number of cases related to identification of individ-
uals arrested for felonies, in which Fourth Amendment challenges 
to the search and seizure, and retention of information in data-
bases that can subsequently be searched without a warrant, have 
failed.507 In Maryland v. King, for instance, the Supreme Court as-
certained that when law enforcement performs a felony arrest, 
supported by probable cause, obtaining DNA material is reasona-
ble for Fourth Amendment purposes.508 For the Court, detainees 
have “a reduced expectation of privacy.”509 
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There are two problems with drawing parallels between the 
DNA database cases and NSA use of Section 702 to cache and 
subsequently search communications. 
First, it is to the individual whose information is being collect-
ed—not to the purpose of the collection—that the Court gives pri-
ority. Suspects in felony cases and convicted criminals obtain a 
lower level of protection than others. This is the same rationale 
under which, in part, the Court found the exception for search 
incident to arrest to be acceptable: it is not just the context of a 
volatile arrest, but also “an arrestee’s reduced privacy interests 
upon being taken into police custody.”510 The Supreme Court has 
repeatedly embraced Judge Cardozo’s account of the historical 
underpinnings for the exception: “Search of the person becomes 
lawful when grounds for arrest and accusation have been discov-
ered, and the law is in the act of subjecting the body of the ac-
cused to its physical dominion.”511 
Allowing for a similar search of U.S. persons’ international 
communications treats them as though they have a reduced ex-
pectation of privacy, despite the fact that they have not been sus-
pected of any wrongdoing. All individuals’ communications may 
be monitored and intercepted, not just those with a lowered ex-
pectation of privacy related to suspicion of criminal activity. 
Second, the use to which the information is being put matters. 
In the context of DNA collection, further search of the data can 
only be done to identify an individual, not to mine the infor-
mation for further knowledge (for example, to determine rela-
tives, look for genetic predispositions, etc.). 
In King, the Court distinguished the DNA database search from 
“programmatic searches of either the public at large or a particu-
lar class of regulated but otherwise law-abiding citizens,” which 
fell within the “special needs” category.512  Such special needs 
searches relate to police stopping a motorist at a checkpoint,513 or 
testing a political candidate for drug use.514 In each case, the Court 
insists on something more than merely detecting evidence of or-
																																																																																																																						
 510. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2488 (2014) (Alito, J., concurring). 
 511. 414 U.S. at 232 (quoting People v. Chiagles, 237 N.Y. 193, 197, 142 N.E. 583, 
584 (1923)). 
 512. Id.; see, e.g., Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 314 (1997). 
 513. See, e.g., Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000). 
 514. See Chandler, 520 U.S. at 308. 
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dinary criminal wrongdoing to justify such searches in the ab-
sence of individualized suspicion.515 In none of these cases is the 
information then fed into a giant database for future use. 
3. Use of Data as Fourth Amendment Consideration 
Nearly twenty years ago, Professor Harold Krent proposed a 
use restriction for Fourth Amendment doctrine.516 His thesis was 
that the reasonableness of the seizure extends beyond the im-
mediate acquisition of the information to the use subsequently 
made of the data so obtained.517 He argued that control over pri-
vate information did not cease upon others’ access to the data.518 
Reasonableness is not to be determined merely at one point in 
time, but at any time law enforcement authorities seek to make 
use of the property and information thus obtained. Use re-
strictions naturally follow. 
Professor Orin Kerr questioned the practicality of Krent’s ar-
gument under Supreme Court jurisprudence.519 Specifically, he 
suggested that because third-party record collection constitutes 
neither a search nor a seizure, the doctrine would have to be radi-
cally overhauled to make all collection of data a seizure to then 
trigger a reasonableness analysis.520 
Kerr’s analysis predated the Court’s recent movement with 
regard to third party data. In United States v. Jones, a shadow ma-
jority on the Court recognized a privacy interest in bulk collec-
tion and programmatic surveillance, despite the information be-
ing obtained from third parties.521 Justice Sotomayor explained 
in her concurrence: 
[I]t may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an indi-
vidual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in infor-
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Amendment, 74 TEX. L. REV. 49 (1995). 
 517. Id. at 51. 
 518. Id. at 51–52. 
 519. Orin S. Kerr, Use Restrictions and the Future of Surveillance Law, The Future of 
the Constitution, BROOKINGS, 1, 9 (Apr. 19, 2011), available at http://www. 
brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2011/4/19%20surveillance%20laws 
%20kerr/0419_surveillance_law_kerr.pdf [http://perma.cc/E9HN-X2RS]. 
 520. Id. at 10. 
 521. United States v. Jones, 615 F.3d 544 (2012). For detailed discussion of United 
States v. Jones in this context, see Donohue, supra note 33. 
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mation voluntarily disclosed to third parties. [] This ap-
proach is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal 
a great deal of information about themselves to third parties 
in the course of carrying out mundane tasks. . . . I would not 
assume that all information voluntarily disclosed to some 
member of the public for a limited purpose is, for that rea-
son alone, disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection.522 
Sotomayor’s words suggest that a use restriction may be rele-
vant to Fourth Amendment analysis. A “limited purpose” for ob-
taining the information may cabin the use to which the data may 
then be put. 
Justice Sotomayor’s reasoning challenges the third party 
Athena that sprung from the Supreme Court in the 1970s. In 
United States v. Miller, the government subpoenaed bank records 
to convict Mitch Miller of running an illegal whiskey distillery523 
In a 7-2 decision, the Supreme Court determined that the de-
fendant lacked a privacy interest in banking records.524 Soon 
thereafter, in Smith v. Maryland, the Court found that a pen regis-
ter placed on a suspect’s telephone line did not implicate the 
Fourth Amendment.525 
In Riley, the Court expressed a healthy skepticism towards a 
doctrine developed in the 1970s. It noted that modern cell phone 
technologies did not even exist in the 1990s; indeed, it found the 
term “cell phone” to be misleading: “They could just as easily be 
called cameras, video players, rolodexes, calendars, tape record-
ers, libraries, diaries, albums, televisions, maps, or newspa-
pers.”526 Their capacity dwarfs what one might previously have 
been able to transport, with a typical smart phone, at a capacity of 
16 gigabytes, able to hold “millions of pages of text, thousands of 
pictures, or hundreds of videos.”527 The Court noted that these 
observations did not even begin to take into account cloud com-
puting. For the Court, it is a new world. To the extent that search 
																																																																																																																						
 522. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 523. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
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 525. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
 526. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489 (2014). 
 527. Id. 
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might implicate “the privacies of life,”528 the government must 
meet a higher standard. 
4. Notice and Section 702-derived Evidence 
The FAA authorizes the government to use Section 702-
obtained material for criminal prosecution, provided that the 
Attorney General provides advance authorization and that 
proper notice is given to the court or governmental entity in-
volved as well as to individuals against whom the information 
will be used.529 The obligation applies (1) “[w]henever the gov-
ernment intends to enter into evidence or otherwise use or dis-
close” (2) “in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before 
any court, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, or other 
authority of the United States,” (3) “against an aggrieved per-
son” (4) “any information obtained or derived from” (5) an 
“electronic surveillance [or physical search] of that aggrieved 
person.”530 The government is required, prior to legal proceed-
ings, to notify the aggrieved person and the court (or other au-
thority), that information is to be disclosed or used.531 The de-
fendant may challenge the use of the information on the 
grounds that it was unlawfully obtained, or that it was not ac-
quired consistent with an order of authorization or approval.532 
It is not clear that the government is abiding by the requirement 
that it reveal to defendants that information acquired under the 
FAA is being used in prosecution. This in turn demonstrates the 
importance of inserting judicial review into the process immedi-
ately once the inquiry turns criminal in nature. 
																																																																																																																						
 528. Id. at 2495. 
 529. The FAA accomplishes this by folding the use of information obtained un-
der Section 702 into the requirements for using information acquired via tradi-
tional FISA in criminal trials. Information obtained under Section 702 is “deemed 
to be” information acquired via Title I of FISA for purposes related to the applica-
bility of the notice requirement and the suppression and discovery provisions 
contained in traditional FISA. 50 U.S.C. § 1881e(a) (2012). 
 530. Id. § 1806(c). 
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 532. Id. § 1806 (f).  
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a. Criminal Law Standard 
As a matter of criminal law, Title III does not forbid the inter-
ception of incidental or “nonpertinent” communications. Instead, 
the statute “requires that measures be adopted to reduce the ex-
tent of such interception to a practical minimum while allowing 
the legitimate aims of the [g]overnment to be pursued.”533 The 
government must minimize its interception of conversations that 
do not implicate predicate offenses.534 The order may not author-
ize interception “for any period longer than is necessary to 
achieve the objective of the authorization,” with an outside win-
dow of thirty days.535 Courts keep a close eye on law enforcement 
to ensure that these steps are being followed.536 
Even with these precautions, at times information relating to 
other criminal activity is intercepted. If the communications 
relate to offenses not specified in the original order, the extent 
to which information may be used is governed by statute.537 
The contents of incidental communications, and any evidence 
derived from them, may be disclosed in subsequent proceed-
ings only after further authorization or approval by a judge, 
with the application having been made “as soon as practica-
ble,” and the judge having determined that the contents were 
obtained consistent with the statute.538 
The law specifies neither the precise form of an application, nor 
the exact procedures that need to be followed by the judiciary in 
granting or denying the application.539 Courts look to the legisla-
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 534. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (2012). 
 535. Id. 
 536. See, e.g., Dennis K. Berman, The Galleon Legacy: White-Collar Wiretaps, WALL 
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tive history of the statute for the appropriate standard, requiring 
that the subsequent application “include a showing that the origi-
nal order was lawfully obtained, that it was sought in good faith 
and not as a subterfuge search, and that the communication was 
in fact incidentally intercepted during the course of a lawfully ex-
ecuted order.”540 
The purpose behind requiring law enforcement to return to a 
court is to ensure that the executive branch does not evade the 
restrictions placed upon applications for original wiretap orders, 
such as the belief that the target is involved in the commission of a 
serious offense.541 For incidental information to be admitted at 
trial, all of the statutorily required conditions for the intercept 
have to be present at the time of the original application for the 
wiretap order. 542  Absent such requirements, law enforcement 
could otherwise conduct a “subterfuge search,” wherein the ap-
plication appears to relate to a particular crime, but the applicant 
anticipates intercepting evidence of different crimes for which the 
prerequisites could not otherwise be satisfied.543 It was to prevent 
such searches that Congress inserted the requirement that law 
enforcement return to a magistrate.544 This was the compromise 
struck between protecting the Fourth Amendment right to priva-
cy and the inadvertent discovery of criminal activity.545 
Congress and the courts frown on the deliberate interception of 
incidental information. What law enforcement may not do is 
begin collecting U.S. citizens’ communications generally, looking 
for any information that might be relevant to the target of their 
investigation. This would be an absurd interpretation of criminal 
law and roundly rejected by the judicial system. Instead, for every 
piece of information sought, such as records held by others, law 
																																																																																																																						
 540. S. REP . NO. 90-1097, at 2189 (1968). 
 541. See United States v. Arnold, 773 F.2d 823, 829 (7th Cir. 1985); United States 
v. Marion, 535 F.2d 697, 700–01 (2d Cir. 1976); Morse, supra note 537, at § 9. 
 542. Arnold, 773 F.2d 829. 
 543. Morse, supra note 537, at § 9. See also United States v. Smith , 726 F.2d 852, 
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enforcement must demonstrate that the information is relevant to 
the target or specific investigation underway. 
b. Notice Under the FAA: Theory and Practice 
Information obtained under traditional FISA may be used in 
criminal prosecution. But acquisition of communications under 
Section 702 includes none of the procedural protections that mark 
Title III or traditional FISA.546 At no point in the process is any-
thing approximating a warrant obtained. The statute allows the 
intercepts to be used to prosecute crimes unrelated to the offense 
for which information was being sought. At no point must an ap-
plication seek judicial approval for the use of electronic intercept 
information relating to “other offenses.”547 
Under the FAA, the government is required to provide no-
tice to “aggrieved persons” that information obtained from 
Section 702 is to be used prior to trial.548 Accordingly, in 2012 
the Obama Administration informed the Supreme Court that 
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this was DOJ’s practice.549 In Clapper v. Amnesty International, 
Justice Samuel Alito relied in part on this claim to support the 
Court’s holding.550 
The question was whether plaintiffs had standing to challenge 
the constitutionality of Section 702. The Court underscored that 
other protections were in place: “[I]f the Government intends to 
use or disclose information obtained or derived from a [Section 
702] acquisition in judicial or administrative proceedings, it must 
approve advance notice of its intent, and the affected person may 
challenge the lawfulness of the acquisition.”551 While this position 
was consistent with the statutory requirement, it did not reflect 
DOJ’s actual practice. In December 2012, during FAA renewal 
debates, Senator Diane Feinstein credited the statute with provid-
ing information material to the prosecution of domestic terrorism 
cases. 552 She cited one hundred arrests between 2009 and 2012.553 
Feinstein went on to discuss cases related to charges of material 
support, use of weapons of mass destruction, and bombing and 
assassination plots.554 Lawyers in two of the cases mentioned re-
sponded by asking prosecutors to confirm whether information 
obtained under the FAA had been used.555 On May 21, 2013, 
months after the arguments in Clapper, prosecutors in Fort 
Lauderdale filed a document with the courts saying that they 
were under no obligation to disclose whether evidence used 
against defendants was derived from data authorized by Section 
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 555. Eric Schmitt et al., Administration Says Mining of Data is Crucial to Fight Ter-
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702.556 According to the government, such notification would be 
“unwarranted and unprecedented.”557 
Solicitor General Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. questioned national se-
curity lawyers as to why he had not been informed of this policy 
prior to his submission of briefs to the Supreme Court or his 
preparation for oral argument in Clapper.558 He was reportedly 
informed that it had been a misunderstanding, stemming from a 
narrow definition of what “derived from” meant. 559  In other 
words, a distinction could be drawn between information ob-
tained, versus derived, from Section 702. The former equates to 
actual acquisitions, while the latter may be a product of subse-
quent searches of the data and further analysis. 
A two-month debate within DOJ ensued as to whether prosecu-
tors were required to provide information to defendants regard-
ing information derived from Section 702.560 Ultimately, the gov-
ernment changed its position to align with Verrelli’s 
representation. In July 2013, DOJ filed a document with the Court 
saying, in a footnote, that while their prior filing in the Florida 
case might have been “construed to assert” that they did not need 
to disclose when such evidence had been used, “that is not the 
government’s position.”561 
Dispute about the use of FAA-derived information in criminal 
cases continues. In October 2013, the ACLU filed a FOIA-related 
complaint in the Southern District of New York, seeking “records 
related to the government’s use of evidence derived from surveil-
lance authorized by” the FAA.562 In light of settlement negotia-
tions, Judge Robert W. Sweet held the case in abeyance.563 And in 
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a May 2014 letter to Verrilli, Senators Mark Udall of Colorado and 
Ron Wyden of Oregon accused DOJ as not being forthright about 
its misrepresentation to the Court in Clapper.564 The government 
has not yet responded. 
In the six months following DOJ’s shift in policy, the govern-
ment submitted Section 702 notices in just three cases. 565 Two of 
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TIMES, May 13, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/14/us/justice-dept-
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 565. In the first case, involving charges of material support, U.S. Attorney Loret-
ta Lynch informed the defendant that the government had used information from 
Section 702 to obtain an order under traditional FISA. Letter from Loretta E. 
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2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/26/us/justice-dept-informs-inmate-of-pre-
arrest-surveillance.html [http://perma.cc/7ZE6-9FHW]. 
 The second case involved a nineteen-year-old, Somali-born student at Oregon 
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tion. See United States v. Mohamud, 941 F. Supp. 2d 1303 (D. Or. 2013); see also 
Indictment, United States v. Mohamud, No. 3:10-CR-00475-KI (D. Or. Nov. 29, 
2010), Docket No. 2. In 2009 the FBI intercepted Mohamud’s emails with an indi-
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Says Oregon Suspect Planned ‘Grand’ Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2010, 
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00475-KI (D. Or. Nov. 19, 2013), Docket No. 486. The government acknowledged 
that the notice had been untimely. Government Discovery Opposition Brief at 9 
n.5, 12, United States v. Mohamud, No. 3:10-CR-00475-KI (D. Or. Feb. 13, 2014), 
Docket No. 491. Efforts to challenge the use of Section 702 evidence on Fourth 
Amendment grounds failed. Opinion and Order, United States v. Mohamud, No. 
3:10-CR-00475-KI (D. Or. Mar. 19, 2014), Docket No. 499. 
 The third case involved notification to Jamshid Muhtorov, whose case had not yet 
gone to trial—to date, the only case in which the government has provided prior no-
tice of Section 702-derived information. Muhtorov was arrested at O’Hare airport on 
his way to Turkey on January 21, 2012. Complaint, United States v. Muhtorov, No. 
1:12-cr-00033-JLK (D. Colo. Jan 19, 2012), Docket No. 1; Indictment, United States v. 
Muhtorov. No. 1:12-cr-00033-JLK (D. Colo. Jan. 23, 2012), Docket No. 5. In October 
2013, the government filed a Section 702 notice. FISA Notice, United States v. Muhto-
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the cases were already post-conviction. The failure to provide pri-
or notice meant that defendants had not had the opportunity to 
challenge the FAA as unconstitutional either on its face or as ap-
plied. They had been unable to address whether the surveillance 
evidence tainted pretrial motions or defenses at trial, or whether 
the government had engaged in overreaching, misrepresentation, 
or misconduct during either pre-trial or trial proceedings. These 
cases are the only ones, as of the time of writing, to involve Sec-
tion 702 notice. Even the two cases discussed by Feinstein, which 
spurred the debate, did not later result in notice being served.566 
At a minimum, government practice appears to be conservative 
in informing defendants of the use of Section 702 information.567 
To the extent that, as a result of Clapper, only those so notified 
may have standing to challenge the constitutionality of Section 
702, the pool of potential challengers to the FAA is limited. This 
underscores the importance of inserting judicial supervision into 
the procedure earlier in the process to protect important Fourth 
Amendment considerations. 
D. Reasonableness Standard 
Courts have routinely recognized that regardless of whether 
the warrant clause applies, the domestic interception of electronic 
communications, and the international collection of communica-
tions involving individuals with a substantial connection to the 
United States, must still comport with the Fourth Amendment’s 
																																																																																																																						
rov, No. 1:12-cr-00033-JLK (D. Colo. Oct. 25, 2013), Docket No. 457. The defendant’s 
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 566. Prosecutors submitted documents to the court saying that they did not plan 
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domestic terrorism arrests. 158 CONG. REC. S8384-02 (daily ed. Dec. 27, 2012) 
(statement of Sen. Feinstein). However, only one person who had yet to go to trial 
had, between July 2013 and June 2014, received a Section 702 notice. 
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reasonableness requirement.568 The NSA’s use of “about” collec-
tion, and the interception of domestic conversations in MCTs, fall 
outside constitutionally acceptable bounds. 
As a matter of domestic criminal law, in determining whether a 
search is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the Court 
looks to the totality of the circumstances.569 This test amounts to a 
balancing test of the interests at stake.570 It considers the nature of 
the government intrusion into privacy.571 By looking at the man-
ner in which the search is implemented, and weighing it against 
individual interests involved, the Court ascertains whether the 
action in question is reasonable. The greater the government in-
terest that is involved, the greater the intrusion that may be per-
mitted, as long as the privacy protections are sufficient in light of 
the stated governmental interest.572 
In relation to searches conducted abroad, three circuit courts 
have considered how best to think about the reasonableness 
standard, creating in the process two different approaches. For the 
Ninth Circuit, the court looks to whether, in joint investigations 
conducted overseas, U.S. officials act in accordance with foreign 
law.573 In 1987, then Judge (and now Justice) Kennedy explained 
that the exclusionary rule applies only where U.S. officials fail to 
act in good faith reliance on foreign law.574 This approach has 
been adopted with regard to physical searches and wiretaps con-
ducted overseas.575 
Under the Ninth Circuit approach, constitutional rights de-
pend in some form on foreign legal systems and relevant laws. 
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Although this seems odd at the outside, it reflects Justice Kenne-
dy’s practical approach to the Fourth Amendment: for joint op-
erations, it would be hard to proceed in a manner that constantly 
second-guesses the law of the jurisdiction in which the United 
States is operating. 
The problem with applying the Ninth Circuit approach to the 
FAA is that in its global intercepts, the intelligence community is 
not operating solely according to one set of laws. Upstream col-
lection may include the interception of packets that pass through 
dozens of different countries. It would be impossible to apply 
each law’s contours as even one packet moves over the net-
work—much less as all the packets that constitute a communica-
tion, or tens of thousands of communications. Even taking into 
account the Five Eyes, such operations could not properly be 
understood as joint operations of the sort considered by the 
Ninth Circuit in Barona. 
Perhaps because of these difficulties, the FISA Court of Review 
has looked to the second approach—one that has been adopted 
only recently—and applied the balancing test to the international 
environment. In 2008 the Second Circuit became the first to em-
ploy the balancing test. In In re Terrorist bombings of U.S. Embassies 
in East Africa, the Court employed a reasonableness analysis that 
weighed governmental interests against the privacy intrusion in-
volved.576 In 2013 the Seventh Circuit largely followed course.577 
This is the test to which the FISA Court of Review has appealed 
in considering the reasonableness of intercepts overseas. An im-
portant point to note at the outset, though, is the trouble with ap-
plying a criminal law approach to the foreign intelligence realm. 
The overwhelming nature of U.S. national security interests—
which FISC considers “of the highest order of magnitude”578 cre-
ate a heavy burden to be overcome. National security, in other 
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 577. United States v. Stokes, 726 F.3d 880 (7th Cir. 2013). Although Professor 
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words, is a powerful trump card. As soon as a foreign intelligence 
purpose is introduced, the standards for reasonableness shift. 
While the targeting procedures and the interception of infor-
mation to or from non-U.S. persons located outside the United 
States meet the Fourth Amendment’s standard of reasonableness, 
when looked at in relation to Section 702, the inclusion of com-
munications “about” targets or selectors and the knowing inter-
ception of entirely domestic conversations shift the program out-
side constitutional bounds. 
1. Criminal Law Versus National Security Law 
In In re Sealed case, in which the FISA Court of Review held that 
traditional FISA did not require the government to demonstrate 
that the primary purpose of electronic surveillance was not crimi-
nal prosecution, and that the shift in language to a “significant 
purpose” was consistent with the Fourth Amendment, the Court 
drew attention to six categories to flesh out whether the protec-
tions afforded to targets are reasonable: prior judicial review, the 
presence (or absence) of probable cause, particularity, necessity, 
duration, and minimization.579 
Six years later, the FISA Court of Review, responding to a tele-
communication service provider’s challenge to the PAA, was 
careful to note that the test from In re Sealed Case should not be 
treated as a rigid framework on the grounds that it would contra-
dict the “totality of the circumstances test”.580 
The test derives from criminal law, in the context of which the 
Supreme Court, like the FISA Court of Review, has enumerated 
factors that must be taken into account to determine whether the 
procedures followed in minimization are reasonable. In Scott v. 
United States, the Court considered the month-long surveillance of 
a telephone used in a narcotics conspiracy, in the course of which 
only some 40% of the conversations were related to the crime in 
question. 581  In finding the minimization procedures (or lack 
thereof) reasonable, the Court explained, 
[B]lind reliance on the percentage of nonpertinent calls inter-
cepted is not a sure guide to the correct answer. Such percent-
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 580. In re Directives, 551 F.3d at 1012–13. 
 581. Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128 (1978). 
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ages may provide assistance, but there are surely cases, such as 
the one at bar, where the percentage of nonpertinent calls is rel-
atively high and yet their interception was still reasonable. The 
reasons for this may be many. Many of the nonpertinent calls 
may have been very short. Others may have been one-time on-
ly calls. Still other calls may have been ambiguous in nature or 
apparently involved guarded or coded language. In all these 
circumstances agents can hardly be expected to know that the 
calls are not pertinent prior to their termination.582 
The Court’s position is worth considering at length: 
In determining whether the agents properly minimized, it is 
also important to consider the circumstances of the wiretap. 
For example, when the investigation is focusing on what is 
thought to be a widespread conspiracy more extensive sur-
veillance may be justified in an attempt to determine the 
precise scope of the enterprise. And it is possible that many 
more of the conversations will be permissibly interceptable 
because they will involve one or more of the co-conspirators. 
The type of use to which the telephone is normally put may 
also have some bearing on the extent of minimization re-
quired. For example, if the agents are permitted to tap a 
public telephone because one individual is thought to be 
placing bets over the phone, substantial doubts as to mini-
mization may arise if the agents listen to every call which 
goes out over that phone regardless of who places the call. 
On the other hand, if the phone is located in the residence of 
a person who is thought to be the head of a major drug ring, 
a contrary conclusion may be indicated.583 
The Court noted that other factors may play a significant role, 
such as the point at which law enforcement intercepted the com-
munications. During the initial phase of surveillance, officers may 
be expected to collect more information than at the later stages, by 
which point categories of nonpertinent communications will have 
been established and identification of nonpertinent discussions 
more efficiently made. The Court contemplated a learning curve 
for law enforcement, where the standards applied may shift based 
on the evolution and maturity of the electronic surveillance.584 
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In Scott, most of the nonpertinent calls were either “very 
short,” “ambiguous in nature,” or one-time conversations. 585 
Therefore they did not amount to a violation of the minimization 
requirement. The subjective intent of law enforcement in Scott 
was of little consequence. Even though, as the district court had 
found, the officers had made “no attempt to comply” with the 
statutory requirement, the Supreme Court looked to the broader 
context. Resultantly, courts have considered similar charges on a 
case-by-case basis.586 
In translating the totality of the circumstances test to national 
security law, the unique nature of foreign intelligence gathering 
matters. As the FISA Court of Review explained in In Re Sealed 
Case, “[g]iven the targets of FISA surveillance, it will often be the 
case that intercepted communications will be in code or a for-
eign language for which there is no contemporaneously availa-
ble translator, and the activities of foreign agents will involve 
multiple actors and complex plots.”587 Therefore, it is common 
practice in FISA surveillance to leave devices on, with the em-
phasis on minimization occurring at the back end, in the process 
of indexing and logging the relevant communications.588 For the 
FISA Court of Review, the possibility that the government 
might, in this process, make a mistake, was not sufficient to in-
validate the surveillance in question.589 
In defense of its practices with regard to the PAA, the gov-
ernment emphasized the protections embedded in the statute, as 
well as those incorporated in the certifications and directives.590 
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FISCR accepted the government’s position. 591  Arguments re-
garding particularity and prior judicial review fell short in light 
of how the PAA had been applied. While the statute did not re-
quire a particularized showing, the “pre-surveillance procedure” 
(which remains classified) established steps “analogous to and 
in conformity with the particularity showing” considered by 
FISCR in In re Sealed Case.592 
The particularity requirement contemplated by the FISA 
Court of Review in In re Sealed Case related to the probable cause 
standards in traditional FISA.593  Applied to the PAA, FISCR 
found in In re Directives that the procedures incorporated via Ex-
ecutive Order 12,333, Section 2.5, as applied via certifications 
and directives, offset the probable cause concern. That section 
states, in pertinent part, that the Attorney General is given the 
authority to approve any techniques within the United States or 
against a U.S. person overseas, where “a warrant would be re-
quired if undertaken for law enforcement purposes, provided 
that such techniques shall not be undertaken unless the Attorney 
General has determined in each case that there is probable cause to 
believe that the technique is directed against a foreign power or 
an agent of a foreign power.”594 
What this requirement means is that for the intelligence 
community to act upon a certification, the Attorney General 
first has to establish probable cause that the U.S. person being 
targeted is a foreign power or an agent thereof.595 Combined 
with other protections, such as minimization, the procedures 
offered sufficient compensation for any encroachments into 
individual privacy, bringing the PAA within the bounds of the 
Fourth Amendment.596 
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This analysis makes sense in light of the Court’s Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence and the manner in which traditional 
FISA has operated. Where the target is a U.S. person based over-
seas, or within the United States, the Attorney General (under the 
PAA), or the FISA Court of Review (under the FAA) must verify 
probable cause of wrongdoing prior to the interception of com-
munications to or from the target. 
In October 2011 Judge John Bates considered the reasonable-
ness of the NSA’s targeting and minimization procedures. The 
court had previously found the targeting and minimization pro-
cedures to be constitutionally sufficient on the grounds that the 
procedures reasonably confined acquisitions to targets who were 
non-U.S. persons located outside the United States and thus out-
side the protections of the Fourth Amendment.597 In October 2011 
Bates concluded that, to the extent that the targeting procedures, 
as applied to the acquisition of information other than Internet 
transactions (meaning, telephone and Internet communications) 
still reflected the Court’s previous assumptions, they were con-
sistent with the Fourth Amendment reasonableness requirement. 
The problem, for Judge Bates, was the interception of Internet 
transactions involving either single discrete communication (Sin-
gle Communication Transactions, or SCTs) or multiple discrete 
communications (Multi-Communication Transactions, or 
MCTs). 598  Here, Fourth Amendment reasonableness questions 
loomed large. The reason these communications changed the pic-
ture is because they allowed for the collection of wholly domestic 
conversations, as well as communications between U.S. persons. 
As a matter of statutory interpretation, the only way in which 
such conversations could be intercepted is by interpreting the 
statute to include not just communications to or from a target, but 
also communications about the target or selector. 
2. Incidental Interception 
In its October 2011 opinion, FISC confronted the fact that the 
number of wholly domestic communications being intercepted 
was much higher than the Court had previously understood.599 
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The FISA Court of Review explained, “NSA’s upstream collection 
devices will acquire a wholly domestic ‘about’ SCT if it is routed 
internationally.”600 The interception of incidental information cre-
ated constitutional concerns.601 
Judge Bates underscored the importance of evaluating the gov-
ernment’s targeting and minimization procedures in light of the 
communications actually acquired.602 The problem was that the 
sheer volume of information obtained by the NSA via upstream 
collection made it difficult, as Judge Bates explained, to conduct 
“any meaningful review of the entire body of the transactions . . . 
.”603 Only a statistical sampling was possible. ISPs might change 
their services, giving users greater latitude in customizing ser-
vices. “As a result, it is impossible to define with any specificity 
the universe of transactions that will be acquired by NSA’s up-
stream collection at any point in the future.”604 
Actual practice also figured large in FISC’s approach to inci-
dental information in In re Directives: 
The petitioner’s concern with incidental collections is over-
blown. It is settled beyond peradventure that incidental col-
lections occurring as a result of constitutionally permissible 
acquisitions do not render those acquisitions unlawful. The 
government assures us that it does not maintain a database of inci-
dentally collected information from non-targeted United States per-
sons, and there is no evidence to the contrary. On these facts, 
incidentally collected communications of non-targeted United 
States persons do not violate the Fourth Amendment.605 
The problem with the FISA Court of Review’s analysis is that, 
regardless of whether one database exists that is dedicated to in-
cidentally collected information, it is of little moment if the NSA 
can feed information incidentally collected under Section 702 into 
other databases. Section 702 data appears to be stored in multiple 
places.606 Information is also forwarded to other agencies, such as 
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the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), at which point it is 
no longer associated with the specific authority under which it 
was collected.607 For datasets acquired pursuant to Track 3 (where 
the agency replicates the data sets obtained from other agencies), 
“NCTC may conduct (i) queries that do not consist of, or do not 
consist exclusively of, terrorism data points, and (ii) pattern-based 
queries and analyses.”608 
Although Judge Bates concluded in October 2011 that the 2009 
minimization procedures did not pass constitutional muster, the 
following month he approved new procedures as consistent with 
the Fourth Amendment.609 Insofar as “about” communications are 
monitored, retained, and mined for further information, and en-
tirely domestic conversations captured and used in subsequent 
criminal prosecution, the procedures do not comport with consti-
tutional requirements. 
Returning to the six categories for reasonableness laid out by 
FISA Court of Review, there is no prior judicial review approv-
ing the targeting of individuals whose communications are being 
intercepted.610 There is neither the presence (nor absence) of prob-
able cause—indeed, there is no standard applied (collection under 
																																																																																																																						
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/09/nsa-loophole-warrantless-
searches-email-calls [http://perma.cc/B5FN-SEGN] (containing screen shot of clas-
sified document). See also James Risen & Laura Poitras, N.S.A. Gathers Data on 
Social Connections of U.S. Citizens, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2013, http://www.nytimes. 
com/2013/09/29/us/nsa-examines-social-networks-of-us-citizens.html?pagewanted 
=all&_r=0 [http://perma.cc/RGE7-PQYD]. 
 607. While it is thus important that agencies like NCTC adopt safeguards to 
ensure the integrity of datasets and access to the information contained therein, 
such protections do not reach the front-end collection considerations entailed in 
Section 702 programs. See, e.g., NAT’L COUNTERTERRORISM CTR., ATTORNEY GEN-
ERAL GUIDELINES FOR ACCESS, RETENTION, USE AND DISSEMINATION BY THE NA-
TIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER AND OTHER AGENCIES OF INFORMATION IN 
DATASETS CONTAINING NON-TERRORISM INFORMATION, ANNUAL REPORT ON THE 
ACCESS, RETENTION, USE, AND DISSEMINATION OF UNITED STATES PERSON INFOR-
MATION, available at http://www.nctc.gov/docs/2012-2013_NCTC_AGG_Annual_ 
Report_(redacted).pdf [http://perma.cc/73CR-H9L3]; NAT’L COUNTERTERRORISM 
CTR., OVERVIEW OF THE BASELINE SAFEGUARD PROTECTIONS UNDER NCTC’S 2012 
ATTORNEY GENERAL GUIDELINES, available at http://www.nctc.gov/docs/ 
NCTCWhitePaperOverviewofNCTC2012AGGBaselineSafeguards050114.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/VAJ7-Q4Y2]. 
 608. NAT’L COUNTERTERRORISM CTR., ATTORNEY GENERAL GUIDELINES, supra 
note 607, at 7. 
 609. [Redacted], 2011 WL 10945618 at *1 (FISA Ct. Oct. 3, 2011). 
 610. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 737–41. 
262 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 38 
Section 702 being outside the confines of either Executive Order 
12,333, Section 2.5 or FAA Sections 703–704). There is no particu-
larity involved (the target being another individual, entity, or se-
lector and the collection broad). The argument that targeting and 
minimization procedures satisfy this requirement may hold for to 
or from communications, but neither of these procedures limits 
the universe of communications that could be monitored and in-
tercepted as an aspect of “about” collection in any meaningful 
way. The interception of communications, programmatic in na-
ture, is not required to be of limited duration. And the minimiza-
tion procedures, far from rectifying the problem, require the NSA 
to retain and to pass on information for subsequent criminal pros-
ecution. Even if one follows the direction of the FISA Court of 
Review in In re Directives and looks at these not as strict categories 
to be satisfied but rather,as a general balancing test, that none of 
them are actually satisfied is probative of the constitutionality of 
using incidentally collected information in prosecution. 
In In re Directives, the government pointed to a series of non-
statutory documents: targeting and minimization procedures, an 
internal procedure adopted to ensure that a significant purpose 
of the surveillance is to obtain foreign intelligence information, 
procedures incorporated via Executive Order 12,333, and proce-
dures outlined in an affidavit supporting the certifications.611 But 
the Court’s discussion focused on the targeting of certain cus-
tomers (as applied), under the PAA. It did not address inci-
dentally-obtained information under Section 702 (as derived 
from the to, from, or about interpretation) and its subsequent 
use in criminal prosecution. 
Nor did the Court consider the query of data using U.S. identi-
fier information. As with TFA and incidental collection, this prac-
tice falls outside the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness re-
quirement. At no point has the collection of the information in 
question been subjected to prior judicial review with anything 
even approaching particularity. Instead, one order suffices for 
nearly 90,000 targets on the grounds that some sort of foreign in-
telligence information may be obtained.612 This is then used to 
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monitor U.S. persons’ international communications, some of 
which may be collected, despite the absence of any contact be-
tween the U.S. person and the targets approved by the FISA 
Court of Review. The FBI may then query this data to attempt to 
find evidence of criminality unrelated to foreign affairs. It may 
use U.S. person information to probe the information, without 
any prior judicial oversight or subsequent accountability. Infor-
mation about who can access the database, what they use as a 
query, what information is obtained, and how it is used is not 
even tracked, much less subjected to oversight. This practice falls 
outside acceptable constitutional bounds. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
As a matter of public discourse, much remains unknown 
about how elements of the intelligence community are making 
use of Section 702 authorities.613 What is clear is that there are 
many difficult questions associated with the NSA’s exercise of 
the FAA. This Article has sought to explain the evolution of Sec-
tion 702, to analyze the statutory framework, and to address 
constitutional concerns raised by the legislation and the manner 
in which it has been applied. 
The most concerning aspect of the NSA’s targeting practices 
under the FAA is the inclusion of TFA. Together with generous 
assumptions with regard to foreignness and the vague require-
ments embedded in the foreign intelligence determination, TFA 
has allowed the NSA to collect data beyond what might otherwise 
be considered incidental. Congress may not have anticipated this 
possibility in 2008. But by 2012 the information had been made 
available to any Members inclined to read it. The legislature, 
however, did not take steps to end programmatic collection. Nor 
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did FISC play a strong role with regard to the legality of knowing-
ly collecting entirely domestic conversations. The court’s decision 
encouraged willful blindness: as long as the NSA did not develop 
sophisticated technologies, it could collect more information and 
fit within the statutory bounds. 
Critique of these developments could be read as simply a com-
plaint that the law went the other way. After all, three branches of 
government appear to have given the NSA their blessing: Con-
gress through renewal of the FAA, the FISA Court of Review via 
its approval of certification, targeting, and minimization proce-
dures, and the AG and DNI in their oversight capacities. But the 
burden borne by the government in the realm of national security 
is one that requires the public authorities to be consistent with 
practice. It is concerning that what is being done in practice looks 
very different than what the law says on its face. 
As a matter of post-targeting analysis, despite Congress’s con-
cern about reverse targeting, the intelligence community is using 
U.S. person identifiers to query Section 702 data, potentially ac-
complishing much the same effect in practice. In regard to data 
retention and dissemination, the NSA’s automatic retention of 
encrypted material has strong arguments in its favor. But increas-
ing consumer and industrial reliance on encryption may prove to 
overwhelm the exception, with retention becoming the rule. 
As a constitutional matter, Congress and the Executive share 
foreign affairs powers. Courts acknowledge foreign intelligence 
gathering as a concomitant of this realm, in which separation of 
powers doctrine stands in tension with the Fourth Amendment.614 
The domestic foreign intelligence exception to the warrant re-
quirement ended with Congress’s enactment of FISA. 
One could argue that, following the FAA, the requirements for 
intercepting U.S. persons’ international communications were 
similarly altered. Bypassing Sections 703 and 704 via incidental 
collection absent a warrant procedure could thus be challenged 
on constitutional grounds. The problem with this argument is that 
following the 2012 renewal of the FAA, the Administration acted 
not at its weakest, but at its strongest. 
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The real issue is where foreign intelligence morphs into crimi-
nal law. The best example of practice beyond the pale is in the 
query of Section 702 data using U.S. person information for poten-
tial violations of criminal law. It is the very definition of reasona-
bleness under the Fourth Amendment that when a search is con-
ducted, outside of any exceptions, it must be supported by a war-
warrant granted by a neutral, disinterested magistrate, upon a 
finding of probable cause. 
Even where the warrant clause does not apply, the statute and 
programs introduced under its auspices must meet the reasona-
bleness requirements of the Fourth Amendment, as applied with-
in a domestic realm and to U.S. persons based overseas. The tar-
geting procedures and the interception of information to or from 
non-U.S. persons outside the United States meet the appropriate 
standard. However, the inclusion of “about” targets or selectors, 
and the knowing interception of entirely domestic conversations, 
pushes the NSA’s actions beyond constitutional boundaries. 
Without doubt, technology has altered the balancing equation, 
raising the question of how best to protect the privacy of U.S. 
persons in the context of digitization and international commu-
nication flows. The use of information obtained through national 
security surveillance for law enforcement purposes, though, al-
ters what protections are necessary for Fourth Amendment pur-
poses. What is required is an effort to re-draw the line between 
national security and criminal law, to ensure that foreign intelli-
gence collection can continue in a manner consistent with the 
right to privacy. 
